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Summary 
 
This dissertation deals with the problem of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) and the 
moral responsibility of pregnant women who carry fetuses to term, as well as the rest 
of society, to try and prevent children from suffering from this condition. 
From the perspective of behaviour, most pregnant women who plan to carry a fetus to 
term, act in ways that are conducive to the normal development and welfare of their 
future children. With the intent to deliver a normal, healthy birth baby, a pregnant 
woman will alter her lifestyle accordingly. On the other hand, some pregnant women 
behave in ways that are not conducive to the birth of normal healthy children. 
Drinking during pregnancy is associated with a range of negative pregnancy outcomes 
including spontaneous abortion, breech presentations, fetal growth retardation and 
premature delivery. A range of disorders and disabilities can occur in varying degrees 
in the child exposed to alcohol prenatally. Fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) is the most 
severe diagnosable condition, along a spectrum of disorders, collectively termed fetal 
alcohol spectrum disorders (FASD) that can occur in children who were exposed to 
alcohol prenatally. In the Western world, FAS is a leading preventable cause of 
mental retardation (Hackler 2011).  It is a major public health issue in countries where 
alcohol is widely used. 
There is no cure for FAS. Affected individuals suffer a range of permanent primary 
and secondary disabilities. Surgery can repair some of the physical problems and 
services can be made available to improve mental and physical development so that 
children may lead relatively normal lives, but they remain below average in physical 
and mental development throughout their lives. FAS and its associated social and 
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economic costs can be avoided if a woman abstains from alcohol for the duration of 
her pregnancy.   
This dissertation firstly sets out to establish whether and what moral obligations 
pregnant women who choose to continue their pregnancies (i.e. prospective mothers) 
may have towards their future children. I argue that women choose to continue a 
pregnancy when they have the option of terminating their pregnancies and that they 
are prospective mothers when they do so, to distinguish them from pregnant women 
who choose to terminate their pregnancies. I argue that prospective mothers, even 
those who are alcoholics, have prima facie moral obligations to benefit and not to 
harm their future children and, can be held morally responsible for their actions.  
Having considered a prospective mother’s moral responsibility for drinking during 
pregnancy, I then investigate society’s interest in these issues. I argue that even 
though women have primary responsibility for FAS prevention, that they are not 
solely responsible for it. I offer reasons why punitive approaches are undesirable, and 
propose what I consider to constitute an ethically appropriate social response to 
prevent FAS. Finally, I consider whether children with FAS can and should be 
allowed to sue their mothers for damages under South African law. I argue that even 
though children can theoretically sue their mothers for damages that this too may be 
ineffective at preventing FAS.  
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Opsomming 
 
Hierdie proefskrif handel oor die probleem van Fetale Alkoholsindroom (FAS) en die 
morele verantwoordelikheid van swanger vroue om te probeer verhoed dat hul kinders 
aan hierdie toestand ly. 
Vanuit die perspektief van menslike gedrag tree die meeste swanger vroue wat beoog 
om aan hul fetusse geboorte te skenk op op maniere wat bevorderlik is vir die normale 
ontwikkeling en welstand van hul toekomstige kinders. ‘n Swanger vrou sal haar 
lewenstyl verander met die oog op die totstandkoming van ‘n normale, gesonde baba. 
Aan die ander kant, is dit so dat sommige swanger vroue optree op maniere wat nie 
bevorderlik is vir die geboorte van normale, gesonde kinders nie. 
Alkoholgebruik gedurende swangerskap gaan gepaard met ‘n reeks negatiewe 
swangerskapuitkomste, insluitende spontane aborsie, problematiese verlossings, fetale 
groei belemmeringe en voortydige verlossings. ‘n Reeks van siektetoestande en 
gestremdhede kan, in variërende grade, voorkom in ‘n kind wat prenataal aan alkohol 
blootgestel is. Hierdie reeks van defekte word bestempel as ‘n ernstige openbare 
gesondheidsprobleem waar ook al in die wêreld alkohol vryelik gebruik word. 
FAS is die ernstigste diagnoseerbare toestand van ‘n spektrum van gebreke wat 
kollektief fetale alkohol spektrum gebreke genoem word en wat voorkom kan word in 
kinders wat voorgeboortelik aan alkohol blootgestel is. In die Westerse wêreld is FAS 
‘n toonaangewende, voorkombare oorsaak van verstandelike gestremdheid in kinders. 
Daar is geen kuur vir FAS nie. Geaffekteerde kinders ly aan ‘n reeks permanente 
primêre en sekondêre gestremdhede. Chirurgie kan sekere van die fisiese probleme 
regstel. Sekere dienste wat besikbaar is, kan verstandelike en fisiese probleme 
verbeter sodat hierdie kinders relatief normale lewens kan ly, maar hulle bly 
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lewenslank onder-gemiddeld in hul fisiese en verstandelike ontwikkeling. FAS en die 
sosiale en ekonomiese koste daaraan verbonde kan volledig voorkom word as ‘n 
swanger vrou bloot geen alkohol tydens haar swangerskap gebruik nie. 
In hierdie proefskrif word daar eerstens vasgestel óf, en dien wel, wátter, morele 
verpligtinge swanger vroue (d.i. toekomstige moeders) wat kies om hul 
swangerskappe te kontinueer, teenoor hul toekomstige kinders het. Ek argumenteer 
dat vroue kies om ‘n swangerskap voort te sit wanneer hulle die opsie het (soos in SA) 
om hul swangerskappe te termineer. Wanneer hulle dus kies om nie te termineer nie, 
is hulle toekomstige moeders, in onderskeiding van swanger vroue wat kies om hul 
swangerskappe te beëindig. My argument is dat prospektiewe moeders – selfs 
diesulkes wat alkoholiste is – het  prima facie morele verpligtinge om hul toekomstige 
kinders te bevoordeel en nie skade aan te doen nie. Sodanige vroue kan bepaald 
verantwoordelik gehou word vir hul dade. 
Nadat ek ‘n voornemende moeder se morele verantwoordelikkheid om nie te drink 
tydens swangerskap nie (dus ook haar verantwoordelikheid om FAS te voorkom) 
oorweeg het, ondersoek ek die samelewing se belang by hierdie kwessies. My 
argument is dat selfs al het swanger vroue ‘n primêre verantwoordelikheid vir FAS-
voorkoming, is hulle nie alleen daarvoor verantwoordelik nie. Ek ontwikkel redes 
waarom strafeisende maatreëls teen sodanige vroue onwenslik is, en ek stel voor wat 
ek meen ‘n eties vanpaste sosiale respons is om FAS te voorkom. 
Ten slotte oorweeg ek of kinders met FAS onder Suid-Afrikaanse wetgewing 
toegelaat behoort te word om regsgedinge teen hul moeders aanhanging te maak ten 
einde vergoeding te ontvang. My argument is dat al kan kinders teoreties sulke eise 
teen hul moeders instel, dit waarskynlik oneffektief sal wees met die oog op die 
voorkoming van FAS. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Developments in science and technology, such as contraception, abortion and prenatal 
screening, “have produced unprecedented conditions under which individuals can 
control reproduction” (Ankeny 2007:38). Nowadays pregnancy is largely treated as a 
medical process. Mullins (2005:54) explains that this medicalization of “pregnancy 
involves interpreting pregnancy as a disruption to health that necessarily requires 
expert medical intervention, and thinking of pregnancy as primarily about health and 
illness. Pregnancy is treated as a medical event requiring risk management 
monitoring” (cited in Kukla 2005) and education, both inside and outside of the health 
care setting (Kukla 2005). This is not necessarily a bad thing because medicalization 
has brought with it benefits including the technological means to monitor fetal 
development and acquire knowledge of maternal and fetal risks. At the same time, 
pregnant women are advised and generally “expected to survey and discipline 
virtually all aspects of their bodies and lives” (Kukla 2005), including what they 
consume and what activities to engage in for the sake of ensuring the birth of a normal 
healthy child.  
From the perspective of behaviour, most pregnant women who plan to continue a 
pregnancy, act in ways that are conducive to the normal development and welfare of 
their fetuses. With the intent to deliver a normal healthy baby, a pregnant woman will 
alter her lifestyle accordingly by, for example, abstaining from certain behaviours and 
substances, or, adopting others, and generally following medical advice. On the other 
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hand some pregnant women behave in ways that are not conducive to the birth of 
normal healthy children.  
 
1.1. The Effects and Impact of Drinking During Pregnancy 
 
Although people have, for centuries, hypothesized about alcohol’s potentially 
damaging effects on the fetus and on pregnancy outcomes (Abel 1999), it was not 
until the turn of the 20
th
 century that a specific medical link between prenatal alcohol 
exposure and fetal outcomes was identified (Abel 1990; Armstrong 1998; Streissguth, 
et al. 1980). Drinking during pregnancy has been correlated with an increase in 
spontaneous abortion, fetal growth retardation, premature delivery, abruption 
placentae and breech presentations (DeVille & Kopelman 1998).  
A child who was exposed to alcohol prenatally can suffer a variety of disorders and 
disabilities, in varying degrees. Fetal alcohol spectrum disorder (FASD) is a collective 
term encompassing the various clinical diagnoses that can occur in a child (CDC 
2005). Fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) is the most extreme condition that can occur in a 
child whose mother drinks during pregnancy (CDC 2005; Hoyme, et al. 2005; IOM 
1996). In the Western world FAS is a “leading preventable cause of mental 
retardation” (Abel & Sokol 1986; Maier & West 2001).  
Less severe conditions on the spectrum of disorders are Alcohol-Related Neurological 
Defects (ARND) and Alcohol-Related Birth Defects (ARBD). FAS is a leading 
preventable cause of mental disability (Abel & Sokol 1986; Floyd, et al. 2009), and 
“is a major public health issue in both well and poorly resourced countries where 
alcohol is widely used” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008).   
A child with FAS suffers a range of permanent physical and cognitive disabilities 
(Chudley, et al. 2005; Hoyme, et al. 2005; Mattson, et al. 1997; May, et al. 2009; 
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Sampson, et al. 1997; Stratton, Howe & Battaglia 1996; Streissguth, et al. 2004). The 
child displays central nervous system (CNS) damage; has distinct dysmorphic facial 
features and is significantly below average height and weight or both (Chudley, et al. 
2005; Hoyme, et al. 2005; Mattson, et al. 1997; Streissguth, et. 1994), and has a 
reduced normal chance of leading an independent life. Disabilities in lifestyle and 
daily function are both frequent and debilitating for FASD children, their families and 
society at large (Spohr, et al. 2007; Streissguth, et al. 2004). Additionally, the child’s 
condition may be further impaired by the social circumstances in which he or she is 
raised (Streissguth, et al. 1994).  
The occurrence of FAS has not been determined in all of South Africa’s nine 
provinces and no single national study has been conducted to determine its prevalence 
(Urban, et al. 2015). However, several localised studies found the prevalence of FAS 
to be particularly high (May, et al. 2000; 2007; Urban, et al. 2015; Viljoen, et al. 
2003; 2005). “Internationally the most widely used summary prevalence estimate of 
FAS is 1 to 1.5 cases per 1000 live births” (Pyettfor, et al. 2007). Data from the 
United States indicates “that 1% of newborns fall into the spectrum of fetal alcohol 
disorders” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008). In some communities in South Africa the 
rates have been “estimated to be 18 to 141 times greater than those for the various 
populations in the United States” (Parry & Pluddemann 1998). Surveys involving 
Grade 1 school children in the Northern Cape, Western Cape and Gauteng provinces 
in South Africa found the “prevalence of FAS to be more than 40 cases per 1000 
children in the Western and Northern Cape and more than 20 cases per 1000 children 
in Gauteng” (Rosenthal, Christianson & Cordero 2005). When these figures are read 
alongside the reported rates of drinking during pregnancy and drinking among 
sexually active women of reproductive age who may not be using effective 
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contraception, it paints a picture of a potentially huge public health problem for the 
country.  
The exact fiscal impact of FAS does not appear to have been calculated in South 
Africa. Where the issue is discussed, it seems to be under the general cost of alcohol 
abuse and birth defects to society. “A conservative estimate of the economic costs of 
alcohol abuse based on research studies conducted in other countries is 1% of gross 
domestic product (GDP)” (Freeman & Parry 2006). Between 2000 and 2001, the 
harmful use of alcohol reportedly cost the South African economy approximately nine 
billion rand a year (Parry, Myers & Tiede 2003). More recent cost calculations 
estimate “the combined total tangible and intangible costs of alcohol harm to the 
economy” (Matzopoulos, et al 2014) to be “10 - 12% of the 2009 gross domestic 
product (GDP). The tangible financial cost of harmful alcohol use alone was 
estimated at R37.9 billion, or 1.6% of the 2009 GDP” (Matzopoulos, et al 2014). 
Together with genetic disorders and other birth defects, FAS is estimated to cost the 
state several billions of rand annually (Department of Health 2001). In 1998, FAS was 
estimated to cost the US government approximately four billion dollars (Howard, et 
al. 1998).  
There are a few reasons for thinking that FAS cost estimates for South Africa would 
yield higher results to that of the US. This is largely related to the difference in health 
care system structures and public policy approaches. Other reasons relate to general 
challenges in screening for maternal alcohol use and diagnosing the range of 
conditions that fall on the FASD continuum (British Medical Association 2007). It is 
for example possible that women under-report their drinking behaviour for various 
reasons that have to do with the sensitive nature of questions about alcohol use and 
fear of being stigmatised (Gfroerer, Wright & Kopstein 1997; Mphi 1994; Stockwell, 
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et al. 2004). Moreover because there are different diagnostic systems to screen for 
FASD, medical professionals and facilities may vary in their diagnosis (Aase, Jones & 
Clarren 1995; Astley 2011; Astley 2006). In South Africa where there is a shortage of 
medical professionals and consequently ones who can use validated screening and 
diagnostic tools (Burd 2006), and where other conditions such as HIV/AIDS are 
prioritised, it is possible that many children are not diagnosed or may be 
misdiagnosed. 
There is no cure for FAS. Alcohol’s potentially damaging effects on a fetus and 
consequently the born child are permanent and cause problems that persist throughout 
an affected individual’s life. Surgery can repair some of the physical problems and 
services can be made available to improve mental and physical development so that 
children may lead relatively normal lives, but they remain below average in physical 
and mental development throughout their lives (Streissguth, et al. 1994; 2004).  
 
2. Rationale/Background 
 
2.1. Respect for Autonomy  
Western philosophical traditions and liberal societies place high value on the 
preservation of autonomy and recognise a general duty to respect it and even to 
promote its exercise. There is a general “presumption that individuals should be free 
to do what they wish unless we can justify a limitation” on their autonomy 
(Wertheimer 2002:38-59). Compelling reasons are required to justify restricting the 
power of individuals to make their own choices and direct their own lives.  
The moral philosophies of both Kant (1996 [1797]) and Mill (1859) endorse and 
recognise the value of autonomy, even though neither used the term “autonomy” and 
value autonomy for different reasons. A Kantian account of autonomy is tied to 
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Immanuel Kant’s notion of respect for persons and sees autonomy as having intrinsic 
moral value.  For Kant respect is based on recognising those special qualities that 
distinguish persons from other beings. Persons are thought to have the capacity for 
rationality and the ability to make moral choices. These qualities entail that persons 
have dignity, which in turn, entitles them to respect. According to Kant we respect 
persons when we treat others, “never merely as a means to an end, but always at the 
same time as an end” (Kant 1996 [1797]). Kant calls this maxim the categorical 
imperative: a supreme principle underlying all morality. He expresses this maxim in a 
number of ways: the above is called the “Formula of Humanity”. Expressed as the 
“Formula of the Universal Law”, the maxim instructs us to “act only in accordance 
with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a 
universal law” (Kant 1996, G 421/39). The underlying idea is that one cannot claim a 
moral right to act in a certain way with a particular purpose, unless one would want to 
grant everyone else the right to do the same. Our moral duties must be applicable to 
everyone: one cannot claim special rights to behave in certain ways for oneself alone. 
Kant suggests that the different expressions of this formula lead to the same 
conclusions regarding what our moral duties are. He says that we can use this formula 
to test what our moral duties are.  
Like Kant, Mill also does not specifically talk of autonomy. Rather he uses concepts 
such as “liberty”, “individuality’ and “originality”, which can roughly be construed as 
the freedom to create and live according to one’s own life plan.  Mill endorses 
autonomy because of its instrumental value. For him, a society that fosters respect for 
individual autonomy will be more progressive and happier. Mill’s account of respect 
for autonomy can be derived from his seminal essay, On Liberty, wherein he argues 
against paternalism and proposes the famous “harm principle” as a justification for 
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restricting a person’s freedom of choice and action. Mill offers two maxims that set 
the limits of interference in individual action. “These maxims are, first, that the 
individual is not accountable to society for his actions, in so far as these concern the 
interests of no person but himself. Advice, instruction, persuasion, and avoidance by 
other people if thought necessary by them for their own good, are the only measures 
by which society can justifiably express its dislike or disapprobation of his conduct. 
Secondly, that for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the 
individual is accountable, and may be subjected either to social or to legal 
punishment, if society is of the opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its 
protection” (Mill 1859, Ch. 5). “Claims to autonomy” or a right to do as one pleases 
therefore has “greatest weight” when one’s “decisions primarily affect” only oneself 
and will “not harm others” (Ankeny 2007). 
Mill recognises that a “person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by 
his inaction” (Mill 1859, Ch. 1), and that “in either case he is justly accountable to 
them for the injury” (Mill 1859, Ch. 1). However he cautions that the latter case 
“requires a much more cautious exercise of compulsion than the former” (Mill 1859, 
Ch. 1).  According to him to “make anyone answerable for not preventing evil, is 
comparatively speaking, the exception” (Mill 1859, Ch. 1).  
Mill is a renowned utilitarian so consequences matter morally, yet he recognises that 
duties of non-interference (so-called negative rights) may be stronger than duties 
grounded in the principle of beneficence (so-called positive rights). He suggests that 
causing harm is always wrong; a prima facie case “for punishing him, by law, or, 
where legal penalties are not safely applicable, by general disapprobation” (Mill 1859, 
Ch. 1), but that punishing someone may not always be the best approach. Mill 
therefore recognises that there may sometimes be overriding reasons for not holding 
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an individual to the responsibility; but says that “these reasons must arise from the 
special expediencies of the case: either because it is a kind of case in which he is on 
the whole likely to act better, when left to his own discretion, than when controlled in 
any way in which society has it in their power to control him; or because the attempt 
to exercise control would produce other evils, greater than those which it would 
prevent. When such reasons as these preclude the enforcement of responsibility, the 
conscience of the agent himself should step into the vacant judgment seat, and protect 
those interests of others which have no external protection” (Mill 1859, Ch. 1).  
Mill therefore recognises that regulation might sometimes be more harmful than the 
behaviour in question or that the harmful behaviour is very costly or has other 
negative effects. Where this is the case, it seems Mill permits society to impose social 
sanctions i.e. punish the harmful act or omission in question by means of for example 
stigmatisation, or as he states “by the reproaches of his own conscience” (Mill 1859, 
Ch. 1).   
Mill appears to also tolerate restrictions on individual freedom that aim to provide 
benefits to others. He allows the state to compel members of society to aid others / 
provide benefits to others. He argues that “every one who receives the protection of 
society owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in society renders it 
indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards 
the rest. This conduct consists first, in not injuring the interests of one another; or 
rather certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit 
understanding, ought to be considered as rights; and secondly, in each person's 
bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labours and 
sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury and 
molestation” (Mill 1859, Ch. 4). Therefore, “In all things which regard the external 
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relations of the individual, he is de jure amenable to those whose interests are 
concerned, and if need be, to society as their protector” (Mill 1859, Ch. 1).   
 
 
2.2. Reproductive Autonomy and the Right to Reproduce  
 
Individual autonomy is “central to debates about decision-making with regard to 
reproduction” (Ankeny 2007:38). Reproductive “autonomy is among many important 
forms of autonomy” that liberal states strive to uphold.  “Decisions about reproduction 
also relate closely to our identities as human beings, our well-being, and our deepest 
relationships with others” (Ankeny 2007:39). Usually our decisions about whether 
and with whom to reproduce “reflect our most closely held values about how we wish 
to live our lives, and what makes something a good life” (Ankeny 2007:39).  
However, reproductive autonomy, which may be understood as the right or freedom 
to reproduce, also has “its moral basis in equality, particularly equality of opportunity 
between the sexes” (Ankeny 2007:39). One of the implications of the right to make 
choices about reproduction is that it allows individuals the “freedom of choice about 
when to take on the various burdens and responsibilities associated with pregnancy”, 
birth and parenting, “which is especially important for women, who often assume 
most of” the “responsibilities” and “whose bodies are significantly affected by 
decisions about reproductive decisions” (Ankeny 2007:39). Individuals who do not 
desire to reproduce, hence become parents, can attain this goal by avoiding 
conception altogether, whether through sexual abstinence, contraception or abortion 
(Ankeny 2007).   
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2.2.1. Views on the Right to Reproduce 
 
Although there is widespread recognition that the “ability to control what happens to 
one’s body is vital to the exercise of autonomy”, there are “a range of views regarding 
the” nature and “extent of the right to reproduce” (Ankeny 2007:39). These can 
roughly be divided into conservative and liberal views.  
Conservative views hold that reproduction is a natural process that “should not be 
interfered with”; neither “should technology be used to intervene in or achieve 
reproduction” (Ankeny 2007:40). They also reject the idea “that rights should serve as 
a point for understanding moral arguments about reproduction. Instead they suggest 
that there may be moral arguments to support the freedom to have children, such as” 
those based on the “desire to have a child that” outweighs “any arguments that people 
should not be allowed to do so” (Ankeny 2007:41). Moreover, they point out “that 
rights talk fails to capture what is essential about reproductive choices and 
relationships in families” (Ankeny 2007:41), and reduce personal and intimate 
relationships with others to being contractual in nature; where one person has a right 
and the other concomitant duties to be fulfilled.  
Advocates of the liberal view strongly value autonomy and equality. “Liberal views 
focus on the harm principle, which holds that we can act as we wish so long as we do 
not harm others” (Ankeny 2007:40). Restrictions on the right to reproduce are 
therefore justified if others will be harmed by the decision. In general, people should 
therefore be free to choose whether and when they want to reproduce and no one 
should interfere with their decision. Some liberal views however insist that the right to 
reproduce is broader than mere non-interference in an individual’s right to reproduce. 
For them the right to reproduce is not only a negative right of non-interference but 
also entails a positive right to assist individuals in realising their desire to reproduce 
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or become parents by for example funding assisted reproduction for infertile adults 
(Ankeny 2007).  
Although it is a widely held view that people have a right to reproduce, the scope of 
the right is controversial and the issues at stake cannot readily be resolved to 
individual rights principles. To view the problems that maternal drinking during 
pregnancy and consequently FAS give rise to from a simple rights-based approach is 
unhelpful because it cannot adequately resolve the ethical problems it raises. Because 
rights-based approaches can recognise the notion of fetal rights, rights-based 
approaches typically view the problem as a conflict between a woman’s rights and 
that of her fetus – a situation often described as maternal-fetal conflict.  
Maternal-fetal conflicts pose two fundamental and difficult moral questions. The first 
question - is the fetus a “person”, i.e. an entity that has rights? - relates to the moral 
status of the fetus. The second question - does a fetus’s purported right not to be 
harmed outweigh a pregnant woman’s rights? - concern the resolution of conflicting 
rights and claims. Although all of the parties to the maternal-fetal debate seem to 
agree that it is usually morally wrong to harm an innocent or non-consenting person, 
there is considerable disagreement over the ontological and moral status of the fetus. 
If the fetus is a person, then it has rights that cannot easily be overridden. The 
implication is that a pregnant woman will have to balance the rights of her fetus with 
those of her own. Moreover, if a fetus has rights, then the state has an interest not only 
in protecting a woman’s interest in being free from certain forms of state control but  
it would also have an interest in preventing harm to fetuses. However, if it is not the 
sort of entity that has rights, then it is not seriously wrong to harm it, and interference 
in a woman’s right may not be justified.  
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A particular problem with rights-based approaches is that rights principles must “be 
refined, weighed against one another and applied within a complex framework of 
moral values, legal considerations, practical issues and attention to consequences” 
(Mathieu 1995:2). Therefore the espousal of one of these rights, i.e. those of the child 
or those of the woman, leads to very different conclusion regarding women’s 
responsibility and the legitimacy of state interference and kinds of interventions that 
may be justifiable. For example, one rights-based view is that the state’s recognition 
of an individual’s right to autonomy, and more specifically a “woman’s right to 
decide what happens to her own body is inconsistent” (Mathieu 1995:2) with one that 
involves coercion or one that seeks to give priority to protecting a child from 
avoidable harm. A different rights-based view is that the state is justified in overriding 
or restricting a woman’s autonomy for the sake of her prospective child. Trying to 
resolve the problem from an exclusively rights-based approach is therefore 
inadequate, largely because resolution of the problems relies on how well one argues 
for the rights of either party. If one supports the claim that a competent adult pregnant 
woman’s rights should override fetal rights (assuming that fetuses have rights) then 
she is doing no more than prioritising her rights over those of her fetus. Equally, if 
one argues from the position of fetal rights, then the woman would have to balance 
her rights with those of her fetus.  
A graver concern about rights-based approaches to the problem of maternal drinking 
during pregnancy is that, by pitting the rights of the woman against those of her fetus, 
a perception is created that a woman and her fetus are in fact two separate entities.  
Considering how we ought ethically to treat the human fetus from a rights-based 
perspective presents the relationship between a pregnant woman and her fetus as one 
in which the fetus is separable and independent from the woman, and one in which 
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their interests stand in opposition, when in fact this is not always the case. In this way, 
rights talk and focus on the moral status of the fetus, offer an impoverished picture of 
the human condition, because it masks the subtleties and complexities of our 
relationships and motivations and their role in our lives. Schoeman (1980:9) explains 
that the “danger of talk about rights of children is that it may encourage people to 
think that the proper relationship between themselves and their children is the abstract 
one that the language of rights is forged to suit.… Emphasis on the rights of children 
might foster thinking about the relationship between parent and child as quasi-
contractual, limited, and directed toward the promotion of an abstract public good. 
Such emphasis unambiguously suggests that the relationship is a one-way relationship 
aimed almost solely at promoting the best interests of the child”. Characterising the 
maternal-fetal relationship as a conflict presents the relationship as one in which they 
are adversaries (Draper 1996; Van Bogaert 2006). This may be contrary to common 
sense morality which typically sees the fetus as part of the woman’s body, and as a 
developing human life. Many women who choose to continue a pregnancy are 
concerned about the welfare of their prospective child and do not see the relationship 
as one where they are adversaries (Minkoff & Paltrow 2004). 
“Philosophers continue to debate whether fetuses are the kinds of beings who can 
have moral rights; whether rights talk in general has any point unless the being to 
whom rights are ascribed is in a position to” exercise choice, “and whether ascribing 
some rights to beings commits us to ascribing others (i.e., must have a whole packet 
of general rights or none at all, or may one ascribe certain rights to one kind of being 
and other rights to other kinds of beings? Many of these abstract philosophical issues 
about rights” are usually “argued inconclusively” (Schoeman 1980), because one’s 
view of how we ought to treat the human fetus will depend largely, if not exclusively, 
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on one’s view of the moral status of the fetus - something which many people 
disagree on. And even if we were to agree that fetuses have rights, we would still need 
to decide whose rights carry more weight on the moral calculus: that of the pregnant 
woman or that of her fetus? Even if the fetus has rights, it does not necessarily follow 
that a woman’s rights are inferior to those of the fetus, in other words that the fetus’s 
claims are stronger than those of the woman in whose body it resides (Thomson 
1971). It still needs to be shown that the woman has a duty to do absolutely 
everything possible to keep the fetus alive or to protect it from harm, particularly if 
there may be other compelling considerations which outweigh any rights it may have - 
whether to continued existence or protection from harm.  
Because of the shortcomings of viewing the problem of maternal drinking during 
pregnancy from a rights-based perspective, this dissertation seeks to consider the 
problem of maternal drinking and consequently FAS from an ethic of moral 
responsibility. The idea that one can have responsibility even to/for entities that do not 
have rights resonates with common sense morality. We tend to for example think that 
people have duties to their pets, even though their pets do not have rights, in the same 
way that human persons do. We also tend to think that we have duties to future 
generations of people, even though they may not have been conceived. It is not 
uncommon to hear people talk about the legacy that they would like to leave for their 
grandchildren. Therefore for purposes of this dissertation, it does not seem imperative 
to debate and settle the question of the moral status of the fetus.
1
   
                                      
1
 The idea that we have moral responsibility even toward distant others (strangers and future 
generations) was first promoted by Hans Jonas in his book, The Imperative of Responsibility, published 
in 1979.  
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Even if the fetus has no or little moral standing (rights), it does not mean that women 
have carte blanche to do whatever they please while pregnant. One could plausibly 
argue that women, who choose to continue a pregnancy to term, thereby accept 
responsibility for and to their fetuses/prospective children.  On this account 
reproductive autonomy is not devoid of responsibility. The idea that the exercise of 
one’s reproductive autonomy carries concomitant responsibilities is not unusual. Once 
a woman accepts a pregnancy, we tend to think that she ought to act in ways that will 
benefit and not harm it. The right to reproduce is therefore not ordinarily understood 
in absolutist terms, but rather as a prima facie claim, power or freedom whose content 
is determined by its interaction with other rights and responsibilities. It is not obvious 
that the right to reproduce (always) overrides other considerations such as the rights of 
others to not be harmed or that it entails the rights to populate the world without 
thought. Pregnant women, have a right to have their autonomy respected, even to 
accept serious health risks for themselves, but is not obvious that this right entails a 
right to impose such risk on her prospective child, or that we should regard behaviour 
during pregnancy as a matter of exclusively personal choice, i.e. as no more than the 
exercise of one’s reproductive autonomy or one’s right to reproduce.  
 
2.3. Moral Responsibility 
 
Andrew Eshleman (2014) explains that “Moral responsibility is both related to and 
different from causal and legal responsibility”. A person is legally responsible for his 
or her actions when he or she will be penalised in a court system for an event that 
occurred. Although, it may often be the case that when a person is morally responsible 
for some act, they are also legally responsible” for it, “there are exceptions to this 
rule” (Eshleman 2014). While there may be compelling moral reasons to act in a 
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morally responsible way, there may be compelling reasons to not make it legally 
obligatory to behave in that way.  
Moral responsibility is also linked to yet distinct from causal responsibility. Assigning 
causal responsibility to something is simply to indicate the factors responsible for 
producing the event or outcomes or to identify a causal connection between an earlier 
occurrence and the outcome (Klein 1995). Both human and non-human entities can 
cause an outcome, but only human persons have moral responsibility. 
Moral responsibility concerns an individual’s prospective and retrospective 
responsibilities. Prospective responsibilities are those obligations or duties “that I 
have before the event, those matters that it is up to me to attend to or take care of” 
(Klein 1995; Williams 2009). Retrospective responsibility concerns the assignment of 
blame or praise, for what a person has done or failed to do, in discharging their 
prospective responsibilities (Duff 1998). It involves evaluating and making judgments 
about the morality of a person’s past actions.  Retrospective responsibility is related to 
prospective responsibility because in order to properly ascribe moral responsibility to 
someone, we need to know what their duties are. Garrath Williams explains that this 
“judgment typically pictures the person as liable to various consequences: to feeling 
remorse (or pride), to being blamed (or praised), to making amends (or receiving 
gratitude), and so forth” (Williams 2009). Craig explains that “to hold A responsible 
for an event is, not yet to say that A should be blamed for it, partly because praise, 
rather than blame, may be due; and partly because I can avoid blame for an untoward 
event by justifying my action” (Craig 1998:291), as may be the case when we claim to 
have killed someone in self-defence.  
Moral responsibility is also “a virtue that people (and organizations) may exhibit in 
one area of their conduct or perhaps exemplify in their entire lives” (Williams 2009).  
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Therefore, moral responsibility also concerns making judgments about a person’s 
attitude to their obligations,  where a responsible person is one who “can be relied on 
to judge and to act in certain morally desirable ways” (Williams 2009) and “can be 
counted on to take her responsibilities seriously” (Williams 2009). On the other hand, 
“the irresponsible person is not one who lacks prospective responsibilities, nor is she 
one who may not be held responsible retrospectively. It is that she does not take her 
responsibilities seriously” (Williams 2009). Consequently we usually praise people 
“for acting in morally responsible ways” if they have “caused some good state of 
affairs to occur” (Schoeman 1980). 
Andrew Eshleman (2014) explains that Aristotle thought “that only a certain kind of 
agent qualifies as a moral agent and is thus properly subject to ascriptions of 
responsibility”, namely, one who possesses a capacity for decision. “For Aristotle, a 
decision is a particular kind of desire resulting from deliberation, one that expresses 
the agent's conception of what is good” (Eshleman 2014). Thus “Aristotle's general 
proposal is that one is an apt candidate for praise or blame if and only if the action 
and/or disposition is voluntary. According to Aristotle, a voluntary action or trait has 
two distinctive features. First, there is a control condition: the action or trait must have 
its origin in the agent. That is, it must be up to the agent whether to perform that 
action or possess the trait—it cannot be compelled externally. Second, Aristotle 
proposes an epistemic condition: the agent must be aware of what it is she is doing or 
bringing about” (Eshleman 2014).  
The capacities to make decisions and to act freely are generally held to be necessary 
conditions to properly ascribe moral responsibility. This means that one can be 
morally responsible for something only if one’s choice was made freely and if it 
affects another’s interests and if one can reasonably have been expected to have 
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anticipated the likely consequences of one’s choice or action. “Normal human adults 
represent our paradigm case” (Williams 2009) of moral agents, i.e. individuals who 
can accept and discharge responsibilities and have responsibility. Because we tend to 
think that competent adults are capable of performing voluntary actions or freely 
choosing their actions, we believe that they can and should be held responsible for 
their consequences. However, if one or another of the necessary conditions is not 
present at the time of the act, they may be excused from moral responsibility. 
 
2.3.1. Moral Obligations to Future People 
 
The idea that we can have moral obligations toward future people has important moral 
implications. Partridge (2003) correctly points out that when we begin to seriously 
consider our moral obligations to future people; it soon becomes apparent that it is not 
as simple a matter as just extending our moral duties towards contemporary, i.e. actual 
or existing, persons, to include those who will exist in the future. Since future people 
do not presently exist, how is it that we can have moral duties toward them? Do our 
moral obligations extend only to our contemporaries or do we also have obligations to 
future people?  
Jen Saugstad (1994) offers a striking illustration to support the claim that we have 
moral obligations to future people. Saugstad says, “Suppose that country A launches a 
missile killing the innocent denizens of country B. Their right to life has been 
infringed. Now suppose again that country A launches the missile, only this time it 
follows an orbit in space before its kills the innocent denizens of country B two 
centuries later. If in the former case, this must surely also be an infringement of these 
future victims’ right to life. The fact that the missile hits its target two centuries after 
it was launched is morally irrelevant” (Saugstad 1994). Using the same reasoning we 
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therefore can reasonably suggest that pregnant women who choose to continue their 
pregnancies have prima facie moral obligations to not harm their fetuses, because it is 
the resultant children that will suffer the fate of their choices.    
According to Joel Feinberg (1984), “Talk of a right not to be born is a compendious 
way of referring to the plausible moral requirement that no child be brought into the 
world unless certain very minimal conditions of wellbeing are assured. When a child 
is brought into existence even though those requirements have not been observed, he 
has been wronged” (Steinbock & McClamrock 1994). Feinberg suggests that these 
“minimal conditions of wellbeing amount to a requirement that we not doom the 
child’s future interests to total defeat. The advance dooming of a child’s most basic 
interests – those essential to the existence and advancement of any ulterior interests – 
deprives the child of what might be called his birthrights” (Steinbock & McClamrock 
1994). According to Feinberg, “if the conditions to enable” a child “to fulfil his most 
basic interests are destroyed before he is born and we permit him nevertheless to be 
born, we become party to the violation of his rights” (Freeman 1997:167). He explains 
that “before the fetus becomes a person it is a potential person with the potential 
attributes, including the possession of rights of a person” (Feinberg, 1994:24). He says 
that “if the potential person has an unalterable destiny of extreme impairment and 
suffering (Feinberg 1994:24), and “if one of the rights of the child will have at birth 
(at the presumed onset of personhood) is the right to be free of these total 
impediments to development and fulfilment, then the potential rights at the very 
moment they are actualized are violated” (Feinberg 1994:24). A severely disabled 
child comes “into existence not simply with rights but with already violated” 
(Feinberg 1994:24) rights. For Feinberg the child “has a grievance, a claim that he has 
been wronged” (Feinberg 1994:24). Thus, if a child cannot have that to which he has a 
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birthright, he is harmed if he is brought to birth (Feinberg, 1985: 71-72). Applying his 
analysis of harm to the “case of prenatal harms, Feinberg concludes that harm can be 
caused to a person before his birth in virtue of the later interests of the child that can 
already be anticipated” (Steinbock & McClamrock 1994). Thus, “on the assumption 
that the fetus will be born, we can ascribe to it certain interests, which can be set back, 
thwarted or defeated by actions done before the potential person becomes an actual 
person” (Steinbock & McClamrock 1994). 
 
2.3.2. Parental Responsibility 
 
“As persons, children ought to be thought of as possessing rights, but as infants 
relationship to their parents, they are to be thought of primarily as having needs” 
(Schoeman 1980); the satisfaction of which implies a close relationship with 
primarily, but not necessarily exclusive, their mothers. Thus while the language of 
rights makes sense in the case of setting moral boundaries for the relationship between 
older children and their parents, it seems inappropriate to focus primarily on rights 
when those children are very young or still fetuses. The language of rights may 
enhance our appreciation of the moral boundaries which separate people, by stressing 
the moral independence and autonomy of others, however, in common morality we 
tend to think that parents have responsibilities (parental responsibility) to their 
children, for various reasons, other than because children have rights, including: 
because of the special relationship thought to exist between parent and child 
(Manning 2001; Schoeman 1980); because of the genetic tie that exists between the 
parent and child (Hall 1999); or because they are (partly) responsible for causing them 
to come into existence (Blustein 1997; Nelson 1991); or because of the child’s special 
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needs and vulnerabilities (Goodin 1985; Held 2006) or because of the child’s unequal 
status in the relationship (Jonas 1979).  
Common sense morality understands “us as having special obligations to those to 
whom we stand in some special relationship” (Jeske 2008). Special obligations are 
those duties that are not necessarily owed to everyone, but only to a subset of people 
with whom we stand in special relationships (Ross 1930). By contrast natural duties 
are “moral requirements which apply to all men [and women] irrespective of status or 
acts performed” (Jeske 2008) and “owed by all persons to others” (Jeske 2008).  
Natural duties are therefore those duties “that are owed to all persons qua persons” 
(Jeske 2008), whereas one’s relationship with another “is fundamental to any 
explanation of special obligations” (Jeske 2008) to that person. The basic or 
fundamental justification for having special obligations is therefore not because of the 
intrinsic nature of persons, but rather because of the special relationships that exist 
among people.  
Generally when we “admonish parents for failing in their relationship to their young 
children it is because we find them not furnishing the goods such as love, attention 
and security” (Schoeman 1980) we think parents ought to provide, rather than because 
they fail  to respect the child’s rights. We tend to “find them short on caring and 
intimacy and insensitive to the state of dependency and vulnerability into which 
children are born” (Schoeman 1980:8). Rather than think that a child has a right to be 
cared for by its parents, we tend to think that parents have this responsibility, 
independent of any idea of a right. While parents may expect some reciprocity from 
their children when they are old, for love and effort spent on them, “this is certainly 
not the motive for doing so, and is still less a condition of the responsibility itself one 
owes toward the child” (Jonas 1979:39).  
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The recognition that parents have obligations toward their children can be traced back 
to John Stuart Mill, who argued “that to bring a child into existence without a fair 
prospect of being able, not only to provide food for its body, but instruction and 
training for its mind is a moral crime, both against the unfortunate offspring and 
against society” (Mill 1859, Ch. 5) for which parents may be held liable.  This can be 
seen as constituting a limitation on individual autonomy and an application of his 
famous “harm principle”. Other notable thinkers including Feinberg (1986), Murray 
(1991; 1987), Purdy (1999), Steinbock (1986) and Benatar (2006), have continued on 
this train of thought.  
The idea of parental responsibility is a relatively uncontroversial necessity. However, 
its scope is contested. What exactly does such responsibility entail and on what basis 
should/can we judge whether (or not) parents fulfil their responsibilities are questions 
that remain subject to dispute and unresolved, yet relevant and important in 
contemporary times. One reason why the scope of parental responsibility is 
controversial relates to the idea that there is a morally relevant difference between 
positive and negative duties. Negative duties are injunctions in that they set out what 
we may not do to others without violating their rights. They therefore impose on us 
duties to refrain from interfering or harming other persons e.g. the duty to not kill an 
innocent person. Negative duties are thought to be universal, fundamental and 
presumptively overriding and “based on the value of justice and respect for human 
dignity, autonomy, freedom, and rights” (Smith 2005:481).  
On the other hand, positive duties are based on the value of charity or benevolence (as 
opposed to justice) (Smith 2005:481). Positive duties require positive action, or posit 
duties to help others, unlike negative duties which require us to merely refrain from 
harming others or interfering in their rights. Moreover, unlike negative duties, positive 
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duties do not apply universally, but only generally. Positive duties correspond to 
positive rights only in cases of special obligations due to special relationships. 
Some commentators “agree that there is a moral defect in parents who intend to 
conceive a child but are indifferent to whether” the “child will be born” with a 
“potential for” a normal existence (Savulescu 2009). Benatar (2006: 2492) for 
example suggests that procreation that stands a high chance of serious harm should be 
actively discouraged and sometimes even prevented. Savulescu and Kahane (2008) go 
as far as to argue, that “[I]f prospective parents have moral reasons to care about the 
potential well-being of their future children, then it would seem that they should also 
have reason to aim to have children who are more advantaged rather than leave this to 
chance or nature” (Savulescu & Kahane 2008). Essentially what these authors argue is 
that parents also have beneficence-based obligations to their children that entail a duty 
to choose to produce the best possible children, where this is possible.   
 
2.3.3. Are There Duties to [Not] Reproduce? 
 
Although we can generally agree that individuals may and should be free to reproduce 
(or not), less clear is whether they may sometimes have duties to avoid reproduction. 
Does the right to reproduce mean that people should always reproduce or that they 
have an unrestricted right to do so? Are the instances where we may think that 
reproduction is wrong and immoral and that individuals should avoid conception and 
birth, hence parenting? Does making responsible decisions about reproduction mean 
that women should sometimes terminate a pregnancy?  The idea that parents harm 
their children and society if they are unable to provide their children with a decent 
quality of life can be traced back to the works of John Stuart Mill (1859).  
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“Although future children” may “not have” full or any “moral standing” (Ankeny 
2007), the principle of parental responsibility instructs prospective parents to take into 
account the interests of their future children when making decisions about 
reproduction (Steinbock & McClamrock 1994). Decisions to reproduce are therefore 
“accompanied by strong, positive duties to promote” the “health” and welfare “to any 
future child” (Ankeny 2007). Certain decisions “arise from the very decision” 
(Ankeny 2007) to reproduce, including rearing the “resulting child and to provide a 
life that is normal, at least in terms of societal norms” (Ankeny 2007). This means 
“that prospective parents who are in a position to prevent harm coming to a child have 
duties to mitigate or prevent such harms and suffering” (Ankeny 2007).   
The issue “of whether we owe certain” duties “to our” children, “particularly so that 
they do not inherit genetic disease conditions has been extensively debated in the 
Bioethics literature” (Ankeny 2007). Commentators such as Purdy (1989) have for 
instance argued that people should refrain from having children “where there is a 
family history for genetic disease”, whereas others such as Arras (1990) and Harris 
(1989) have equally argued that people should refrain from reproduction where their 
children will suffer serious disability, “by practising abstinence, using contraception 
and prenatal testing and terminating a pregnancy (where these are socially acceptable 
options). Julian Savulescu for instance defends a principle of procreative beneficence, 
which he argues posits an obligation on individuals to“ select the child, of the possible 
children they could have, who is expected to have the best life, or at least as good a 
life as the others, based on the relevant, available information” (Savulescu 2001).  
Essentially Savulescu proposes that given the range of factors e.g. intelligence and 
disability, affect a child’s chances at leading a good life that individuals should (have 
a duty) to use available to “genetic information and technologies to guide” their 
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“reproductive decision-making” (Ankeny 2007). This is controversial because 
Savulescu’s “argument makes an indirect claim about the duty not to have certain 
types of children, where other options are available” (Ankeny 2007).   
Although it may be argued that his argument undermines widely held “views of 
human life as a gift to be unconditionally accepted”, it must be kept in mind that 
parents have, “in many senses, always had considerable but not unlimited authority, to 
shape their children’s lives through choices about education, , upbringing and so on” 
(Ankeny 2007). Prenatal genetic testing may then be just another means for 
prospective parents to shape their children’s lives.  
The “argument for a duty to prevent passing on serious genetic diseases” to one’s 
biological offspring “typically begins from the idea that we should try to provide 
every child with a normal opportunity for health” (Ankeny 2007). On this 
understanding, “every child has an open future, which means that he or she has a right 
not to be raised in a manner that closes off a reasonable range of opportunities 
particularly for future autonomous choices” (Ankeny 2007). An “extreme position 
holds that termination of pregnancy is” obligatory (as opposed to merely voluntary); 
“when a woman learns she is pregnant with a fetus which has a serious problem and 
will develop into a child who will experience considerable pain and suffering” 
(Ankeny 2007). The argument rests “on the idea that it is wrong to deliberately 
inflict” harm, “and that a life of suffering is a harm to the child and thus not in its best 
interests” (Ankeny 2007). Although the woman who terminates a pregnancy may 
suffer psychological harm as a consequence, these harms are arguably “less weighty 
than the potential” harms “to the child who would experience severe impairment and 
suffering” (Ankeny 2007).   
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“Others” however “argue that there is no moral duty” to terminate a pregnancy “even 
in cases of genetic or other disease conditions, particularly where potential parents 
view the fetus as a child” (Ankeny 2007). They argue that "prospective parents are not 
required to find out about their genetic constitution when planning to reproduce and 
that ignoring genetic information can be reconciled with some views of responsible” 
or “good” parenting, particularly “those that take parenthood to be essentially an 
unconditional project in which parents” should “commit themselves to nurturing any 
kind of child” (Ankeny 2007). Others point out that, even though prenatal and “other 
forms of genetic testing may be useful when making decisions about reproduction, it 
does not prevent harm to actual, future children” (Ankeny 2007). Parents may still opt 
to continue a pregnancy despite the risks. Finally some others argue that children with 
disabling conditions are “not harmed by being born because the only other option for 
that child was not to have been born, and thus never to have existed” (Ankeny 2007). 
By these accounts “a pregnant woman has a right to remain in ignorance of any 
genetic conditions present in the fetus she is carrying” (Ankeny 2007) because the 
constitution of one’s child doesn’t/shouldn’t matter. Children are not harmed by being 
born or by their not being born. Mary-Anne Warren (1978) expresses the point in the 
following manner: “failing to have a child, even when you could have a happy one, is 
neither right nor wrong… But the same cannot be said of having a child, since in this 
case the action results in the existence of a new person whose interests must be taken 
into account. Having a child under conditions which should enable one to predict that 
it will be very unhappy is morally objectionable, not because it violates the rights of a 
presently existing potential person, but because it results in the frustration of the 
interests of an actual person in the future” (cited in Steinbock & McClamrock 1994). 
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Underlying all of these arguments is the core idea “about a relatively objective notion 
of acceptable quality of life, upon which” many “or all could agree, and which 
individuals” can “use to assess their duties and responsibilities. However, individuals’ 
experiences of various conditions and life experiences differ dramatically” (Ankeny 
2007). Thus it could “be argued that individual family experiences and understandings 
should determine individuals’ senses of” their “duties” and responsibilities 
“regarding” reproduction (Ankeny 2007). “If a family is willing to raise a child with” 
serious mental retardation “there is no strong moral” duty to claim that they have a 
duty to avoid reproduction (Ankeny 2007). “Part of having a normal range of life 
opportunities includes” (not) “having and raising children” and “it is an important” 
determinant “of the good life for many people (Ankeny 2007). Some would argue that 
no one would want a loved one to suffer” a serious condition or illness (Ankeny 
2007).  
Given the “diverse opinions and beliefs about the moral legitimacy of termination 
under various sorts of circumstances”, it seems “difficult to maintain there are 
objective duties to (or not to) reproduce” (Ankeny 2007). To “claim that children have 
a right to be born” is problematic because “it is impossible to say what such a right 
involves” (Ankeny 2007). For example, does it mean that individuals ought to always 
reproduce and that it would be wrong to use contraception or terminate a pregnancy? 
“Even if we might be able to outline the basis for such a rights claim, enforcing it” 
would infringe on the pregnant woman’s “most basic rights and also is likely to 
undermine the maternal-fetal relationship” (Hornstra 1998). 
“Although one assumes a range of responsibilities in making a decision to reproduce, 
including consideration of the conditions that should be in place to bear and rear a 
child, there are no obvious objective norms for ideal childrearing conditions.  Whether 
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a child is likely to have a happy and healthy upbringing cannot be gauged directly by 
e.g. the sexuality, age or marital status of parents” (Ankeny 2007). Although it can be 
said that responsible reproduction requires careful consideration about the timing and 
circumstances for reproduction, “there is no strong duty to refrain from” it "except 
perhaps under extreme conditions where a potential child is likely to experience 
considerable suffering” (Ankeny 2007).   
For many people, “reproduction is an important part of having a good life and 
deserves protection as a right because it is the usual way to establish a family” 
(Ankeny 2007).  It is for at least this reason that the decision to reproduce or not 
should remain a decision to be made by individuals. Although one may argue that 
individuals have duties to take into account their social circumstances and the future 
lives of their potential children, it is difficult to argue that individuals’ reproductive 
autonomy should be utterly trumped by other issues and concerns, in other words, that 
they have strong duties not to reproduce.   
 
3. Problem Statement  
 
A pregnant woman’s behaviour significantly impacts the normal development and 
health of her fetus (Aronson & Olegard 1987; Cole, et al. 1984; Little, et al. 1982). 
FAS is not a natural phenomenon. It does not occur as part of the “natural order” of 
events. Neither is it a hereditary or communicable condition. It cannot be inherited or 
transmitted between people. Women who drink alcohol during pregnancy and 
sexually active women of reproductive age who drink and may not be using effective 
contraception are at risk for having a child with FAS.  
Although there is no clear guidance on the amount of alcohol exposure that is harmful 
to the fetus/child (Barr & Streissguth 2001; Katwan, Adnams & London 2011; Laufer, 
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et al. 2013), no amount of alcohol can be guaranteed to be safe (Hackler 2011; IOM 
1996; Laufer, et al. 2013).  The spectrum of disorders that can occur in a child 
exposed to alcohol prenatally suggests that, because children are not affected in the 
same way, there must be other factors, beyond drinking during pregnancy, influencing 
the nature and extent of harm suffered by the child. However, despite the range of 
determinants and factors that influence a woman’s drinking and consequently risk for 
having a child with FAS, prenatal alcohol exposure is a necessary condition for its 
occurrence. If a woman does not drink during pregnancy her child is not at risk of a 
fetal alcohol spectrum disorder.   
Alcohol’s damaging effects are entirely preventable. The most obvious and effective 
way to prevent FAS is for women to abstain from alcohol if they are or plan to or 
might become pregnant. Where socially acceptable, women who do not want to 
reproduce can avoid pregnancy by using effective contraception, and where abortion 
is legally permissible. Those who may become pregnant can avoid birth and parenting 
by terminating their pregnancies.   
The knowledge that a woman’s behaviour during pregnancy can adversely affect the 
outcome of her pregnancy seriously challenges the traditional view of pregnancy as a 
personal matter. It also challenges society’s commitment to freedom of choice in 
general, and raises fundamental ethical, legal and social policy questions that centre 
on the proper role and function of the state.  
Although we may agree that pregnant women have moral obligations to the fetuses 
that they choose to carry to term, what precisely these obligations may be is not 
obvious. Do they have a moral obligation to not harm future people? What does to 
harm mean? When is harming or causing harm wrong? Do we harm future people 
when we make it impossible for them to exist e.g. by using contraception? Do we 
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harm and thereby wrong them if we do not bring about their existence e.g. by 
terminating a pregnancy? Do future people have a right to be born? We may agree 
that people have the right to reproduce, but may they sometimes have a duty to not 
reproduce? Is it wrong to bring into the world a child that will suffer serious physical 
or mental disability? Do we have the same kinds of obligations toward future children 
that we have toward presently living people? If so, how do we balance our obligations 
toward future people with obligations toward ourselves or those presently existing? 
Often the interests of these two groups come into conflict. The moral problem, then, is 
to find the best way to meet both our own interests and those of future people.  
 
4. Goals and Research Questions 
 
This dissertation has five goals. In each case, the relevant concomitant research 
questions following from each goal is added. The first goal of this dissertation is to 
establish what, generally, if any, are the (possible) moral implications of both 
becoming pregnant and deciding to carry the fetus to term. Do pregnant women, who 
choose to carry a pregnancy to term, i.e. prospective mothers, have moral 
responsibility for and toward their fetuses and consequently prospective children? Or 
does the pregnant woman’s alleged sovereignty over her own body imply a right to 
harm herself, even to the extent that it amounts to undeniable permanent harm to her 
fetus and consequently child? Are there limits to women’s rights in the context of 
pregnancies that are carried to term? And if so, what limitations might there be on a 
prospective mother’s autonomy and how are they morally justified? Questions raised 
by this goal pertain to how the possibility (indeed, as will be argued, the fact) of such 
responsibilities is reconcilable with the pregnant woman’s entitlement to have her 
autonomy, and her concomitant sovereignty over her own body, be respected.  
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The second goal of this dissertation is to establish exactly what these moral 
responsibilities are. It is a well-established rule in liberal and just societies that 
competent individuals enjoy the right to behave as they choose provided that the 
behaviour is within legal and moral limits. One’s right or freedom to do as one pleases 
is therefore not absolute. Moreover that, with the exercise of one’s rights is the co-
relative idea of responsibility. What set of moral responsibilities therefore face a 
woman who opts to carry a pregnancy to term? Does it mean that she has a duty to 
stop drinking if she is pregnant? Does it mean that she has a duty to avoid 
reproduction by using contraception or terminating her pregnancy if she is at risk for 
having a child with FAS? To what extent can she be held morally responsible for 
prenatal harm incurred by her child? While the prevention of FAS may be a relatively 
simple matter, questions remain about the extent to which women could be held 
responsible for all kinds of harms that may be related to their behaviour while 
pregnant. If harms could be prevented by abstaining from alcohol, what about all 
kinds of (for the woman beneficial, though not for the fetus) drugs, treatments, 
activities (including sexual behaviour), and the like? And does society have a role to 
play in preventing FAS?  
The third goal of this dissertation is therefore to investigate society’s interest in the 
issue of morally justified behaviour during pregnancy. What exactly is this interest, if 
it exists at all, and how is it to be protected and/or enforced? To what extent is the 
argument from scarce resources morally relevant to this debate? Who exactly is to act 
on behalf of “society”? Is it the state, only the state, or other institutions as well? If so, 
which institutions, and how are their interests pertinent to this situation? 
Following from this, the fourth goal of the dissertation is to establish who all the 
relevant parties are that carry moral responsibility in respect of FAS, particularly in 
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South Africa and what their responsibility might be. Is the individual pregnant woman 
the only party to be held morally responsible for the aberration of FAS? FAS does not 
come into existence, nor does it thrive, in a social and political vacuum. FAS can 
indeed also be seen as a social disease with roots in social practices and beliefs that 
are morally deeply problematic. Many factors that have been found to influence a 
woman’s decision to drink have to do with her psycho-social and economic 
circumstances including alcohol’s widespread availability and social acceptability. 
This suggests that society also has a role to play in FAS prevention. How realistic is it 
to expect morally upright and responsible behaviour from many women whose 
fundamental interest in life is often hardly more than access to a next plate of food or 
whose life circumstances are relatively bleak? When moral responsibility is conferred, 
it is required to also ask critical questions about the extent to which alcohol abuse is a 
societal condition. In turn, this raises questions about society’s responsibilities 
towards these women. Again: is “society” here to be understood only as the state, or 
also as other institutions? If so, which institutions, and what are their responsibilities? 
Would the state be justified in interfering in the rights of a pregnant woman for the 
sake of protecting the future child/preventing FAS in children? Is criminalising her 
conduct justified? Should the state adopt coercive measures? What arguments can be 
made for and against state interference in a pregnant woman’s rights? The choice is 
“between respecting a pregnant woman’s right to decide what happens to her own 
body and protecting an innocent child from preventable harm. Who should the state 
protect: a woman’s interest in remaining free from certain forms of state control” 
(Mathieu 1991) and interference or the “child’s interest in having a decent quality 
life?” (Mathieu 1991). Even if a prospective mother has a moral responsibility toward 
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her fetus, should those be made legal ones? What are ethical social responses to 
prevent FAS?  
The fifth and final goal of the dissertation is to establish if and whether children who 
have suffered prenatal harm and consequently have FAS can and should be allowed to 
institute delictual actions for prenatal harm against their mothers. This, in turn, raises 
the interesting question about the (possible) rights, not only of children, but also of 
fetuses, given the fact that, in South African jurisprudence, the fetus has no rights. In 
criminal law, the intentional killing of a fetus is not considered an act of murder 
because the fetus is not a person in law. This means that if someone “hits a pregnant 
woman” in the stomach “intending to kill” the fetus, and succeeds in doing so, the 
perpetrator can “be charged with assault of the woman but” not with murder for 
killing her fetus (Mathieu 1991:1-28). In South African jurisprudence, the issue of 
possible “rights of the fetus” can be interpreted in terms of the nasciturus fiction and 
the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act (No. 92 of 1996). Although the fetus has 
no legally enforceable rights in South Africa, the courts have recognised that 
situations that are prejudicial to the fetus may arise, had it been born alive at the time 
of the harm-causing event (Kruger & Skelton 2010). The law protects these potential 
interests of the unborn child, by employing a fiction (the nasciturus fiction) which 
allows for the fetus to be regarded as born if it will be to the fetus’s advantage (Kruger 
& Skelton 2010). A review of pertinent South African case law suggests that the fetus 
need not have any legal standing in order for the courts to recognise delictual actions 
for prenatal harm. Moreover, the conditions and limitations on a woman’s right to an 
abortion inherent in the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act suggests that at least 
some value is afforded to the fetus, as a pregnancy progresses and the fetus develops. 
Given this knowledge, might it therefore be legally possible that children with FAS 
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can and should be allowed to sue their mothers for damages for their disabled 
condition?   
 
The implications and potential impact of the dissertation include: 
 Contributing to existing ethics literature on the inter-related problems of 
alcohol abuse and drinking during pregnancy and consequently FAS in the 
South African context. 
 Stimulating discussion and debate on the topic of moral responsibility for FAS 
rather than looking at these problems solely from a “rights-based” perspective. 
 
5. Delimitation of Study Area 
 
For purposes of this dissertation I use the term fetus to refer to the developing human 
being in utero at any stage in development prior to birth, since nothing morally 
significant seems to ride on my choice of terminology. I use the term “prospective 
mother” to include those pregnant women who intend to carry their pregnancies to 
term. I confine the discussion to competent adult women and therefore exclude those 
women who lack full decision making capacity due to for example their age or mental 
incapacity. Although the concept of future people is wide enough to embrace even 
those who have not yet been conceived, i.e. possible people, for purposes of this 
dissertation, I restrict its meaning to those who have been conceived and will, 
assuming pregnancy takes it normal course, in all likelihood, be born children.  I 
therefore use the term future people synonymously with the term prospective child.  
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Although the focus of the dissertation is on the conduct on pregnant women, this 
should not be taken to mean that men do not have moral responsibility for and to their 
children, or that their behaviour cannot also be subject to moral scrutiny.   
I restrict the term prenatal harm to those instances where a wrongful act that occurs 
prior to a child’s birth, initiates a causal sequence that leads directly to harm the child 
(Matthieu 2007, Feinberg 1985; 1984). Joel Feinberg illustrates a case of prenatal 
harm in the following example, cited in Mathieu (1995): “A negligent motorist who 
runs over a pregnant woman may cause damage to the fetus that causes it later to be 
born deformed or chronically ill. Some time after birth that infant will have an active 
welfare interest in self-locomotion or health that may be harmed (doomed to defeat) 
right from the beginning. The child comes into existence in a harmed state caused by 
the earlier negligence of a motorist whose act initiated the causal sequence, at a point 
before actual personhood, that later resulted in the harm. The motorist’s negligent 
driving made the actual person, who came into existence months later, worse off than 
she would otherwise have been. If the motorist had not been negligent, the child 
would have been undamaged” (Mathieu 1995:21). The outcome of a pregnancy and 
the health and welfare of fetuses and consequently, children, can be affected by a 
variety of events and lifestyle choices of parents, but perhaps most significantly by 
those of pregnant women. A woman’s lifestyle choices may have beneficial and at the 
same time harmful effects on their fetuses and children. Particular changes in a 
pregnant woman’s lifestyle such as taking proper nutrition, attending regular antenatal 
care and taking vitamins, can be beneficial to the health and welfare of her child 
(Phillips & Johnson 1977; Rosso 1981). At the same time, and setting aside the 
obvious harmful substances such as nicotine (Cnattinguis 1992; Shiono, et al. 1986) 
and alcohol (IOM 1996; Jones & Smith 1973; Streissguth, et al. 2004; 1994), there is 
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evidence that even ingesting seemingly harmless substances such as caffeine and even 
some common medicines can result in fetal damage and birth defects (Fortier, 
Marcoux & Beaulac-Baillargeon 1993; Konje & Cade 2008; LoBue 1983).  
Broadly construed, the notion of prenatal harm includes both the use of substances 
which can cause harm and the refusal of therapies or interventions designed to benefit 
the fetus, in other words, those that can prevent prenatal harm, as for example in the 
case of a pregnant woman who refuses a blood transfusion, surgery or vitamin 
regimens. However, for purposes of this dissertation, I restrict usage of the term, 
prenatal harm to refer to those instances where a competent adult woman consumes 
alcohol during pregnancy.  
The term harm may be construed in different ways, even to include birth as a harm. 
However, I distinguish prenatal harm from so-called wrongful life actions. The idea 
behind wrongful life actions is the controversial claim that the child has been 
wrongfully harmed by being born and that his or her existence is such that never 
having been born would be a preferable condition (Feinberg 1986; Pearson 1997; 
Strauss 1996; Steinbock 1986; Steinbock & McClamrock, 1994). Here, the child’s 
claim is essentially that he or she would have been better off dead and, that by 
bringing him or her into existence; the parents have harmed them (Benatar 2006; 
Pearson 1997; Steinbock 1986; Steinbock & McClamrock 1994). In wrongful life, the 
central question is therefore whether one can be harmed by being born. On the other 
hand, prenatal harms can be defined as wrongful actions (or omissions) that lead to 
disability in a child. Actions for prenatal harm are thus better understood as actions 
for wrongful disability. The claim is not that one would be better off dead, but rather 
that one has been wronged because of a prenatal harm.   
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The focus of this dissertation is on FAS. This is not to deny the relevance of the range 
of other conditions falling on the spectrum of FASD. The reason that FAS is the focus 
relates to its seriousness and because the other conditions, namely, Alcohol-Related 
Neurological Defects (ARND) and Alcohol-Related Birth Defects (ARBD) are 
controversial diagnoses largely because they share features with other conditions such 
as attention-deficit disorder (ADD) and attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD) in children (Coons 2013).  
This is a philosophical study in the field of ethics, so it involves conceptual analysis, 
ethical reasoning and argumentation to evaluate ethical problems and questions to 
arrive at rational judgments about what the right or good action, policy or character 
disposition is. It does aim to make empirical claims based on findings from research. 
Instead research findings from secondary sources may be used to support normative 
claims.  
 
6. Research Design and Methods 
 
As this is a philosophical study it was conducted mainly by means of a comprehensive 
literature survey and study, as well as independent reflection and consultations with 
my supervisor, and other knowledgeable people in the field. As a dissertation on, 
specifically, ethics, it does not entail any empirical study, since ethics is a sub-
discipline of philosophy, and philosophy is the study of concepts and ideas.  
Ethics theses are normative in nature, i.e. they are concerned with what ought to (as in 
should) be, and not with what is. As such it does not seek to describe a particular state 
of affairs. Ethics does not draw conclusions from what is actually happening in the 
world because what is actually happening is not necessarily the same as what ought to 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
46 
 
be happening. For this reason, this study did not involve controlled experiments or 
empirical methods of inquiry. Instead it considers an aspect of the moral 
consequences of reproductive choice by reviewing existing literature.  
Empirical research is what ethicists may refer to as “descriptive ethics”. While 
descriptive ethics gives us insight into human behaviour and thinking, morally 
speaking, it does not tell us which actions are right, good, wrong, permissible, 
responsible, praiseworthy etc. This is not to say that empirical research is not useful in 
ethics; indeed empirical findings can give weight to moral arguments. 
The typical research methods and standards applicable to philosophical research are 
employed. This primarily involves the interpretation and critical analysis of the most 
important texts to answer the research questions. My analysis of the relevant texts 
includes the definition and clarification of concepts, the identification and criticisms 
of assumptions, the analysis and evaluation of theoretical frameworks and the 
articulation of the most reasonable interpretation of significant concepts found in the 
sources. 
Literature was sourced through utilising internet search engines such as Google 
Scholar, PubMed, Jstor and other academic search engines and by using keywords 
and phrases including, but not limited to, the terms drinking during pregnancy, fetal 
alcohol syndrome, fetal interests/rights, maternal-fetal conflict, pregnant woman, 
moral responsibility/obligation/duty, moral status, prenatal alcohol exposure, prenatal 
harm/injury, reproduction and pregnant woman autonomy/rights.   
 
7. Ethics Statement 
 
Since this is a normative study that uses secondary sources of data, ethical approval 
from a research ethics committee was not required.   
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8. Chapter Outline 
 
In this chapter I offered an overview of this dissertation. The next chapter of this 
dissertation provides a description of the problem of maternal drinking during 
pregnancy. Chapter Three provides an analysis of the notion of moral responsibility 
and introduces the ethical issues and questions that maternal drinking during 
pregnancy gives rise to. In Chapter Four the questions pertaining to the nature and 
extent of a pregnant woman’s moral responsibility for FAS are explored. Does she 
have a duty to abstain from alcohol? Should she avoid reproduction? Chapter Five 
explores the possible interests and ethical responses of the state to the problem of 
maternal drinking during pregnancy and FAS.  Essentially it considers whether the 
state has any moral responsibility for the problem, and if it does, what that 
responsibility might entail. What arguments may be made for and against using 
coercion to prevent prenatal harm? Is the state justified in using coercion to prevent 
FAS? Finally, chapter six considers the question of whether children with FAS can 
and should be allowed to institute delictual actions against their mothers.     
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Chapter 2: Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter I present an overview of the problem of drinking during pregnancy. I 
describe the spectrum of disorders, collectively termed Fetal Alcohol Spectrum 
Disorders (FASD) that can occur in a child following prenatal alcohol exposure 
(PAE). The different clinical diagnoses and their symptoms under the umbrella of 
FASD are described along with the range of disorders and disabilities that can occur 
in affected individuals throughout the lifespan. This is followed by a presentation of 
the prevalence of FASD and woman’s alcohol and contraceptive use in South Africa. 
Reasons why women drink and may abuse alcohol and the factors that increase a 
woman’s likelihood of having a child with FASD are considered. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of interventions to prevent FASD and the socio-economic 
costs of FASD. 
 
2. The Effects of Prenatal Alcohol Exposure through 
Maternal Drinking During Pregnancy 
 
Alcohol is a known teratogen, i.e. a substance capable of interfering with fetal 
development.  If a woman drinks “during pregnancy, alcohol freely crosses the 
placenta into the blood and other tissues of the developing embryo or fetus” (Rendall-
Mkosi, et al. 2008), and cause irreparable damage to the child.  As Dorris (1994:122) 
explains: “… whatever a pregnant woman drinks, the baby she is carrying drinks, too. 
It is that simple… the fetus cannot eliminate alcohol nearly as quickly as the adult 
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body can; when a woman drinks, the concentration of alcohol in utero is higher than 
in the rest of her system, and it persists twice as long. By the time the woman feels 
pleasantly relaxed or euphoric, the fetus may be comatose”.  
Drinking during pregnancy has been correlated with an increase in spontaneous 
abortion, fetal growth retardation, premature delivery, abruption placentae and breech 
presentations (DeVille & Kopelman 1998). There are many critical periods during 
pregnancy when the fetus is vulnerable to alcohol’s damaging effects (Rendall-Mkosi, 
et al. 2008). During the first trimester, alcohol can change the way in which cells 
grow and organise themselves and can result in abnormalities of the face, heart, brain, 
limbs and urogenital system. Neural defects can occur in severe cases.  In the second 
trimester, prenatal alcohol exposure can lead to miscarriage, and in the third trimester, 
exposure to alcohol can impair overall fetal growth (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008). The 
brain, which is thought to be most sensitive to alcohol’s toxic effect, continues to 
grow throughout pregnancy and post-partum. “Damage done to the developing brain 
may result in a range of neurobehavioural problems in the face of normal intelligence” 
(Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008).  Additionally, “the fetus exposed to high concentrations 
of alcohol in utero typically demonstrates a constellation of pre and postnatal 
problems including growth retardation, characteristic facial features and central 
nervous system (CNS) deficits” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008). 
The adverse effects of maternal drinking during pregnancy have been postulated as far 
back as written records exist. One of the earliest observations of alcohol’s negative 
effects during pregnancy was made by Aristotle who cautioned that “foolish, drunken 
and harebrained women most often bring forth children like unto themselves, morose 
and languid” (cited in Streissguth, et al. 1980). Another ancient warning about the 
potentially harmful effects of drinking during pregnancy can be found in a passage 
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from Judges in the Bible. In this story an angel appears to Manoah and his wife to 
announce to them that his infertile wife will “conceive and give birth to a son”, 
cautions her to “from then on to, take great care” and to “drink no wine or fermented 
liquor, and eat nothing unclean“ (Judges 13:7). The couple name their son Samson 
and he becomes well-known for his strength and wisdom (Abel 1999).  
A specific medical link between alcohol and pregnancy outcomes “was not identified 
until 1899”, when “Dr William Sullivan compared the pregnancy outcomes of 
alcoholic prisoners with their relatives” and “found the infant mortality rate to be 
higher” among the alcoholic women (US Department of Health and Human Services 
2007). In 1968 Dr Paul Lemoine and associates (Lemoine, et al. 1968), described the 
specific facial features and other symptoms associated with drinking during 
pregnancy. Doctors Jones, Smith and Ulleland (Jones, et al. 1973; Jones & Smith, 
1973) are credited with coining the term Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) to describe 
the most severe condition that can occur in a child who was exposed to alcohol 
prenatally (Abel 1990; Armstrong 2003; Astley 2011).  
Children who were exposed to alcohol prenatally are not affected in the same way and 
to the same extent. They can suffer a broad spectrum of disorders and disabilities that 
occur with variable severity, “depending on the dose, timing and conditions of 
exposure” (Streissguth & Bonthius 2006). There is no clear scientific consensus on 
the amount and pattern of alcohol exposure that is harmful to the fetus. “Risk from 
alcohol exposure varies between fetuses, even between fraternal twins with ostensibly 
identical exposure” (Astley 2011:18).  
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3. Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD)  
 
Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD) is the umbrella term to describe the range 
and varying degrees of physical, cognitive and neurobehavioural effects or conditions 
that can occur in a child as a result of a woman’s drinking during pregnancy (CDC 
2005; Streissguth et al. 2004; Streissguth & O’Malley 2000). FASD is a “descriptive 
term rather than a diagnosis” (Zadunayski, et al. 2006). “Four diagnostic categories 
within the continuum of FASD” (May, et al. 2009), have been identified by the 
Institute for Medicine, “which represent the spectrum of damage from mild to severe. 
The specific diagnosis from most severe to less severe include: Fetal Alcohol 
Syndrome (FAS), partial FAS (PFAS) and alcohol-related neurodevelopmental 
disorders (ARND), and alcohol-related birth defects (ARBD)” (IOM 1996; 
Streissguth & O’Malley 2000; Zadunayski, et al. 2006).  In the Western world, FAS 
“is the leading known preventable cause of intellectual disabilities” (Nuñez, Roussotte 
& Sowell n/d) and is a growing public health concern worldwide (WHO 1994). 
FASD specific diagnostic guidelines that have been published include the Institute of 
Medicine (IOM) guidelines in 1996 (IOM 1996), the 4-Digit Code in 1997 (Clarren & 
Astley 1997), the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) FAS guidelines in 2004 
(Bertrand, et al. 2004), and the Hoyme FASD guidelines in 2005 (Hoyme, et al. 
2005).  Each of the different FASD diagnostic guidelines or systems has strengths and 
limitations and raises questions concerning the clinical features that define each 
diagnosis on the FASD continuum (Astley 2011).  
While each guideline requires a complete FASD evaluation to include an assessment 
of “four key diagnostic features” (Benz, Rasmussen, & Andre 2009) of FAS - viz. (i) 
growth deficiency, (ii) facial features, (iii) central nervous system (CNS) damage and, 
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(iv) prenatal alcohol exposure - there are differences among the systems that lead to 
variations in definitions and diagnostic criteria across the FASD continuum.  
a. Growth deficiency 
The different guidelines provide differing criteria for what constitutes growth 
deficiency for a FASD diagnosis, but children with FAS are typically significantly 
below average height and weight for their age (Chudley, et al. 2005; Hoyme, et al. 
2005).  
b. Facial features 
Several specific facial abnormalities, that may be absent or mild in other FASD 
conditions, are visible in FAS children (Astley 2006). To meet the criteria for a FAS 
diagnosis, all of the diagnostic guidelines or systems require an individual to display 
three FAS facial features: (i) a smooth philtrum (flattened groove between the nose 
and upper lip), (ii) thin upper lips and (iii) shortened eye width (Chudley, et al. 2005; 
Hoyme, et al. 2005; IOM 1996). 
c. Central nervous system (CNS) damage 
Evidence of CNS damage may be “structural, neurologic and functional” (IOM 
1996:72). Structural irregularities of the brain are observable through medical imaging 
techniques and may include microcephaly i.e. a smaller than normal head size (IOM 
1996; O’Leary 2002). Other structural impairments must be observed through medical 
imaging techniques. If structural anomalies are not observed then neurological 
irregularities are assessed (IOM 1996). Functional irregularities are assessed when 
structural or neurological irregularities are not observed (Astley 2006; Chudley, et al 
2005; IOM 1996). Various CNS domains have been identified that can determine a 
FASD diagnosis, including: general cognitive deficits (e.g. IQ), deviations in 
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executive functioning, memory, language, motor and social skills (Astley 2006; 
Hoyme, et al. 2005; IOM 1996).   
d. Prenatal alcohol exposure 
To meet the criteria for FAS, all of the above “three categories of problems must be 
present and non-alcohol related causes of the anomalies must be excluded” (Rendall-
Mkosi, et al. 2008). Where possible, there must be confirmation of maternal alcohol 
consumption directly from the mother or a reliable collateral source e.g. health 
records. A “report of maternal drinking at the time of the pregnancy can help to 
confirm the diagnosis, but is not necessary. Whilst confirmation of maternal drinking 
is preferable, in a situation where it is impossible to obtain this information (for 
example if the mother is deceased and collateral information is not available) a 
definitive diagnosis of FAS can be made without confirmation of maternal drinking” 
(Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008).  
The presence of the highly specific FAS facial features confirms a FAS diagnosis and 
distinguishes it from less severe conditions on the spectrum of FASD. Therefore, even 
in the absence of confirmed maternal drinking in pregnancy, the presence of the facial 
features can validate a FAS diagnosis.  This is because only children with FAS have 
the distinct dysmorphic facial characteristics, caused by prenatal alcohol exposure.  
For a diagnosis of Partial FAS (PFAS) “affected children must display typical facial 
features and abnormalities of either growth or CNS structure (or function). As in the 
case of FAS the diagnosis of PFAS can also be made without evidence of maternal 
alcohol use, however in both cases the clinical records classification should reflect 
this. Damage is present at the same level as FAS” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008), so 
while individuals with PFAS may look less like FAS, they have the same functional 
disabilities as someone with FAS.  
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Children diagnosed with alcohol-related neurodevelopmental disorder (ARND) 
display few or none of the FAS facial features and their growth and height may range 
from normal to minimally deficient, but they display significant CNS damage 
(Sampson, et al. 1997; Stratton, Howe & Battaglia 1996). An individual diagnosed 
with ARBD presents with a range of congenital abnormalities that are associated with 
prenatal alcohol exposure but has not the key features of FASD (IOM 1996). “A 
diagnosis of ARBD or ARND can only be made if there was confirmed heavy 
maternal alcohol exposure” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008). 
The highly specific FAS facial phenotype makes FAS distinguishable from ARNB 
and ARBD. In the absence of the specific FAS facial features an individual’s outcome 
cannot be linked to prenatal alcohol exposure and FAS becomes indistinguishable 
from ARNB and ARBD. A particular problem with the diagnostic terms ARND and 
ARBD is that they imply that a person’s condition was caused by a woman’s drinking 
during pregnancy. But this presumption is problematic “because CNS abnormalities 
are not specific to (caused only by) prenatal alcohol exposure.  There are many other 
known or unknown risk factors that may be partly or even fully responsible for the 
patient’s outcome. In the absence of the FAS facial phenotype, current medical 
technology has no ability to confirm or rule-out the etiologic role of alcohol in an 
individual patient” (Astley 2011:18). So while technology may reveal that there is 
damage it cannot prove or disprove that maternal drinking is the cause of the damage.  
When a FASD diagnosis is made the child and the birth mother - are directly 
implicated (Astley 2011). A positive diagnosis implies that the child’s mother 
possibly drank during pregnancy. These are however bold conclusions to make 
particularly in light of diagnostic challenges, and when a few of the FAS 
characteristics “are not specific to prenatal alcohol exposure and often manifest 
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differently across the lifespan” (Astley 2011:3). For example disorders, such as 
Williams-Beuren syndrome (WBS), also known as Williams syndrome (WS), have 
some symptoms like FAS (Martens, Wilson & Reutens 2008; Pober 2010). Williams 
syndrome is a rare genetic neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by among other 
features: a distinctive, "elfin" facial appearance, along with a low nasal bridge; 
developmental delay and cardiovascular problems that may be present at birth or may 
develop later in life (Martens, Wilson & Reutens 2008; Pober 2010).  
 
4. Disabilities and Disorders in Individuals Exposed to 
Alcohol Prenatally  
 
Children exposed to alcohol prenatally may suffer “a range of physical abnormalities 
including heart defects, skeletal defects, abnormalities of the renal system and visual 
and hearing problems” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008). Additionally, they display 
varying degrees of structural and neurological brain disorders and evidence of a 
complex pattern of behavioral, or cognitive abnormalities that are inconsistent with 
developmental level not explained by genetic predisposition, family background or 
environment alone” (May, et al. 2009). All children with FASD exhibit 
neurocognitive problems to a comparable degree (Kodituwakku, et al. 2001; Mattson, 
et al. 1997). 
“Prenatal alcohol exposure can have numerous detrimental effects across” an affected 
individual’s “lifespan” (Coons 2013). Children with FASD suffer a range of lifelong 
(permanent) primary and secondary disabilities (Streissguth et al. 2004). Secondary 
disabilities are those disabilities that the child is not born with. “Secondary disabilities 
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include mental health problems, disrupted school experience, trouble with the law
2
, 
inappropriate sexual behaviour, alcohol and drug abuse, difficulty with independent 
living, difficulty with employment and problems with parenting” (Rendall-Mkosi, et 
al. 2008:52); all of which arise as a consequence of primary disabilities, and “which 
can presumably be ameliorated through better understanding and appropriate 
intervention” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008).    
“Primary disabilities are cognitive/intellectual deficits that reflect the CNS 
dysfunctions inherent in the FASD diagnosis” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008). They “are 
the direct cause of organic brain damage due to prenatal alcohol exposure” (Coons 
2013), and create “problems with communication skills, memory, learning ability, 
visual and spatial skills, intelligence and motor skills” (Paton & Croom 2010). As a 
result of these primary disabilities, individuals with FASD are vulnerable for further 
difficulties (secondary disabilities) in life (Streissguth, el at. 2004).  
The infant affected by alcohol usually presents with “feeding problems, irritability, 
unpredictable patterns of sleeping and eating and poor weight gain” which “make 
babies hard to care for and interferes with maternal bonding. The young child with 
FASD will often present with more specific signs – developmental delay, especially 
of speech; deficits in verbal learning, language, some aspects of visuospatial ability as 
well as overall intellectual ability, poor growth and behaviour abnormalities. 
Characteristic behaviour manifestations of FAS include hyperactivity, poor judgment, 
inability to appreciate consequences of actions, excessive friendliness, difficulty with 
sequencing, poor short-term memory and learning difficulties. Almost all of them 
suffer neurocognitive impairments of low social skills, emotional immaturity, memory 
                                      
2
 According to a report, based on findings from a biennial snap survey conducted by the Department of 
Social Development between October and December 2010, and results from other studies, an 
assumption can be made that between 50% and 70% of minors who end up in jail have FAS (Williams 
2012).  
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deficits, and most have a need for continued close supervision and support services” 
(Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008). 
In the adolescent years many of the secondary disabilities begin to flourish (Coons 
2013). “Many children with FASD do not legally qualify as mentally retarded and are 
likely to have problems accessing appropriate services. The child who appears 
physically normal and with an average IQ but who has behavioural difficulties, is 
more likely to be judged harshly than a child with intellectual impairment, and is more 
prone to the anger and frustration resulting from unrealistic expectations of parents 
and teachers who do not recognize or understand the neurological origins of the 
problem behaviours. The situation is aggravated if the mother and/or father are using 
alcohol in a chaotic family environment with negative impacts on the child with 
FASD and other family members” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008).  
“Many challenges faced in adolescence continue into adulthood” (Coons 2013). The 
most common secondary disability in adolescents and adults with FASD is mental 
health disorder, “with clinical depression being the most prevalent diagnosis amongst 
adults with FASD” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008) and attention-deficit disorder (ADD) 
and attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) in children (Burd, Carlson & 
Kerbeshian 2007). Adults with FASD have constant difficulties and usually need help 
with financial management, “medical care, productive work and safe housing” (Coons 
2013).  
 
5. Prevalence of FASD in South Africa 
 
The most widely used international summary prevalence estimate for FAS in the 
developed world is “1 to 1.5 cases per 1000 live births” (Klug & Burd 2003). 
Population estimates in the US are that “1% of newborns fall into the spectrum of 
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fetal alcohol disorders” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008). FAS rates have been “estimated 
to be 18 to 141 times greater than those for the various populations in the United 
States” (May, et al. 2000). For urban populations, “the prevalence of FAS/FASD 
commonly reported in the literature for urban populations is 0.5 to 3 cases per 1000 
live births for FAS and approximately 9 cases per 1000 live births for a FAS 
(Zadunayski, et al. 2006).  
A national study to determine the prevalence of FAS/FASD in South Africa has not 
been conducted (May, et al. 2007; Olivier, et al. 2013; Urban, et al. 2015). However, 
prevalence studies have been conducted in 3 of the country’s 9 provinces - viz. 
Gauteng, the Western Cape and the Northern Cape – and mostly in “geographically 
and socio-economically localised” communities (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008). 
According to Urban, et al. (2015:1017), research has “almost exclusively targeted 
populations with 2 demographic characteristics: (i) residents of rural areas or small 
towns, and (ii) areas with populations comprising predominantly the mixed ancestry 
minority group, designated officially as ‘Coloured’”.  
Rates of FAS/FASD in South Africa are reportedly amongst the highest in the world 
(Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008). Available data suggests that the rate of FAS/FASD is 
worryingly high in areas where research has been conducted. Surveys involving 
screening of Grade 1 school children found the prevalence to be more than 40 cases 
per 1000 children in the Western Cape and Northern Cape and more than 20 cases per 
1000 children in Gauteng (Rosenthal, Christianson & Cordero 2005).   
A study conducted in Gauteng among first-graders from four schools estimates the 
median prevalence of FAS to range from 19/1000 to 26.5/1000 (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 
2008). In the Western Cape, three studies were conducted in 1997, 1999 and 2002, 
amongst three different cohorts of Grade 1 children in the wine-producing town of 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
59 
 
Wellington. The first study reported a prevalence of FAS of between 40.5 and 
46.4/1000, the second a higher rate of 65.2-74.2/1000 and the third a combined FAS 
and PFAS rate of 68.0-89.2/1000 (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008).
3
 These results reflect 
an upward trend which can partly be explained by the influence of increased 
diagnostic accuracy over the years.  
Results from a more recent survey conducted in the rural town of Aurora, describe 
equally high rates of FASD among Grade 0 to 7 learners (Olivier, et al. 2013). “Of the 
160 learners screened” for FAS/PFAS, “78 (49%) were screen-positive, of whom 63 
(81.5%) were clinically assessed for FAS. The overall FAS/PFAS rate among the 
screened learners was 17.5%, with 16 (10%) children having FAS and 12 (7.5%) 
PFAS” (Olivier, et al. 2013). “High rates of stunting4; underweight and microcephaly 
were noted in all learners, especially those with FAS or PFAS” (Olivier, et al. 2013). 
“The median body mass index of children without” FAS/PFAS was 15.8 kg/m2, 
“
compared with a median 14.7 kg/m
2
 in children with FAS/PFAS” (Olivier, et al. 
2013). 
In studies conducted in the Northern Cape towns of De Aar and Upington among first 
graders in 2001 and 2002, , an overall prevalence rate of 67.2/1000 of FAS, and PFAS 
of 20.8/1000 was reported (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008; Urban, et al. 2008). The town 
of De Aar had the highest yet reported prevalence of 119.4/1000 of FAS and PFAS 
combined. A recent study by Urban and colleagues (2015) that compared the 
prevalence of FAS/FASD among Grade 1 school children in “2 suburbs with 
predominantly mixed ancestry and Black African populations” (Urban, et al. 
                                      
3
 Rendall-Mkosi, et al. (2008) explains “that in the third study the prevalence of both FAS and PFAS 
was determined and reported together which in part explains the higher prevalence”. 
4
 Stunting can be defined as a failure to grow optimally (height-for-age below -2SD from the median of 
the growth standard) and is usually caused by chronic undernutrition and/or infections. It is associated 
with poor physical and cognitive development in childhood and higher risks of cardiovascular and 
metabolic diseases in adulthood (Said-Mohamed, et al. 2015). 
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2015:”1016) in the city of Kimberly found there to be no difference between the FAS 
and FASD prevalence in the two communities (Urban, et al. 2015:1018). “Stratified 
by school, ascertainment for FAS status was over 90% for 12 schools and over 85% 
for the remaining 2 schools” (Urban, et al. 2015:1018). A FASD diagnosis was made 
in “96 children (6.4%) including 83 (5.5%) with FAS, 6 (0.4%) with partial FAS, and 
7 (0.5%) with ARND and none with ARBD” (Urban, et al. 2015:1024). 
Prior to the study by Urban and colleagues (2015), only one study reportedly sought 
to determine the prevalence of FAS in the Black African population of South Africa 
(Urban, et al. 2015:1017). This study found a “1.9% prevalence of FAS among 830 
first graders, with 1.7% prevalence in the subset of 414 learners from 2 predominantly 
Black African suburbs” in metropolitan Gauteng (Urban, et al. 2015:1017). 
The findings from the various studies are particularly noteworthy because it shows 
that FASD is an issue in both rural and urban areas, as well as one in predominantly 
Black African communities, and suggests that the rates of FASD may underestimate 
the true magnitude of FASD for at least two reasons. Firstly, epidemiological studies 
to determine the rates of FASD have typically been conducted among Grade 1 school 
children, therefore excluding a large pool of people who are not in school or who are 
older and who may have a FASD (Clarren, et al. 2001; Little et al. 1990). Secondly, 
the difficulty and lack of uniformity in accurately diagnosing the range of FASD, 
means that some children may be misdiagnosed or not diagnosed. Given that the rates 
of FASD may be greater than research suggests, it is worth reflecting on the patterns 
and rates of drinking among pregnant women and alcohol and contraceptive use 
among women of reproductive age, in an effort to gain a more accurate picture of the 
magnitude and scope of FASD.  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
61 
 
6. Alcohol Use among Pregnant Women in South Africa 
 
In a “survey of pregnant women attending antenatal clinics (ANC) in three areas in 
the Western Cape – George/Oudtshoorn, Vredenberg/Saldanha and the Cape 
Metropole – 42.8%” of the women interviewed reported drinking alcohol during 
pregnancy (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008). One quarter of the sample were classified as 
binge drinkers, i.e. had three or more drinks on one or more days in the past week, and 
almost one-third reported using “both alcohol and tobacco whilst pregnant” (Rendall-
Mkosi, et al. 2008). Other localised studies in the province have documented equally 
high rates of drinking during pregnancy. In a farm-based study in the town of 
Stellenbosch, 41.6% of mothers reported drinking during pregnancy (Rendall-Mkosi, 
et al. 2000) and in the town of Wellington 96% of the mothers who reported current 
drinking i.e. have consumed alcohol in the month preceding the study were binge 
drinkers (May, et al. 2005; Viljoen, et al. 2002). In the Western Cape, mothers of 
children with FAS were found to have as much as “12.6 drinks per week” during 
pregnancy “compared with 2.4 drinks” for women in the control group (Ojo, et al. 
2010).  
In the Northern Cape, 66% of mothers or caregivers of FAS children reported current 
drinking as compared with 15% of control women (Urban, et al. 2008). Eighty two 
percent (82%) of mothers or caregivers reported drinking during index pregnancy 
compared to 19% of controls and mothers and caregivers reported almost twice as 
high rate of current drinking and concurrent tobacco use during pregnancy (Urban, et 
al. 2008).  
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7. Alcohol and Contraceptive Use among Women in South 
Africa 
 
Although alcohol use among women in South Africa has traditionally been quite low, 
with high lifetime abstention persisting among many women (Parry, Harker 
Burnhams & London 2012), population-based surveys and localised studies have 
documented high rates of alcohol use and heavy drinking among women aged 15 
years and older (WHO 2004). If these women are sexually active and not using 
effective contraception then they may be at risk of having a FASD baby.  
In 1998, as part of the country’s first South African Demographic and Health Survey 
(SADHS 1998), one-fifth of the women (17%) reported that they were currently 
drinking. Sixteen percent (16%) of women reported that they were currently drinking 
and 32% of them reported binge drinking, usually over weekends. Approximately 
10% of women are dependent on alcohol (WHO 2004) and alcohol dominates 
admissions as the primary substance of abuse and dependence (Freeman & Parry 
2006; Parry, et al. 2005; 2003; Rataemane & Rataemane 2006; SACENDU 2011).  
In a more recent national population based survey on alcohol use and drinking 
patterns 27.1% of women 15 years and older reported that they were currently 
drinking (Peltzer, Davids & Njuho 2011). Binge drinking was reported by almost 3% 
of the women (Peltzer, Davids & Njuho 2011). In a cross-sectional household survey, 
which aimed to compare the extent of, and assess factors associated with drinking 
among women of reproductive age in a rural site in the Western Cape and an urban 
site in Gauteng, 27% of women in Gauteng reported current drinking compared to 
46% in the Western Cape site (Ojo, et al. 2010). Twenty percent (20%) of current 
drinkers in Gauteng were classified as high risk drinkers compared with 64% of 
current drinkers in the Western Cape (Ojo, et al. 2010).  
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Alcohol can impair one’s judgment and “is increasingly being recognised as a key 
determinant of sexual risk behaviour” (Morojele, et al. 2006; Trigg, Peterson, & 
Meekers 1997), and “consequently an indirect contributor to HIV transmission in sub-
Saharan countries” (Morojele, et al. 2006; WHO 2011). Findings from both 
qualitative and quantitative studies conducted in South Africa amongst adults aged 
between 22-45 years, suggest a relationship between drinking and risky sexual 
behaviour (Morojele, et al. 2004; 2006), including higher levels of unprotected sex 
(Fritz, et al. 2002; Mnyika, et al. 1997).  
Alcohol use by sexually active women who are not using effective contraception can 
lead to unplanned or unwanted pregnancies. A nationally representative survey of 
South African 15-24 year olds, found that of the 6217 women interviewed, 67.9% 
(n=4066) reported having had sex in the year before the survey (MacPhail, et al. 
2007). A little over 50% of these “sexually experienced women (52.2%) reported 
currently using contraception” (MacPhail, et al. 2007) and an equal number “reported 
ever having been pregnant” (MacPhail, et al. 2007). Of these, approximately “65% 
indicated that their pregnancy had been unwanted” (MacPhail, et al., 2007), however, 
“only 2.6% reported having accessed termination of pregnancy”. The results of this 
study show that not all sexually active women use contraception, and even when 
pregnancy is unplanned and unwanted, only a few access abortion services.  
The reported rates of drinking among women may be underestimated because women 
tend to underreport their drinking habits, either because female drinking is 
disapproved in some communities (Mphi 1994) or because of inadequate attention 
paid to making women feel at ease when asking sensitive questions (Gfroerer, Wright 
& Kopstein 1997). Moreover “questions about typical quantities of alcohol consumed 
can lead to underestimates as do questions about drinking standard drinks of alcohol” 
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(Peltzer, Davids & Njuho 2011). What constitutes a standard drink or standard 
drinking will of course vary depending on local customs. And although recent “recall 
methods encourage fuller reporting of volumes plus more accurate estimates of 
unrecorded consumption that places drinkers at risk of harm, they do not capture 
longer term drinking patterns” (Peltzer, Davids & Njuho 2011).  
 
8. Determinants of and Risk Factors for Drinking During 
Pregnancy and FASD 
 
Research indicates that some women drink alcohol when they are pregnant, thereby 
placing their fetuses at risk for alcohol’s damaging effects and consequently FASD in 
their children. But while drinking during pregnancy is a necessary condition for 
having a FASD baby, it is not by itself a sufficient condition for having a FASD baby. 
The spectrum of disorders that can occur in a child exposed to alcohol prenatally 
suggests that, because children are not affected in the same way, there must be other 
factors, beyond merely drinking during pregnancy or prenatal alcohol exposure to 
alcohol,  influencing the nature and extent of damage suffered by the child.  
“A woman’s drinking during pregnancy does not occur in a vacuum” (Coons 2013). 
Women from all socio-economic groups drink for a host of reasons, so the question is 
then not so much who drinks during pregnancy but rather why women do drink during 
pregnancy thereby risking FASD in their children. The motivation and urge to drink 
alcohol is complex and there is no single reason for why some women drink during 
pregnancy and the various manifestations of FASD features. Factors that play a role in 
contributing to a woman’s drinking during pregnancy and consequently the risk of 
FASD include alcohol’s relative availability and acceptability and the woman’s 
drinking pattern, nutrition, genetics and psycho-social and cultural context (Coons 
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2013; Katwan, Adnams & London 2011; May, et al. 2005; Ojo, et al. 2010; O’Leary 
2004; 2002; Urban, et al. 2015; 2008; Viljoen, et al. 2002; 2001).  
 
8.1. Social acceptability and availability  
Alcohol is not a banned or illegal substance in South Africa, although its sale, 
advertising and use are subject to regulation. Anyone aged 18 years and older can 
purchase alcohol in terms of the Liquor Act (2003). Despite restrictions on the use and 
sale, through time and location restrictions, alcohol is widely available in the formal 
and informal sectors to consumers in both rural and urban areas (NAMC 2002; Parry 
& Bennets 1999). According to Parry and Bennets (1999) the informal sector 
comprises approximately 200 000 liquor outlets (largely shebeens
5
) and hundreds of 
home brewers of traditional beer. Based on retail sales, in 1997, it was estimated that 
there were approximately “22 900 licensed outlets”, mainly comprising “liquor stores, 
restaurants and taverns (Setlalentoa, et al. 2010). The number of liquor outlets 
operating in the country has since increased (Parry & Bennets 1998) and South Africa 
is considered one of the highest consumers of pure alcohol per adult capita in the 
world (WHO 2011). In terms of recorded alcohol consumption the country ranks 47
th
 
out of 189 countries, with a per capita consumption of 7.81 litres (WHO 2004). When 
this is added to the unrecorded consumption of alcohol - such as traditionally or home 
brewed beverages, smuggling, and beverages with alcohol below the legal definition 
of alcohol such as mouthwashes - the total rises to over 10 litres (WHO 2004), and 
when that figure is adjusted for the number of current drinkers aged 15 years and 
older, the figure rises to approximately 20.1 litres of pure alcohol per capita (Rehm, et 
al. 2003). Of 35 countries surveyed, the 2004 WHO Global Status Report on Alcohol 
                                      
5
 Shebeens are usually illegal unregulated establishments, whereas taverns refer to legal and regulated 
establishments.  
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ranks South Africa as having  the highest reported figure of alcohol dependence 
(alcoholism) amongst the adult population: 27.8% of males and 9.9% of females 
(Freeman & Parry 2006; Parry, et al. 2005; WHO 2004). Alcohol dominates 
admissions as the primary substance of abuse and dependence (Parry, et al. 2005; 
2003; SACENDU 2011) and “is consistently the substance of abuse in people 
receiving help for substance related problems” in the country (Freeman & Parry 
2006).  
There are currently no binding regulations on alcohol advertising, sponsorships, sales 
promotion and product placement (WHO 2011), however the Department of Health is 
considering passing legislation in the form of the Control of Marketing of Alcoholic 
Beverages Bill (2013), which will totally prohibit the advertising and promotion of 
alcoholic products in the country (Paton 2012; Short 2012). A body of evidence 
suggests that several forms of alcohol advertising promotes and increases 
consumption (Ellickson, et al. 2005; Parry, Harker Burnhams & London 2012; Snyder 
2006). In South Africa, the alcohol industry reportedly spends over R 350 million on 
above-the-line advertising alone, with many tens of millions spent on below-the-line 
advertising such as sports sponsorships and promotions (Parry 2005).  
Up until 2007, when new packaging regulations were gazetted to regulate the 
packaging of alcoholic beverages in the country, cheap, poor quality wine with a high 
alcohol concentration was being sold in inferior packaging to the general public in 
massive volumes (McLoughlin 2007; NAMC 2002). Nowadays, in terms of the 
Regulations to the Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act (1972), container 
labels for alcoholic beverages must contain at least one of seven health messages or 
warnings that includes one that reads “Drinking during pregnancy can be harmful to 
your unborn baby”. Driving a vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.05% 
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and higher is criminal (Thakali 2011) but drinking during pregnancy is not, although 
there has been a contentious proposal from the Gauteng Provincial Government to 
effectively ban the sale of alcohol to pregnant women (Gauteng Liquor Bill 2012). In 
terms of the proposal, a licensed liquor trader is not allowed to sell, supply or give 
alcohol to a pregnant woman and is required to visibly display in the premises a notice 
that informs consumers about the dangers of drinking during pregnancy. The proposal 
makes no distinction between on-premise and off-premise sales of alcohol.  
Drinking is socially acceptable and there is generally very little criticism of people 
who drink. In some groups and on some occasions drinking - sometimes even to the 
point of intoxication - is encouraged and even expected. Because alcohol supposedly 
has a “mystique” that non-alcoholic beverages lack, alcohol is widely used in 
traditional rituals and celebrations, such as champagne toastings at weddings, birthday 
parties and graduation ceremonies. In some Christian churches, alcohol is also used as 
part of communion, where it is symbolic of the blood of Jesus Christ.  
“Many people, especially youth, may be, or feel, pressurized to drink alcohol as this is 
regarded as the social norm or the norm of a particular age or social/cultural grouping. 
The pressure to conform, especially amongst youth, is a well-documented 
psychological phenomenon. People may be (or fear they may be) excluded from or 
ostracized by the group if they do not partake in alcohol” (Freeman & Parry 2006:4). 
Young people, in particular, may therefore feel the need to drink and do so in harmful 
ways to show that they are part of the group so as to avoid exclusion. Indeed some 
people may start drinking “ignorant of the facts regarding the” impact and “effects of 
alcohol” (Freeman & Parry 2006). 
In many situations, alcohol may be used as a social lubricant to help people who may 
be uncomfortable at social events to relax, and make it easier for them to socialise. 
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Alcohol is the tool that enables them to lose their inhibitions or disinhibit their 
defenses and facilitate ‘good company’ (Freeman & Parry 2006). “Sharing an 
alcoholic drink with other people” is therefore seen to be a means to promote 
“bonding and connectedness among consumers often not gained through sharing non-
alcoholic drinks” (Freeman & Parry 2006). Many people who enjoy consuming 
alcohol, may also enjoy the state of being intoxicated by its effects; although perhaps 
in varying degrees, ranging from mild intoxication to being “totally smashed” or 
“motherless”. For some drinkers, “intoxication is not maintained unless additional 
alcohol is consumed. This may lead to more consumption and to states of drunkenness 
not necessarily intended when starting to drink” (Freeman & Parry 2006). In some 
groups getting drunk is almost like a badge of honour, even amongst women. Whereas 
some groups shun the idea of drinking to a state of intoxication, in other groups, the 
more you drink, the more you are accepted. Being able to drink “more than anyone 
else” or more quickly than anyone else is “often regarded as admirable qualities” 
(Freeman & Parry 2006). Among men, excessive drinking is usually seen as an 
indication of one’s “strength and manliness” (Freeman & Parry 2006). Hence people 
say things like ‘He sure can hold his liquor’, meaning he can drink a lot. Nowadays 
however this applies equally to women. “With changing gender roles some women 
also prove themselves with binge drinking patterns” (Freeman & Parry 2006). So one 
may equally hear things like ‘She can drink like a man’, which is actually meant as a 
compliment.  
 
8.2. Drinking patterns 
The quantity, regularity and timing of maternal drinking can significantly impact the 
development of key FASD features. Despite there being agreement that alcohol is a 
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teratogen, there is no clear consensus about the precise pattern of drinking that is 
dangerous (IOM 1996). Although a body of literature suggests that “light” or 
“moderate” drinking during pregnancy is not linked to detrimental impacts on mental 
or behavioural development during early childhood (Eriksen, et al. 2012; Kelly, et al. 
2013; 2009; O’Leary, et al. 2010; Polygenis, et al. 1998; Robinson, et al. 2010; Wilkie 
1997), this remains contestable.  
The Food-Based Dietary Guidelines for South Africa do not clearly stipulate how 
much alcohol constitutes “moderate” drinking (Van Heerden & Parry 2001) but in the 
United States of America (USA), it is defined as having up to 1 drink per day for 
women and up to 2 drinks per day for men (US Department of Agriculture 2010; US 
Department of Health and Human Services 2009). Although a woman’s drinking 
pattern, her overall state of health and a range of socio-economic, biological and 
environmental factors play a role in FASD, no amount of alcohol or drinking pattern 
can be said to be safe. Genetic examinations in mice suggest that even moderate 
amounts of exposure to alcohol can cause significant modifications (Laufer, et al. 
2013).  
On the other hand, regular heavy drinking during pregnancy is an established primary 
risk factor for FAS (Jones & Smith 1973; May, et al. 2005; Ojo, et al. 2010; Urban, et 
al. 2015; Viljoen, et al. 2002). The WHO defines heavy drinking as “a pattern that 
exceeds some standard of moderate drinking defined in terms of exceeding a certain 
daily volume or quantity per occasion” (WHO 1994) - or more specifically, socially 
acceptable drinking. “Socially acceptable” or “social drinking” is however “not 
necessarily moderate drinking” (WHO 1994), because  in some societies it may be 
socially acceptable to drink to the point of intoxication (WHO 1994). According to 
the WHO (2004) people who use alcohol in harmful ways fulfil any of the following 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
70 
 
criteria: they match criteria for alcohol abuse or dependence (“alcoholism”) or engage 
in periodic binge drinking or regular heavy consumption.  
In the 1990s, the World Health Organization published diagnostic guidelines for 
defining alcohol abuse in the ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural 
Disorders: Clinical descriptions and diagnostic guidelines (WHO 1993). ICD-10 
defines two alcohol use disorders – (a) harmful use and (b) dependence syndrome. 
Harmful use is defined as, “a pattern of psychoactive substance use that is causing 
damage to health. The damage may be physical (e.g. hepatitis following injection of 
drugs) or mental (e.g. depressive episodes secondary to heavy alcohol intake) (WHO 
1993). The WHO explains that “harmful use commonly, but not invariably, has 
adverse social consequences”, but that “social consequences in themselves”, are not 
sufficient to justify a diagnosis of harmful use” (WHO 1993).  
Another pattern of harmful alcohol use described by the WHO is dependence. 
“Dependence syndrome is a cluster of physiological, behavioural, and cognitive 
phenomena in which the use of a substance or a class of substances takes on a 
much higher priority for a given individual than other behaviours that once had 
greater value. A central descriptive characteristic of the dependence syndrome is 
the desire (often strong, sometimes overpowering) to take psychoactive drugs 
(which may or may not have been medically prescribed), alcohol, or tobacco” 
(WHO 1993). Usually, “a definite diagnosis of dependence is only made if three or 
more of the following have been present together at some time during the previous 
year: (a) a strong desire or sense of compulsion to take the substance; (b) 
difficulties in controlling substance-taking behaviour in terms of its onset, 
termination, or levels of use; (c) a physiological withdrawal state when substance 
use has ceased or been reduced” (WHO 1993). In South Africa the legal definition 
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can be found in the Prevention of and Treatment for Substance Abuse Act (No. 70 
of 2008), which defines alcohol abuse as the sustained or sporadic excessive use of 
alcohol, but does not seem to specify how we are to understand “excessive use”. 
High rates of binge drinking among women and pregnant women have been 
documented in studies conducted in South Africa. Binge drinking is typically defined 
in these studies as having had three or more alcoholic drinks on one occasion for 
females and five or more drinks on one occasion for men (Croxford & Viljoen 1999; 
Department of Health 1998; Peltzer, Davids & Njuho 2011; Reddy, et al. 2003).  
In the 1998 South African Demographic and Health Survey (SADHS), 32% of the 
16% of women who reported current drinking were classified as binge drinkers 
(Department of Health 1998) and “10% of women screened positive for alcohol 
problems” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008). A cross-sectional household survey 
conducted in a rural site in the Western Cape and an urban site in Gauteng revealed 
that of the 27% female drinkers who reported current drinking in Gauteng, 20% were 
high risk drinkers compared to 64% of the 46% current female drinkers in the 
Western Cape (Ojo, et al. 2010). High rates have also been documented in surveys 
involving schoolgirls: in Port Elizabeth (Eastern Cape) 43% reported binge drinking 
and in Cape Town (Western Cape) and Durban (KwaZulu-Natal), the figures stood at 
18.7% and 28.7% respectively (Rataemane & Rataemane 2006).  One reason for the 
high rates of heavy drinking and consequently FASD in some communities, notably 
those in the Western Cape and Northern Cape can be historically traced back to a 
system that used alcohol as a form of social control and to induce and secure labour 
on farms.   
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8.3. Historical explanations 
When the Dutch first settled in the Cape in the 1600s, the “dop system”6 was 
introduced in order to induce and secure labour on farms (La Hausse 1988; McKinstry 
2005.). In terms of this system indigenous “farm workers were partially paid in 
alcohol (typically wine) for their labour” (Scully 1992). The “system became 
entrenched during the 18
th
 century – the time of slaveholding – when poor quality 
wine was given, as a condition of service, at regular intervals during the working day 
and on weekends to farm workers and children as young as 12 years. Wine was 
cheaper than wages and over time the system also became a profitable mechanism for 
disposing poor quality wine” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008:23). 
By the end of the 19
th
 century, the British colonial government believed that alcohol 
had become such a serious social problem that it introduced laws to control drinking. 
Because they believed that alcohol made Africans disobedient (La Hausse 1988), the 
government sought to restrict access to alcohol by Africans. The Native Beer Act, 
which was passed in 1909 in Natal (now KwaZulu-Natal), became the model 
legislation throughout South Africa. In terms of this law, the legal consumption of 
alcohol by Africans was allowed only within municipal beerhalls (Parry & Bennetts; 
1998; 1999). African people were totally banned from drinking in bars and other 
public areas. La Hausse (1988) postulates that this was “based on the idea that it was 
wrong for natives to have their own beer hall (Setlalentoa, et al. 2010). One exception 
to the law was made for mine workers, who were “legally permitted to brew and then 
distribute beer” among workers at the end of their shift and on condition that it was 
“consumed on the mine premises” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008:25). Because its 
                                      
6
 The word “dop” is Afrikaans and means alcohol or drink.  
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consumption off mine premises was illegal, “the system ensured that workers not only 
returned to work but also returned sober” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008).  
The restrictions placed on the sale and consumption of alcohol to Africans led to a 
proliferation of homebrewed alcoholic beverages (especially sorghum beer) and 
small-scale illegal outlets that served them. These activities provided many people 
with a source of income and continue to play an important role in the economy. 
According to Parry and Bennetts (1998) the production and sale of homebrewed 
liquor represented an act of defiance by Africans against the restrictions placed on 
them. “Government controlled beerhalls and illegal shebeens were central to social 
networks and featured strongly as means of both control and resistance in both pre- 
and apartheid South Africa” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008).  
Although the dop system has been outlawed in South Africa, the system reportedly 
persisted in the 1990s and there is evidence that variations of the system continue to 
operate in farming communities. For example, in a study by London (2000) almost 
one-fifth (19.4%) of farmworkers in the deciduous fruit industry “reported current use 
of the dop system” (London 2000), and nearly 50% reported having experienced the 
system on “one or more farms in the past” (London 2000). The study found that 
workers with “past experience of the system were 10 times less likely to be abstainers 
than colleagues without exposure to the system“ (Gossage, et al. 2014). Undoubtedly 
therefore the dop system, together with “other coercive and paternalistic labour and 
social control” practices played a significant role in influencing people’s decision to 
drink and in shaping drinking patterns in the country (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008). 
Collectively these measures influenced the racially aligned drinking patterns and 
preferences in the country (Mager, 2004; McLoughlin, 2007).  The dop system may 
have been outlawed but it has left a devastating legacy. Farm workers’ experiences of 
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the dop system have “been linked to numerous negative health outcomes including 
greater poverty” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008) and FAS (London, Sanders, & Te 
WaterNaude 1998b; London, et al. 1998a; May, et al. 2007), and today problem 
drinking is deeply ingrained in the communities (May, et al. 2005). Even today, 
despite the low wages that they earn working on farms, farm workers continue to 
spend money on alcohol and often liquor outlet owners will extend credit to the 
workers, effectively ensuring that they are in constant debt. The dop system “evolved 
into a system of” institutionalized “alcohol use and social control” and created a 
heavy dependence on alcohol, and which consequently resulted in generations 
becoming trapped in “cycles of poverty and heavy alcohol use” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 
2008). 
 
8.4. Psychological explanations 
Alcohol is controversial largely because it is no ordinary commodity. Alcohol has 
psychoactive properties. It affects a person’s brain and influences an individual’s 
behaviour in a way that ordinary commodities, like for example bread and milk do not 
do. Many people find their life circumstances abysmal and intolerable and drink to 
reduce tension or anxiety or to enhance feelings of wellbeing. Jellinek (1971) believes 
that because alcohol is thought to relieve tension or stress, drinkers tend to drink more 
and more frequently. Tolerance thus develops over time and individuals may then 
drink only to become intoxicated. In South Africa women have reported drinking 
during pregnancy because they were depressed, stressed or bored (May, et al. 2005; 
Morojele, et al. 2006; Rouleau, et al. 2003; Urban, et al. 2008; Viljoen, et al. 2002; 
Vythilingum, et al. 2012).  
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8.5. Socio-economic status and nutrition 
Having low socio-economic status, including living in poverty (May, et al. 2005; 
Viljoen, et al. 2002), and having a low level of education (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 
2008), are additional factors for abusing alcohol and consequently that increase the 
probability for having a FASD child. This is because poverty is thought to exacerbate 
stress and heavy drinking and consequently increases the odds of unprotected sex. 
Women who are poor are also likely to have poor nutrition or be undernourished. 
Research is increasingly reporting the effect of poor nutrition on pregnancy outcomes 
(Keen, et al. 2010; May, et al. 2009; 2005; Urban, et al. 2008). Alcohol can interfere 
with maternal nutrition and with the digestion and absorption of food (Keen, et al. 
2010) thereby displacing other dietary nutrients. Undernourished or smaller women 
may be at increased risk of having a FASD baby because they attain higher blood-
alcohol concentrations than women who drink that same amount but are adequately 
nourished or have a larger body (Chudley, et al. 2005).  
 
8.6. Genetics   
Genetic factors also play a role in FASD, particularly with regards to alcohol 
metabolism for at least two reasons (Coons 2013). Firstly, this is because not all 
children that have been exposed to alcohol prenatally display clinical effects. And, 
secondly because studies on animals “have shown that there are strain variances that 
are determined by differences in genetic background” (Coons 2013).  
Within families there is a high recurrence rate and risk of FASD (Chudley, et al. 
2005). "For example research has documented that siblings of children with FAS have 
an increased risk of FAS at 170 per 1000 among older siblings and 771 per 1,000 in 
younger siblings compared to 1.9 per 1000 in the population as a whole” (Coons 
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2013:17-18). Other studies have shown that identical twins tend to be affected in more 
similar ways by prenatal alcohol exposure compared to non-identical twins thus 
suggesting a genetic component to FASD expression (Astley 2011; Coons 2013). It is 
postulated that “variations in the functions of particular gene products or enzymes that 
may lead to alcohol cravings and alcoholism may increase a woman’s susceptibility to 
drink during pregnancy” (Coons 2013:18).  
Additionally “emerging evidence suggests that some genes found in mothers, and 
others found in mothers and/or their children, may be protective by influencing 
alcohol metabolism and by being associated with lower BAC for the same amount of 
alcohol consumed in individuals who have the genes compared to those who do” 
(Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008:21). According to May and colleagues (2009) individuals 
“who are lacking in alcohol dehydrogenase (ADH) and aldehyde dehydrogenase 
(ALDH) metabolism tend to drink less and therefore have a lower risk” of having 
“children with FASD” (Coons 2013). Concomitantly, women “who have more ADH 
and ALDH may be at an increased risk of having children with FASD” (Coon 
2013:18). However, despite the role of genetics in maternal drinking and FASD, it is 
important to note that any amount of drinking during any stage in pregnancy is 
potentially harmful to the fetus and consequently the child (Coons 2013).  
Other determinants of drinking during pregnancy and FASD include: being raised in 
an environment where heavy drinking is present (Astley, et al. 2000; May, et al. 2005; 
Rouleau, et al. 2003; Viljoen, et al. 2002), being exposed to “abusive and 
dysfunctional families” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008) and having a partner or family 
member who drinks in harmful ways (Bakhireva, et al. 2011), and polydrug use, 
particularly concurrent drinking and smoking during pregnancy (Ojo, et al. 2010; 
O’Leary 2004; 2002; Urban, et al. 2008; Vythilingum, et al. 2012).  
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9. Prevention of FASD 
 
There is no cure for FASD, and although treatment can ameliorate some of its effects, 
affected children may suffer a range of permanent disabilities. FASD is 100% 
avoidable, if women stop drinking if they are or plan to become pregnant. However, 
changing behaviour – be it to abstain or reduce alcohol intake – is not as 
straightforward in practice as it may seem in theory. This has much to do with the 
reasons women drink and understanding the range of factors that make some women 
more likely than others to continue drinking during pregnancy and therefore risk 
miscarriage or having a FASD child. The fact that a range of variables, beyond 
maternal drinking or prenatal alcohol exposure, have a role to play in FASD suggests 
that a multifaceted approach aimed at the level of the individual and population is 
more likely to be successful than any single strategy by itself (WHO 2005). Despite 
the general difficulties involved in efforts to change behaviour, and the uncertainty 
about their efficacy and cost-effectiveness, a number of strategies  discussed below -
some of which have an evidence base of demonstrated efficacy - can be used to 
reduce or prevent maternal drinking during pregnancy and consequently FASD 
(Wilson & Wilson 2013).  
 
9.1. Screening for alcohol use and brief interventions   
Screening for alcohol use is critical in assessing the severity of use and need for brief 
interventions. A number of validated screening tools are available to assist in 
identifying women who may be abusing alcohol and at risk of having a child with 
FASD. These include: the AUDIT (Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test), T-
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ACE and TWEAK tests. The T-ACE and TWEAK tests were developed specifically 
for use with pregnant women (Bradley, et al. 1998; CDC 2009; Chang 2001; Elliott, et 
al. 2008).  
The TWEAK is a five-item screening tool that includes the following set of questions 
(Chan, et al. 1993): 
i. Tolerance: How many drinks can you hold? 
ii. Worried: Have close friends or relatives worried or complained about your 
drinking in the past year? 
iii. Eye opener:  Do you sometimes take a drink in the morning when you get up? 
iv. Amnesia: Has a friend or family member ever told you about things you said 
or did while you were drinking that you could not remember? 
v. K( C): Do you sometimes feel the need to cut down on your drinking?  
Scores are calculated as follows: A positive response to the question on Tolerance and 
Worry yields 2 points each; whereas an affirmative reply to question E, A, or K scores 
1 point each. A total score of 2 or more points on the TWEAK indicates a positive 
outcome for pregnancy risk drinking (Chan, et al. 1993). 
The instrument shown to be the most sensitive (indicating true exposure) in the 
periconceptual populations is T-ACE (Bradley, et al. 1998; Sokol, et al. 1989). The T-
ACE test consists of the following four questions: 
i. Tolerance: How many drinks does it take to make you feel high? 
ii. Annoyance: Have people annoyed you by criticizing your drinking? 
iii. Cut down: Have you ever felt you ought to cut down on your drinking?  
iv. Eye opener: Have you ever had a drink first thing in the morning to steady 
your nerves or get rid of a hangover? 
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Scores are calculated as follows: a reply of More than two drinks to question T is 
considered a positive response and scores 2 points, and an affirmative answer to 
question A, C, or E scores 1 point, respectively. A total score of 2 or more points on 
the T-ACE indicates a positive outcome for pregnancy risk drinking (Sokol, et al. 
1989).  
The purpose of brief interventions is to motivate individuals with “a real or potential 
alcohol problem to do something about it and are “characterised by their low intensity 
and short duration” (WHO 2001). Brief interventions “usually comprise one to three 
sessions of counselling and education” (Freeman & Parry 2006; U.S. Department of 
Health & Human Services 2009), and have been  found to be effective in health care 
settings (Bient, Miller & Tonigan 1993; D’Onfrio & Degutis 2002; Whitlock, et al. 
2004; Wilk, Jensen & Havighurst 1997) and in community (O’Connor & Whaley 
2007) and college settings (Larimer & Cronce 2002). In the health care setting it may 
provide opportunities for medical professionals to educate patients about the potential 
harms of drinking during pregnancy, and to their use of medication and other aspects 
of treatment in addition to referring them for treatment and rehabilitation and other 
support services (WHO 2001).  
A few randomised controlled trials that sought to assess the success of brief 
interventions coupled with the provision of contraceptive services and that involved 
partners of women who drink reported reduced rates of maternal drinking (Chang, et 
al. 2005; Floyd, et al. 2007; O’Connor & Whaley 2007).  For example, a randomized 
trial of a brief intervention, that entailed the provision of four counselling sessions and 
contraception services to women at high risk for having a child with FASD, found the 
odds of reducing the risk  to be higher in the intervention group over the information 
(control) group (Floyd, et al. 2009). Another randomized trial of a brief intervention 
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targeting pregnant women in the third trimester, reported results that showed women 
in the brief intervention group to be less likely to continue drinking during pregnancy 
than women in the assessment only group by the third trimester (Elliott, et al. 
2008:59; Floyd, et al. 2009). And a “2005 randomized study of pregnant women 
found that a single brief intervention counselling session that included partners” to be 
effective in reducing drinking among the heavier drinkers in the treatment group 
(Floyd, et al. 2009).  
 
9.2. Treatment and rehabilitation services 
While screening and brief interventions may have success at getting some women to 
abstain or cut down on their drinking, the effectiveness of these strategies is doubtful 
if the woman is dependent on alcohol or cannot easily stop drinking. So while some 
women may act on advice to stop drinking if they are or plan to become pregnant, 
others may ignore the advice, either because their circumstances are not conducive to 
them abstaining or because they are “alcoholic”.  For alcoholics behaviour change 
may be a difficult if not almost impossible thing to do on their own, and as Abel 
(1998:14) explains, there is little reason to think that women alcoholics will be any 
different from the drunk driver who, despite its unlawful status and the risk involved, 
continues to drink and drive. What Abel (1998) is suggesting is that the pregnant 
alcoholic woman is an alcoholic woman who happens to be pregnant, rather than a 
woman who happens to become alcoholic during pregnancy. By Abel’s (1998) 
account, it is irrational to expect pregnant women who are alcoholics to simply 
abstain, even if they are aware of the dangers of drinking during pregnancy and 
especially if appropriate treatment and rehabilitation services are neither available nor 
accessible to help them to do so. In the absence of treatment and rehabilitation 
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services, prevention efforts are likely to have little, if any, impact on the drinking 
habits of women at risk of having a child with FASD. Access to alcohol and other 
drug use treatment programmes designed for women that include support services, 
can result in changes in alcohol and other drug use, mental health symptoms and birth 
outcomes (Ashley, Marsden & Brady 2003).  
In view of the many factors that foster alcohol abuse and dependence, treatment 
programmes must make systematic use of a combination of approaches (Moos & 
Finney 1983) that may include cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT), the use of 
pharmacological agents and community programmes such as Alcoholics Anonymous 
(AA) to help alcoholics overcome abuse and dependence (Sue, Sue & Sue 1994; NHS 
2011). Cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) is a form of counselling or therapy that 
emphasizes a problem solving approach to alcoholism (Sue, Sue & Sue 1994). Among 
the many CBT strategies devised to treat alcoholism and other substance-abuse related 
disorders is aversion therapy, relaxation techniques and motivational approaches. 
Aversion therapy is based on classical conditioning principles and has been used for 
many years. It is a process by which sight, smell or taste of alcohol is paired with a 
noxious stimulus. For example, alcoholics may be given painful electric shocks while 
drinking alcohol, or they may be given agents that induce vomiting (emetics) when 
they get the urge to drink or after smelling or tasting alcohol (Cooper, Russell & 
George 1988). Because people often consume alcohol to cope with emotional 
problems, behavioural techniques such as relaxation and stress management have also 
been explored in the treatment of alcoholism as has a motivational approach in which 
alcoholics are helped to define and accomplish important and realistic goals (Cooper, 
Russell & George 1988; Cox & Klinger 1988, NHS 2011).  
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A range of medications can also be prescribed to prevent drinking. These include: (i) 
Acamprosate, which has been “shown to lower relapse rates” in alcoholics; (ii) 
Disulfiram or Antabuse, which produces unpleasant side effects if a person drinks 
within 2 weeks after taking the drug”, and (iii) Naltrexone or Vivitrol, “which 
decreases alcohol cravings” (A.D.A.M 2011). None of these drugs can however be 
used by pregnant women or drinkers who have certain medical conditions (A.D.A.M. 
2011), thus underscoring the need for psychotherapy.   
 
9.3. Contraception and abortion services 
Aside from not drinking during pregnancy one sure way to avoid FASD is for women 
drinkers to simply avoid pregnancy and birth altogether. If women who drink do not 
get pregnant or do not give birth, then there is no fetus or child at risk of FASD. 
FASD can also be prevented if sexually active women who do not wish to become 
pregnant use effective contraception. Some people may however elect not to use 
contraception, for whatever reason, or their choice of contraception may fail, resulting 
in unwanted or unplanned pregnancy. Some pregnant women may not wish to remain 
pregnant and consequently become parents and they should have access to abortion 
services. I am not suggesting that women should (have a duty to) use contraception or 
that they should (have a duty to) selectively abort their fetuses; only that they should 
have the right to terminate a pregnancy, especially ones they do not want. Even if they 
abort for reasons of possible disability in their child, this is not a good reason for 
preventing them from having an abortion.
7
 One can have a right to (not) reproduce but 
it is debatable whether one has a duty to (not) reproduce. Moreover, it seems 
                                      
7
 In South Africa, under the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act, women may terminate their 
pregnancies for a host of reasons, including if their future child is likely to be disabled. 
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unreasonable to deny women the option of terminating a pregnancy, particularly since 
pregnancy and birth prevention may be less costly than those of FASD.  
 
9.4. Public education 
According to the WHO (2002), the most successful approaches to change drinking 
behaviour and attitudes concentrate not only on trying to change the drinker’s 
behaviour directly, but also on influencing the community environment around the 
drinkers. Programmes aimed at the wider community can serve to increase levels of 
awareness of alcohol abuse and the possible negative effects associated with maternal 
drinking during pregnancy (Glik, et al. 2008). But while it is generally recommended 
that programmes “to prevent FASD should include universal or community-level 
measures, little has been done to document their effectiveness” (Chersich, et al. 2012). 
One local study has however sought to determine if the prevalence of FASD “would 
be reduced by universal interventions aimed at raising community and health worker 
awareness of the harms of maternal drinking and to shift-related social norms” 
Chersich, et al. 2012).  
Findings from a study conducted in two towns in the Northern Cape suggest that 
“universal prevention might reduce FASD by 30% and have population-level effects” 
(Chersich, et al. 2012). The study took place from 2003 to 2006 in De Aar and from 
2005 to 2010 in Upington and occurred in three phases (Chersich, et al. 2012). Phase 
one involved conducting “a baseline assessment of FAS and PFAS prevalence among 
cohorts of infants, born in a 1-year period” (Chersich, et al. 2012); maternal alcohol 
use; women’s “knowledge and attitudes to alcohol use; and the amount of exposure to 
the intervention” (Chersich, et al. 2012). In phase two of the study, various FASD 
prevention interventions, led by trained community health workers, were implemented 
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in the study sites over a one-year period. This included the distribution of pamphlets 
and posters that were designed in consultation with the local community (Chersich, et 
al. 2012). In addition, FASD related articles were regularly “published in local 
community newspapers and reinforced by regular advertisements on the local 
community radio. Local drama productions on FASD themes were performed” and 
“community workers presented health talks” on various topics “at clinics for infants 
and young children, family planning and antenatal care and at church and community 
meetings. Training workshops on FASD were held for provincial and district-level 
staff from the Departments of Health and Social Services. FASD prevention messages 
were mainstreamed within the Department of Health's activities and in their 
interactions with the public, with FASD topics given prominence in all National 
Health Promotion events” (Chersich, et al. 2012). Phase three of the study involved a 
follow-up assessment of FAS/PFAS prevalence 1 year after prevention activities were 
implemented. The same procedures were used as in phase one.   
At baseline, prior to the implementation of the “prevention activities, education about 
harms of drinking during pregnancy was relatively low” (Chersich, et al. 2012). Only 
about half of the female participants knew “about the potential risks of drinking 
during pregnancy” (Chersich, et al. 2012). A little under 40% “recalled having 
received information about FASD on the radio or television, while about two-thirds 
reported receiving this information from a nurse” (Chersich, et al. 2012). FASD/PFAS 
prevalence was 8.9% (72/809) (Chersich, et al. 2012). Mothers of children with 
FAS/PFAS reported drinking on average 14.9 units a week during pregnancy 
(Chersich, et al. 2012). Post-intervention the average was 5.8 units a week and 
FAS/FASD prevalence dropped to 5.7% (43/71) (Chersich, et al. 2012). Changes in 
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the amount consumed were, however, only detected in mothers of children with 
PFAS, and not among women with a FAS child (Chersich, et al. 2012).  
The intervention also “reached a large proportion of the population who recalled 
receiving information about FASD” – around 80% reported receiving information 
from nurses and about 60% reported that they received it from the media (Chersich, et 
al. 2012).  Approximately three-quarters “of women believed that using posters to 
communicate information about drinking harms could modify women’s drinking” 
(Chersich, et al. 2012). Combined, “these findings provide supportive evidence of the 
need for enhanced community-level interventions in settings where levels of 
knowledge about the harms of maternal drinking are low” (Chersich, et al. 2012). But 
while universal approaches are better “suited to altering occasional episodic drinking 
in pregnancy, alcoholic women and those with depression require more individualized 
and specialized services to alter their drinking” (Chersich, et al. 2012).   
 
9.5. Early diagnosis and intervention 
Early diagnosis and being raised in a stable and nurturing home and receiving services 
for a range of physical, cognitive, psychological, sensory and speech impairments 
have been found to have a beneficial effect on children with FASD (Streissguth, et al. 
2004; Zizzo, et al. 2013).  
The “earlier identification of FASD is made the sooner intervention efforts can be 
implemented. A missed diagnosis has consequences, which accrue the longer the 
diagnosis is missed. Screening for and diagnosing FASD as early as possible after one 
year of age increases the possibilities that a child will receive appropriate care and 
stimulation to minimise developmental delays and that the mother will be supported 
so that she does not have another alcohol affected child” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008).  
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The testing for fatty acid ethyl ester (FAEE) in infant meconium (first stool) and scalp 
hair are two methods to screen for PAE and thus facilitate the early identification of 
children at risk for FASD (Zadunayski, et al. 2006; Zizzo, et al. 2013). In addition to 
enabling an early FASD diagnosis, testing the biological samples of infants can also 
“allow for counselling that could influence future maternal behaviour in subsequent 
pregnancies” (Zadunayski, et al. 2006).  
However, despite the benefits of screening for biomarkers for PAE in the infant’s 
biological samples, testing raises ethical, social and legal concerns (Zizzo, et al. 
2013). Zizzo and colleagues (2013:1451) explain that “Some are common to neonatal 
screening programs (e.g., parental consent, confidentiality, and third party disclosure), 
while others are related to the specific nature of FASD, where a positive result has 
implications for both the child and mother (e.g. both could be stigmatized)”.  
In their reflection and commentary on the ethics of meconium screening for PAE, 
these authors identify “7 major ethical concerns in the ethical, social, and legal 
literature” (Zizzo, et al. 2013:1452).  These relate to (i) the targeted populations for 
screening, (ii) consent to screening programmes and respect for persons, (iii) stigma 
and participation rates in screening programmes, (iv) cost-effectiveness of a PAE 
biomarker screen, (v) consequences of false-positive and false-negative test results, 
(vi) confidentiality and appropriate follow-up of positive screen results, and (vii) use 
of screen results for criminal prosecution (Zizzo, et al. 2013: 1452-1454). 
According to Zizzo and co-authors (2013) “a key concern in the literature is the 
debate over whether or not screening tests should be offered to all pregnant women 
(i.e., universal screening) or limited to those deemed at risk (i.e., targeted screening). 
Both approaches are however fraught with problems. Although, “universal screening 
is most respectful of the principle of justice and minimizes the risk of stigmatizing 
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and stereotyping population groups viewed as at risk” (Zizzo, et al., 2013:1452), the 
approach gives rise to ethical questions concerning “cost-effectiveness, the use of 
limited healthcare resources, and the lack of distinction between apparently high-risk 
and low-risk populations” (Zizzo, et al., 2013:1452). On the other hand, although 
“targeted screening is viewed as a more economically viable option” concerns have 
been raised over its “potential for negative stereotyping, and for over identification of 
others” (Zizzo, et al. 2013:1452). One reason for being apprehensive about meconium 
testing is because “FAEEs have also been identified in meconium and hair samples 
from newborns of abstaining mothers” (Zadunayski, et al. 2006). 
A particular problem concerning meconium testing for PAE is that is also a de facto 
test of the mother. And since medical testing or treatment of children usually requires 
the permission of the child’s parents or legal guardians, it is questionable whether 
women will consent to testing of their children when the test results will also reveal 
details about their drinking habits and when “the screen may engender negative legal 
and social consequences (e.g., stigma and removal of the child from the mother’s 
care) for both mother and child of the test results are positive (Zizzo, et al. 
2013:1452). Therefore test results must be interpreted in ways that will not be harmful 
to women and particularly abstaining women (Zadunayski, et al. 2006). Although 
screening is beneficial, in that it can alert one to the need for diagnosis, it is not a 
substitute for a clinical diagnosis of FASD. 
In addition to early identification and intervention, growing up in a stable and 
nurturing home has been found to be an important protective factor in ameliorating 
some of the secondary disabilities however this is not always the reality of a child 
with FASD in South Africa (Coons 2013; Streissguth, et al. 2004; 1994). For example 
in “five case studies in Gauteng, all of the children” with FASD “were either staying 
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with their grandparents or had been placed in foster care” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 
2007). Whereas “five case studies in the rural Western Cape revealed that all of the 
children were still staying with their biological mother, even though some of the 
mothers continued to abuse alcohol and some had more than one alcohol affected 
child” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008). In another study in the Western Cape 
approximately “1 in 5 of mothers” of FASD children” were dead (Olivier, et al. 2013).   
Research-based interventions in the Western Cape have found “that in spite of 
cognitive and classroom behavioral difficulties, children with FASD from a 
vulnerable environment demonstrated significant cognitive improvements following a 
classroom intervention with a programme that targeted literacy and linguistic skills” 
(Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2007). However a FASD diagnosis “often does not occur until 
school age, if at all, at which point maximal benefit from early intervention and 
support may not be achieved” (Zadunayski, et al. 2006).  
 
10. Social and Economic Costs of Alcohol Abuse and FASD 
 
Alcohol abuse and maternal drinking during pregnancy and consequently FASD has a 
significant impact economically, socially, and medically. When one considers the 
primary and secondary disabilities that result from prenatal alcohol exposure (PAE) – 
“intellectual deficits and learning disabilities; hyperactivity; attention and/or memory 
deficits; inability to manage anger; difficulties with problem solving; and prenatal and 
postnatal growth deficiencies - it is easy to understand that parenting a child with 
FASD presents a significant set of challenges throughout the life cycle of the child” 
(Rendall-Mksoi, et al. 2008). The birth of a disabled child, often places heavy 
demands on family morale, and if they are poor, thrusts them deeper into poverty and 
hence seriously hinders their development. Moreover, and depending on the nature 
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and severity of the child’s disability, they would be unlikely to find meaningful 
employment and be almost entirely dependent on social assistance from the state.  
Alcohol imposes a high economic cost on society (WHO 2004). A “conservative 
estimate of the economic costs of alcohol abuse (harmful use) based on research 
conducted in other countries is 1% of gross domestic product (GDP)” (Freeman & 
Parry 2006). Between 2000 and 2001, the harmful use of alcohol reportedly cost the 
South African economy approximately nine billion rand a year (Parry, Myers & Tiede 
2003; Schmidt 2003). This amount includes the costs for alcohol-related crime, 
hospital expenses, and lost production (Parry, Myers & Tiede 2003; Schmidt 2003) 
and is almost twice as much as that which was received in excise duties over the same 
period (Freeman & Parry 2006). In 2009, alcohol was estimated to have cost the 
provincial and national health department R 6.1 billion and R 0.5 billion respectively 
(Budlender 2009).  
The exact fiscal impact of FAS/FASD in South Africa is difficult to calculate, largely 
because no studies have been conducted to determine the national prevalence rate or 
the economic cost of FAS/FASD for the state. Where the issue of FAS/FASD has 
been considered, it has been considered under the general cost of alcohol abuse or 
birth defects and genetic disorders to the country. The cost of birth defects and genetic 
disorders to the country in terms of burden of disease is estimated to run into several 
million rand annually (Department of Health 2001). Cost estimates done in the US, 
have estimated the annual cost for FAS to range from US$75 million in 1984 to 
approximately US$4 billion in 1998 (Abel & Sokol 1991; Elliott, et al. 2008; 
Harwood, Fountain & Livermore 1998). Cost components include the types of costs 
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associated with FAS such as special
8
 medical and education costs and the costs of 
social services and support for disabled persons and their families. It is therefore 
likely that the cost of drinking during pregnancy and FASD to the state is grossly 
underestimated.  
Although parents and families will, in many cases, cover the costs of caring for a child 
with FAS, this is not always the case, especially where the family is poor or 
dependent on social assistance from the state. In terms of the Social Assistance Act 
(No 13 of 2004), physically or mentally disabled adults and parents or caregivers of 
children with physical or mental disability may apply for social assistance, in the form 
of a cash payment or grant. If the person with a mental or physical disability is a child, 
i.e. legally, younger than 18 years of age, the child’s parent, primary caregiver or 
court appointed foster parent can apply for a child dependency grant, if they are SA 
citizens or permanent residents who are living in the country. To qualify for the grant, 
the child must need full-time and special care. The applicant must submit a medical or 
assessment report confirming permanent severe disability. If the child’s parent or 
caregiver has an income above a certain level they cannot get the grant. They do not 
qualify if they earn more than R144 000 per year if they are single, and if married, 
their combined income should not be above R288 000 per year. The income limit does 
not apply to foster parents. The care dependency grant covers disabled children from 
birth until they turn 18 (South African Social Security Agency 2011). As at April 
2012, the grant amount was R1200 per month. Over a five year period (2005-2009) 
the number of children accessing care dependency grants rose from nearly 86 000 in 
2005 to an estimated 109 000 in 2009 (South African Social Security Agency 2009). 
                                      
8
 Special costs are costs over above ordinary costs and would include the (additional) costs for things 
such as medical treatment and social assistance  
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According to the 2012 Child Gauge (Hall, Woolard & Smith 2012), 117 246 children 
with severe disabilities currently receive the care dependency grant.  
Disabled adults may qualify for a disability grant. To qualify for a disability grant, a 
person must be between 18 and 59 years if they are female or 18 and 60 years if they 
are male and they must not earn more than R47 400 if single or R94 800 if married. 
The person’s assets must not be worth more than R792 000 if they are single or R1 
584 000 if they are married. The applicant must either be a citizen, permanent resident 
or refugee and be living in the country and be unable to work because of a mental or 
physical disability. The applicant must undergo a medical examination where a doctor 
appointed by the state will assess the degree of disability (South African Social 
Security Agency 2010). As of 1 April 2013, the grant amounts to R 1260 per month. 
A person can get a permanent disability grant if their disability will continue for more 
than a year and a temporary disability grant if their disability will continue for a 
continuous period of not less than six months and not more than twelve months. A 
permanent disability grant does not mean that the person will receive the grant for life, 
but just that it will continue for longer than 12 months. The number of individuals 
receiving disability grants has more than doubled since 2000, rising to 1.4 million in 
2008, and declining to 1.2 million recipients in 2010
9
 (South African Social Security 
Agency 2010). As at 2011, a total of 1,200,431 beneficiaries received disability 
grants, representing 8% of the total (South African Social Security Agency 2010). 
A disabled adult who receives a disability grant, war veteran’s grant or grant for older 
persons, and is unable to care for him or herself owing to physical or mental 
disability, may qualify for an additional grant called a grant-in-aid. As at January 
                                      
9
 The growth between 2000 and 2008 has been attributed to the expanding number of AIDS-sick people 
who were unable to access ARVs prior to the incremental roll out in 2004 (see Seekings & Nattrass 
2005 and Nattrass 2006). 
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2013 the grant was R280 per month. To qualify for the grant-in-aid, the disabled 
person must provide a medical or assessment report, which shows they need full-time 
care (South African Social Security Agency 2010). A person does not however 
qualify for either of these grants if he or she is in prison or living in any kind of state-
subsidized facilities such as an old age home or psychiatric hospital or is receiving 
care from a treatment centre (South African Social Security Agency 2010). 
 
11. Concluding Remarks 
 
Drinking during pregnancy predisposes one to adverse pregnancy outcomes. A child 
exposed to alcohol prenatally can suffer a range of disorders and disabilities in 
varying degrees. FAS is the most severe diagnosis on a continuum of disorders that 
can occur in a child exposed to alcohol prenatally. It is not a hereditary condition that 
can be passed onto one’s children; it is the result of prenatal alcohol exposure through 
maternal drinking during pregnancy. Affected children experience physical and 
psychological impairment throughout their lives.  
FASD is 100% avoidable if a woman does not drink during pregnancy. However a 
range of variables influence a woman’s decision to drink, sometimes even during 
pregnancy and which places her at increased risk of having a FASD baby. Rather than 
focusing simply on alcohol use, “it is essential to understand” and intervene “in the 
accumulation of risk that puts an individual” at risk of having a FASD child (Coons 
2013). Accurate data on drinking during pregnancy is crucial to the design and 
evaluation of prevention programmes that have some prospect of success.  
Alcohol abuse and drinking during pregnancy are complex problems, inseparable 
from many other factors including a woman’s mental health, her socio-economic 
status and family and community attitudes to drinking. Any programme that seeks to 
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make a positive change must understand and address the “array of interrelated 
demographic, social, economic, psychological and biological factors” (Rendall-
Mkosi, et al. 2008), which not only influence a woman’s decision to drink but which 
“also increase or decrease the damage to the fetus for a given amount of alcohol” 
(Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008). Thus the success of prevention efforts requires that 
social conditions that contribute to the vulnerability of women to alcohol use also be 
addressed and that sufficient financial and human resources are provided to this end. 
Concerning the range of risk factors for FAS/FASD, one may say that each one 
represents an important area of study that continues to further our knowledge of the 
effects of prenatal exposure to alcohol in children. However, irrespective of social, 
environmental, behavioural and genetic factors, absent maternal drinking, no child 
will be born with FAS/FASD. FAS and its lesser conditions are “100% preventable if 
a woman abstains from alcohol while she is pregnant” (Elliott, et al. 2008:183). But 
since a range of factors, in addition to maternal drinking during pregnancy, influence 
a woman’s drinking behaviour, it is logical that any programme that seeks to change 
drinking behaviours and reduce the potential harm that can occur in children as a 
result thereof, should have multiple targets and a variety of components (Andrews & 
Patterson 1995). We cannot expect women to simply abstain without taking account 
of the reasons they drink and may even do so during pregnancy. Thus the prevention 
of FASD cannot be left solely to women. For example women who abuse alcohol 
should have access to effective treatment and support that takes into account their 
specific reasons for drinking and the context within which they drink. Research has 
documented the variety of reasons why women may do so. Given this knowledge it 
seems absurd to expect all women to simply abstain. For one they must at least have 
information and an enabling environment. That means having access to effective 
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treatment and support, having decent living conditions and so on that gives them a 
chance at flourishing, or at least choosing and living differently. We know that 
knowledge is not enough, in order for people to effect the positive changes we expect 
them to, society must at least, enable them to not only make informed choices but also 
to obtain assistance in achieving these positive lifestyle changes. Health care-based 
interventions can be integrated with existing interventions e.g. TB and HIV 
programmes, thereby providing additional public health benefits and utilising limited 
resources more efficiently, but they must also be complimented with ones outside of 
health facilities. 
Despite there not being a national prevalence established nor a precise calculation of 
FASD and its associated costs in South Africa, one can infer from the results of 
various localised studies that, it is potentially a much bigger problem that has serious 
implications for individuals and society. Estimates may be grossly underestimated for 
a number of reasons including that “prenatal surveillance for alcohol use is poor” 
(Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008) and the possibility of self under-reporting of alcohol use 
by women. “Because of the complexity and broad array of outcomes observed in 
individuals” with FASD, an interdisciplinary team that includes medical 
professionals, psychologists, occupational therapists and social workers –“is needed to 
assess and interpret accurately the broad array of outcomes that define” FASD (Astley 
2011). In part poor surveillance, and consequently lack of accurate data, has to do 
with the shortage of trained medical professionals who can use validated screening 
and diagnostic tools (Burd 2006).  
Medical professionals, as agents of the state, have an important role in reducing 
alcohol abuse. They can screen for alcohol use in their patients and provide accurate 
information about the risk of alcohol abuse and drinking during pregnancy in addition 
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to providing pharmacotherapy and referring them to treatment and other support 
services (WHO 2010).  
Early identification of children at risk may lead to early diagnosis and consequently 
early participation in developmental interventions, which, in turn, improve the quality 
of life for FASD children, including the prevention of future mental health problems. 
A medical diagnosis serves several purposes including facilitating communication 
between medical professions and patients in health care teams and assisting in the 
study and treatment of FASD (IOM 1996). But while these interventions may appear 
to have a good cost-effectiveness profile they are not without ethical problems. For 
example, they can be implemented in ways that are potentially discriminatory and 
stigmatising.  
While women in all socio-economic groups and areas use alcohol, certain groups, e.g. 
women labelled “high risk” or residing in “high risk communities”, may be unfairly 
targeted and subject to more invasion of their privacy, thus likely to experience 
adverse outcomes from screening and diagnosis. Placing an individual in a diagnostic 
category confers both benefits and disabilities.  For example, a FAS diagnosis may 
validate an individual’s disability and facilitate appropriate interventions and social 
benefits. On the other hand, the diagnosis may also be used to stigmatise the affected 
individual, his or her mother and family (IOM 1996).   
FASD is not restricted to the children in rural and agricultural communities - it is a 
problem in urban communities as well. Any woman of any socio-economic or cultural 
group who drinks during pregnancy can have a child with FASD, but poor women are 
at greater risk for having a FASD child (Armstrong & Abel 2000). However those 
women who are better off financially and educated and who drink socially are equally 
at risk of having a child with FASD (Coon 2013).  
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FAS is a huge problem in some parts of South Africa - notably in agrarian 
communities. Although much of the “investigation into the historical influences that 
have shaped drinking patterns” in the country have focused largely on the dop system 
(McKinstry 2005; London 2000; 1999; Parry & Bennetts 1998; Te WaterNaude, et al. 
1998), “it is erroneous to associate” it only with “wine farms and wine-growing 
regions of the Western Cape” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008), where high rates of 
drinking and problem drinking have been observed among “both male and female 
farm workers” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008). The system was also widely used to 
secure and control labour in the “deciduous fruit industry” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al 
2008) and in the mining industry (Mager 2004; Parry & Bennetts 1998) in other 
communities in the country. This is extremely important for FAS prevention “efforts 
as there are likely many high prevalence areas, which have been subject to similar 
social, cultural and economic forces as the wine-growing areas” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 
2008) of the Western Cape and thus explain the equally high rates of drinking among 
pregnant women and FAS that have been observed in communities elsewhere, notably 
the Northern Cape (Urban, et al. 2015; 2008; Viljoen, et al. 2003) and Gauteng (Ojo, 
et al. 2010).   
There are a few validated screening and diagnostic tools available, however, in the 
absence of objective accurate and reproducible methods for assessing and the severity 
of exposures and outcomes in individual children, diagnoses are likely to vary widely 
among professionals and health establishments (Aase, Jones & Clarren 1995; Astley 
2011; Astley 2006). “From a clinical perspective, diagnostic misclassification leads to 
inappropriate patient care, increased risk for secondary disabilities and missed 
opportunities for primary prevention. From a public health perspective, diagnostic 
misclassification leads to inaccurate estimates of incidence and prevalence. Inaccurate 
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estimates frustrate efforts to allocate sufficient social, educational and health care 
services to” the populations at “risk, and preclude accurate assessment of primary 
prevention efforts” (Astley & Clarren 2000).  
While there remains some uncertainty as to the exact amount of alcohol that is 
damaging to the fetus and consequently child, heavy maternal drinking during 
pregnancy is an established risk factor for FAS. This does not however exclude the 
possibility “that even low levels of alcohol” may place the child “at risk of permanent, 
neuropsychological impairment later in life” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008). The fact 
that light or moderate drinking has not been found to affect very young children, does 
not exclude the possibility of developmental problems emerging later in childhood. 
Because it remains unclear what the level for drinking safely during pregnancy is and 
how this level might be affected by individual susceptibility, no amount of alcohol 
can be guaranteed to be safe (Day 1992; Goodlett & Petersen 1995; Nathanson 2007; 
Streissguth et al. 1994). The safest and prudent option for women to avoid FAS thus 
remains avoidance of alcohol during pregnancy.  
Because alcohol can damage the fetus at any point in its development, although to 
differing degrees, all sexually active women of reproductive age who do not wish to 
be pregnant and give birth to an alcohol-affected baby should avoid pregnancy by 
using effective contraception or where they have a right to an abortion, consider 
terminating their pregnancies.
10
 
                                      
10
 See Chapter 4 for an elaboration of the conditions under which women in South Africa may lawfully 
terminate a pregnancy. 
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Chapter 3: Moral Responsibility  
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter I consider different accounts of responsibility and distinguish these 
from the notion of moral responsibility. I discuss two important criteria expressed by 
Aristotle as pre-conditions for the proper ascription of moral responsibility 
(understood here primarily in terms of blame instead of also praise). By Aristotle’s 
account moral agents can be held morally responsible for their voluntary actions. 
However, not everyone agrees that we have free will, i.e. that our choices and actions 
are voluntary. This has important implications for moral responsibility. If people don’t 
have free will, in other words, if events are predetermined on what basis can we hold 
them morally responsible? I argue that, even though we may not be fully in control of 
our actions because of the limited options available to us, we can and should 
recognize the notion of moral responsibility, even if only for utilitarian reasons. I 
conclude with a discussion of factors that diminish and excuse one from full moral 
responsibility. 
 
2. Moral Responsibility 
 
When we use the term responsibility we often use it in different ways to mean 
different things. Sometimes we use it in a sense that assigns causal responsibility to 
something, i.e. identify a cause, causal factor or reason for a particular outcome, event 
or state of affairs. Other times we use the term responsibility in the sense that involves 
evaluations of a person’s character - whether they are responsible or irresponsible. 
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Often too, we use the term responsibility in a sense that denotes blame (or praise, as 
the case may be) when someone fulfils or fails in fulfilling their duties and we hold 
her or him accountable.  
 
2.1. Moral Responsibility and Causal Responsibility 
Moral responsibility is related to, yet distinct from both causal and legal 
responsibility. Assigning causal responsibility involves identifying a causal 
connection between an earlier occurrence (X) and a particular event, outcome or state 
of affairs (Y). Causal responsibility applies to persons, objects, happenings, failings to 
happen, actions and omissions. We assign causal responsibility when we say things 
like ‘The heavy rainfall is responsible for the flooding in the area’ or ‘Alcohol abuse 
is responsible for many deaths and injuries’ or ‘The cat is responsible for the glass of 
milk falling from the chair.’  
But while anything, not only persons, can be found to be causally responsible i.e. 
cause an outcome to occur, only persons can be morally responsible for something 
and thus have moral responsibility. What this means is that they are answerable for or  
can be called upon to account for it, to explain, to justify or admit responsibility for it 
- and can be held accountable for their dispositional traits, their choices, conduct and 
its consequences (Duff 1998).  
Usually if someone is causally responsible for something they are also morally 
responsible for it, for example someone who kills an innocent person, is not only 
causally responsible but usually also morally responsible for bringing about this 
person’s death. However this is not always the case. For example although a child 
may have caused a harmful state of affairs to occur as a result of its action, we tend to 
not hold them fully morally responsible as we would and do normal adults for the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
100 
 
simple reason that we do not tend to think that children have full decision making 
capacity.  
Because moral responsibility involves making moral judgments or evaluations of a 
person’s decisions, actions, the results of their actions, or their dispositional traits, it 
falls within the domain of morality and is necessarily concerned with what 
philosophers refer to as an individual’s prospective and retrospective responsibility 
and their attitudes towards their responsibilities (Eshleman 2014; Klein 1995; 
Williams 2009).  
 
2.2. Moral Responsibility and Legal Responsibility 
As is the case with causal responsibility, legal responsibility is also related to yet 
distinct from moral responsibility. Our judgments about legal responsibility are based 
on the laws of the particular land, where “legal institutions assign responsibilities to 
people, and hold them responsible for failing to fulfil these responsibilities – either via 
the criminal law and policing, or by allowing other parties to bring them to court via 
the civil law” e.g. breach of contract (Williams 2009). In liberal societies, there is 
usually convergence between moral and legal responsibility. Usually the law will 
uphold important moral principles.
11
 Examples of where law and morality clearly 
overlap are the crimes of murder and theft. Few, if anyone, would deny that “it is both 
a legal and moral wrong” to intentionally kill an innocent person or to take another’s 
property without permission (Williams 2009).  
However, while legal and moral responsibility often overlaps, they do sometimes 
diverge. For example, we may find it immoral for someone to break their promise or 
to commit adultery, but we do not tend to think that all instances of promise-breaking 
                                      
11
 Arguably, in corrupt, tyrannical states, legal and moral responsibility would typically have no 
relation at all (Williams 2009).  
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or that adultery should be punishable offences. Moreover, while the law may 
legitimize certain conduct e.g. abortion, euthanasia or same sex marriage, this does 
not mean that such conduct is necessarily moral. Even in places where these practises 
are legal, they remain the subject of intense debate.  
Moreover it does not necessarily follow that because something is morally required or 
permitted that it should be legally sanctioned or proscribed i.e. that someone should 
be penalized or held accountable in the court system for an event that has occurred or 
for failing to fulfil what is considered to be their moral responsibilities. There may be 
compelling moral reasons to not always make moral responsibility a legal 
responsibility.  
And while both law and morality are concerned with intentions and outcomes, law 
“does not prioritize intentions over outcomes in the same way that many believe that 
moral” judgments should (Williams 2009). For example, law does not punish an 
attempted crime e.g. “attempted murder in the same way as an actual murder” 
(Williams 2009). The “difference between murder and” attempted murder “may not 
lie in the intention or even in the actual” injuries inflicted: “everything depends on the 
outcome”, i.e. “whether death results. Thus, the crimes attract different punishments, 
though our moral judgment of someone may be no lighter in the case” (Williams 
2009) of attempted murder.  Moral responsibility is concerned with an individual’s 
prospective and retrospective responsibility, i.e. with an individual’s duties and what 
an individual can rightly be held accountable (blamed or praised) for.  
 
2.3. Prospective Responsibility (Responsibility as Duty) 
Prospective responsibilities are “those matters that it is up to me to attend to or to take 
care of” (Williams 2009). When we are concerned with a person’s responsibilities in 
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this forward looking sense, we are concerned with what he or she ought to be doing or 
attending to, in other words, their duties. Robert Frazier (1998) explains that having a 
duty to do something is “like having been given a command by someone who has a 
right to be obeyed: it must be done“. Therefore when we say someone has a duty we 
mean that he or she is subjected “to a binding normative requirement and unless there 
are reasons” to do otherwise, he or she “is required” to “satisfy it and can be 
justifiably criticized for not doing so” (Craig 1998). An important feature of the 
concept of duty is that it provides a justification for our action. Explaining why we did 
something by saying we had a duty, i.e. that we were obliged to (not) perform it, is 
offering a defensible reason, i.e. a justification, for (not) doing it (Lenman 2009).   
 
2.3.1. Duty and other normative concepts 
The concept of duty is related to various other important philosophical concepts, 
including the concepts of permission, prohibition and rights. The connection between 
permission, prohibition and duty is relatively “straightforward: if we are permitted to 
do something, then we do not have a duty not to do it; if we are prohibited from doing 
something, we have a duty not to do it” (Frazier 1998).  
The relationship between duties and rights is however not as obvious. One important 
view of the relationship between duties and rights holds that “there is a correlation 
between, at least some rights and duties” (Frazier 1998). WD Ross (1930:48), for 
example, argues that (i) “A right of A against B implies a duty of A to B” and (ii) “A 
duty of B to A implies a right of A against B”. Essentially what Ross proposes is this: 
If you have a right against someone, they have a duty toward you, and if you have a 
duty to another, they have a right against you. For every right a person has, someone 
else has a duty. So, for example, if you borrowed money from a friend with the 
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promise to repay it, your friend has a right against you and you have a duty (grounded 
in the duty of promise keeping) to repay your friend. Similarly, someone’s right to not 
be harmed posits a concomitant duty on others to not harm them (at least not without 
a valid defence).  
One problem with the view - that there is a general association “between rights and 
duties, where right implies duty and duty implies a right” (Duff 1998) - is that it 
compels us to grapple with questions about the sorts of entities that can have duties 
and rights and against whom there can be rights, where a right can simply be defined 
as justified claim.
12
 For example, can fetuses, animals and the environment have 
rights and duties? This question has important implications. If, for example, fetuses 
are the sorts of beings that have rights, then others are obliged to respect their rights, 
i.e. others, including pregnant women, have duties to it. However, if they are not the 
sorts of beings that have rights, it seems that others do not have duties to it. But we 
tend to think that one can have duties to something, even if that thing does not have 
rights, so in an effort to address this problem, another view of the relationship 
between duties and rights holds that while being a person or having moral agency is a 
necessary condition for being the bearer of duties, it is not a necessary condition for 
being the object of duties of others. This view therefore recognises that one may have 
duties to an entity even though that entity does not have rights. In other words, that 
one may have duties towards another being even if that being does not have a 
concomitant right to have it fulfilled.  
 
 
 
                                      
12
 By contrast, a privilege is ordinarily understood to be something that we may be offered or have 
taken away from us.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
104 
 
2.3.2. Types of duties 
A number of distinctions have been offered between different types or kinds of duty 
(Frazier 1998). The most important distinctions include those between positive and 
negative duties, those between prima facie and “all things considered” duties and the 
distinction between duties and obligations.  
 
2.3.2.1. Positive and negative duties 
Often a distinction is made between positive duties of beneficence and negative duties 
grounded in the principle of non-maleficence. Underlying the distinction between 
positive and negative duties is the more fundamental and contentious claim that there 
is a morally significant difference between acting (i.e. taking positive steps) and 
refraining from acting (i.e. doing nothing or omitting to act). The general idea is that 
positive duties concern what we are required to do e.g. help those in need and care for 
others, while negative duties concern what we are required to refrain from doing e.g. 
not to kill or wrongly injure someone. The implication of the distinction between 
positive and negative duties is this: if we believe that morality consists largely or 
exclusively of constraints on our action, i.e. mostly negative duties, then we may 
believe them to be more stringent or important than the positive ones. Indeed, it is 
sometimes held that there can be a duty not to bring about something, while there is 
no duty to prevent it from occurring. For example, we may believe that we have a 
duty not to drown another person, but at the same time, believe that we do not have a 
duty to save them if they are in the process of drowning. Equally, in medicine, while 
physicians are not allowed to kill their patients, they are not obliged to make futile 
attempts to save a patient’s life. So while we may have a duty to not harm or to kill 
others, it is debatable whether we have a duty to rescue or save them from harm.  
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If, however, one is more inclined to consequentialism and believes that outcomes are 
what matters in the moral evaluation of our actions, then the claim that there is 
sometimes a morally significant distinction between an act and an omission is 
somewhat problematic. This is because consequentialists, even if they do recognise a 
distinction, do not generally consider it to underpin a morally relevant difference 
between positive and negative duties. Consequentialism, as an approach, is concerned 
with promoting values (rather than with motives for action or adherence to duties), 
and it does not matter whether acting or refraining from acting is promoting those 
values. What matters are the consequences of our actions or failure to act (omissions), 
so by consequentialist standards it doesn’t really matter whether or not one had a duty 
to act in a particular way, what matters are the consequences of our decisions and 
actions - be it to act or to not act.  
 
2.3.2.2. Prima facie and ‘all things considered duties’ 
WD Ross (1930) offers another important distinction between kinds of duties, i.e. 
what he calls prima facie duties and “all things considered” duties. Contrary to its 
literal meaning, a prima facie duty is not one that merely appears to be a duty. It is a 
conditional moral duty that can be morally outweighed, or overridden by other moral 
considerations. It is one that does not overwhelm other considerations in all 
circumstances (Murray 1991; Steinbock 2001). So, it is a duty we ought to fulfill if 
there is not a more important moral duty to override it. For example, assume that a 
person can choose between telling the truth and protecting someone from harm, but 
cannot do both. Telling the truth and protecting someone from harm are both prima 
facie duties. By contrast, an “all things considered” duty is what duty requires, all 
things considered, in particular, given all the prima facie duties.        
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2.3.2.3. Duty and obligation 
Some philosophers e.g. WD Ross (1930) make a distinction between the concepts of 
“duty” and “obligation”. They restrict their use of the term “duty” to refer only to 
those “moral requirements” that “apply to all” people “irrespective of status or acts 
performed and which are owed by all persons to all” other persons (Simmons 1979). 
Duty is thus used to refer only to our non-voluntarily assumed responsibilities, i.e. our 
natural duties or those that we have vis-à-vis everyone else, simply in virtue of our 
being human. By contrast, the term “obligation” is restricted to those (special) 
responsibilities or duties, which individuals owe to only some limited class of 
persons, and which consequently justify us giving preferential treatment to them.  
Unlike the concept of duty, which is justified by the intrinsic nature of persons, the 
basic or fundamental justification for recognizing the concept of obligation has to do 
with the special relationships that exist among people. We stand in a special 
relationship to those with whom we voluntarily enter into contract or to “whom we 
have made promises or commitments of some sort” (Jeske 2008). Obligations 
therefore include those duties that we freely choose to take on but also those duties 
that derive from our social roles or status in society, even when these positions are 
neither voluntarily nor explicitly chosen by a person (Hardimon 1994; Jeske 2008; 
Manning 2001). What we may call role responsibilities are also special obligations. 
Role responsibility involves the duties one has for doing various things which come 
with occupying a certain role in society, whether those social roles have been 
voluntarily assumed by us or delegated or given to us.  
Although the idea of obligations and special relationships seems counterintuitive to 
utilitarianism and modern thinking about human equality, which urges us to be 
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impartial
13
 when weighing the interests of different people, the idea is widely 
accepted in common morality that places value on personal relationships and expects 
us to treat intimates in partial (or preferential) ways. The idea can, however, be 
defended on consequentialist grounds. A consequentialist can argue that there is 
instrumental value in recognizing the concepts of obligation and special relationships 
because each person acting so as to benefit her children, family, friends, promises and 
so forth will have the best overall consequences. John Stuart Mill (1863) notes “that 
few hurts which human beings can sustain are greater, and none wound more, than 
when that on which they habitually and with full assurance relied fails them in the 
hour of need” (Mill 1863, Ch. 5). What Mill is suggesting is that we have certain 
natural affections and expect others to act on them. When they don’t act in accord 
with these expectations, pain is caused by deviations from them.   
Setting aside the philosophical debate about the concepts of duty and obligation, I will 
use the terms duty and obligation interchangeably since little, if anything, of moral 
significance seems to ride on my choice of terminology.  By duty I will therefore 
mean one’s natural duties and one’s obligations, whether acquired voluntarily or 
derived as a consequence of one’s social and professional role in society.  
 
2.4. Retrospective Responsibility (Responsibility as Blame) 
Retrospective responsibility is related to prospective responsibility, in that it involves 
making a moral judgment or evaluation of a person’s (past) actions or the 
consequences of their actions or their attitude to their duties. According to Williams 
(2009), this “judgment typically pictures the person as liable to various consequences: 
to feeling remorse (or pride), to being blamed (or praised), to making amends (or 
                                      
13
 The utilitarian idea of impartiality can be found in Jeremy Bentham‘s well-known expression, that 
“Each to count for one and none for more than one“.  
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receiving gratitude) and so forth.” Retrospective responsibility therefore involves the 
assignment of praise, desert (fairness or just reward) or blame (the assignment of 
fault) for what someone has done or failed to do, in discharging his or her duties (Duff 
1998).  
People who fulfil or act in accord with their duties and have “caused some good state 
of affairs” to occur are typically praised for acting in responsible ways ((Schoeman 
1980). Conversely one is usually blamed for having caused a harmful state of affairs 
to occur, for failing to act in accord with one’s duties, for acting in irresponsible ways 
and for assuming or lacking certain character dispositions.  
If someone fails to perform his or her duties, we tend to hold them responsible in a 
retrospective sense. Our retrospective responsibility is therefore partly determined by 
our prospective responsibilities. So, if we are to determine the scope of a person’s 
retrospective responsibility, we must first determine the nature and scope of his or her 
prospective responsibilities, in other words what their duties are.  
However, when we are concerned with moral responsibility, we are also concerned 
with a person’s attitude to their duties. Thus we may (and often do) describe people as 
being responsible or irresponsible, where being a responsible person is someone who 
“can be relied on to judge and to act in certain morally desirable ways” and “be 
counted on to take her responsibility seriously” (Williams 2009). Conversely, “the 
irresponsible” person “is not one who lacks prospective responsibilities, nor one who 
may not be held responsible retrospectively. It is that she does not take seriously her 
responsibilities” (Williams 2009). So, moral responsibility is also concerned not only 
with duty, but also with virtue that people “exhibit in one area or perhaps exemplify in 
their entire lives” (Williams 2009). 
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The scope of our retrospective responsibility is controversial. We are responsible for 
our voluntary actions and the intended and foreseen “results of our actions, but how 
far we are responsible for their foreseen effects, or for harms that we do not prevent 
when we could, depends on how we should define our prospective responsibilities, 
that is, on how far we should regard such foreseen effects, or such preventable harms, 
as our business” (Duff 1998). To say that someone is responsible for some foreseen 
effect, or for a harm which they did not prevent, is to say that they have a duty; that 
they should have attended to that effect or to that harm in deciding how to act. But 
while the nature and scope of our duties of non-interference is relatively 
uncontroversial, the nature and scope of our positive duties is less clear.   
Concerning our attitudes to our duties, if we take vicious or wicked attitudes or 
intentions as the standard for moral responsibility the degrees of responsibility will 
vary with the wickedness of the person’s character, attitudes or intentions. Because 
consequences don’t matter, a person who makes a failed attempt to harm another 
person would be as responsible as a person who succeeded in doing this. If we take 
actually causing harm to be the standard of responsibility, then likewise, the degrees 
of responsibility will vary with the degrees of the overall harmfulness of the actual 
consequence. There are however two problems with this standard of responsibility. 
Firstly, according to this standard, it neglects a person’s knowledge and intentions. 
Hence, someone who accidentally caused harm would be as responsible as a person 
who expected or even intended to cause harm. The second problem – that of attempts 
- is related to the first. The standard implies that a person who made failed attempts to 
harm another could not be responsible. If we take actual performance of a wrong 
action to be the standard of responsibility, we are, similarly, faced with problems. 
Like the other standards, the degrees of responsibility will vary with the degrees of the 
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wrongness of the action. Moreover, a person who unknowingly or unintentionally 
took a wrong action would be as responsible as a person who knowingly and 
intentionally took the wrong action.  
 
3. Who Can Have Moral Responsibility For What?  
 
Aristotle (2009) is credited as being the first philosopher, in the Western philosophical 
tradition, to explicitly construct a theory of moral responsibility in Nicomachean 
Ethics (Eshleman 2014). According to him moral agents are responsible for their 
voluntary actions (Aristotle 2009, Bk 3). He specifies two essential conditions that are 
required for the proper ascription of moral responsibility, viz. the freedom (control) 
condition and the mental (cognitive capacity) condition (Eshleman 2014). To properly 
ascribe moral responsibility to a moral agent, the agent must have the requisite 
decision making capacity and the action or decision must have been made freely 
(voluntarily). This means that it must have been possible for the agent to perform it 
and been made free of coercion and compulsion and based on an appraisal of all the 
relevant information. Joel Feinberg (1971) explains that, “one assumes risk in a fully 
voluntary way when one shoulders it while informed of all relevant facts and 
contingencies and in the absence of all coercive pressure or compulsion” (Feinberg 
1971:105). Thus, to be a free action the action must be the outcome of a free and 
deliberate choice by a moral agent. If the choice or action is not one’s own, it is not 
freely made because one did not have complete control of it, in the sense required for 
moral responsibility.  
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3.1. Who is a moral agent?  
Moral agents can have moral responsibility and be held morally responsible. A moral 
agent possess certain psychological capacities of understanding and reasoning that 
enable the agent to reflect on a situation, to form intentions about how he or she will 
act, to evaluate reasons and give an account of his or her actions (Williams 2009). A 
moral agent is therefore capable of reasoning and acting on the basis of reason. Moral 
agents are not restricted to acting on the basis of instinct, desire or emotion. Normal 
adult persons represent our paradigm case of moral agents. They can have rights and 
duties and be held responsible for their decisions, actions and dispositional traits. In 
both Kantian and non-Kantian philosophical traditions, only persons can have moral 
responsibility, i.e. have duties and be held morally responsible for their actions, 
omissions and character dispositions 
 
3.1.1. Individual and collective responsibility 
Although moral responsibility is typically ascribed to individuals, it can also be 
applied to collectives. Moral responsibility as it pertains to individual moral agents is 
often referred to as personal or individual responsibility. This is to distinguish it from 
accounts of what is called collective responsibility. Unlike personal responsibility, 
collective responsibility construes groups as moral agents and associates both 
causation and blameworthiness (fault) with collectives or groups, as opposed to 
specific individuals and their actions (Smiley 2010; Risser 2009).  
There is an extensive debate in moral philosophy about whether collectives such as a 
state, a community, a corporation or other organization can have moral responsibility, 
in other words, can have moral obligations and be held accountable in the same way 
that individuals can. A number of authors, for example, Erskine (2010), Wringe 
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(2010) and Miller (2004) have however argued in favour of considering collectives to 
be moral agents and thus as potential holders of moral obligations (Schwenkenbecher 
2011).  
Toni Erskine explains that “a collectivity is a candidate for moral agency if it has the 
following: an identity that is more than the sum of the identities of its constitutive 
parts and, therefore, does not rely on a determinate membership; a decision-making 
structure; an identity over time; and a conception of itself as a unit” (Erskine 
2010:72). Erskine calls collectives that have these features “institutional moral 
agents” (Erskine 2010:72), who can have prospective and retrospective responsibility.   
Moral obligations ascribed to states cannot however be independent of moral 
obligations of the individuals represented by the collective or the individuals 
consisting of the collective. To claim that a collective’s obligations are the obligations 
of the collective itself rather than an obligation of its members would be to generate 
“a somewhat artificial distinction between a collective and its members. If a collective 
could hold moral duties in a way that results in no moral duties for its individual 
members, this would leave us with no one to hold accountable and with no agent who 
could feel morally motivated to put things right” (Schwenkenbecher (2011:83).   
Anne Schwenkenbecher (2011:89) explains that “moral duties held by a collective -
for example a state - entail duties for individual members of that collective, both 
occupants of institutional roles (such as politicians) and persons with no institutional 
role”.  She calls “these entailed duties contributory duties” and holds that they “entail 
professional duties” (Schwenkenbecher (2011:89).  
According to Schwenkenbecher (2011:88), a collective “can only hold moral duties 
because it is capable of collective action, i.e. more than just aggregate actions and 
because it consists of individual members who hold corresponding individual duties”. 
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However, these duties differ depending on the individuals’ positions within the 
collective.  
Schwenkenbecher (2011:89-90) proposes three criteria to determine the extent “of an 
individual agent or sub-group’s contributory duty to a collective duty”. The first 
criterion that determines how much an individual within a collective must contribute 
to the collective duty is the agent’s capacity (Schwenkenbecher (2011:89-90). 
Schwenkenbecher (2011) explains that individuals with greater power to discharge a 
collective duty have a greater contributory duty, because they are more capable or 
better placed to discharge it. “This criterion clearly establishes stronger contributory 
duties for those members of a collective who hold an institutional role” 
(Schwenkenbecher 2011). 
The second criterion that Schwenkenbecher says determines the extent of individual 
contributory duties is what she calls ‘moral correlation of the agent to the problem 
that the collective duty aims to address“(Schwenkenbecher 2011). This means that 
“individuals (or sub-collectives) that have responsibility for the occurrence of the 
problem have to contribute more to solving the overall problem than others, other 
things being equal” (Schwenkenbecher 2011). 
Finally, “how much an agent or sub-group has to contribute depends on how much the 
other agents contribute and how much the agent has publicly committed herself to 
contribute. If I have made it clear to other members of the collective that I will take on 
a particular contributory task in the context of discharging a collective duty, I have a 
stronger obligation to do so than if I had not announced this, because I make others 
believe that they need not undertake this contributory task. It is also now more likely 
not to be undertaken at all, should I not do it” (Schwenkenbecher 2011). 
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Two of the criteria proposed by Schwenkenbecher to determine the “magnitude of an 
individual agent or sub-group’s contributory obligations – capacity and commitment – 
indicate that those who are in a position of power within a state, usually politicians, 
above all the government, but also other influential figures of public life, have the 
strongest duties to contribute to discharging the moral duty of the state. Hence 
individuals who fail to discharge their contributory duties in an obvious way—for 
example politicians who ignore the problem of climate change or even deny it—are 
morally liable to punishment as individuals. But the second criterion—moral 
correlation—suggests that persons with limited power and with no explicit 
(professional) commitment, who are in some way responsible or benefit from the 
problem the duty addresses, have contributory duties as well” (Schwenkenbecher 
2011). 
 
3.2. When is an action voluntary? 
To have moral responsibility an agent must have the requisite decision-making 
capacity (cognitive capacity or competence) and to be morally responsible the actions 
they perform must be voluntary. Typically, an action is voluntary if it is within the 
agent’s control. Aristotle recognizes that there are events that are out of a person’s 
control. For example, events such as death and ageing are part of natural occurring 
processes over which we have no control. They cannot be altered by our desires, our 
decisions or beliefs. For Aristotle, we have control when things are up to us. Things 
that are up to us, hence over which we have control, are those things that are not 
caused by nature, necessity or fortune, but by our own minds  (Aristotle 2009: 
1112a31). Having control over one’s actions and choices in this way requires that one 
is able to choose from an array of alternative possibilities, and that the source of one’s 
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choices and actions is oneself and not in anything or anyone over which one has no 
control (Kane 2002). An action is therefore voluntary if one is able both to perform 
and to not perform it, i.e. if it is up to a person whether (or not) to perform it.  
 
4. The Problem of Free Will for Moral Responsibility 
 
As humans we tend to value our freedom and autonomy. Intuitively we believe that 
we have free will and control; that we can choose if, where, when and how to execute 
our choices. Free will is an important issue in discussions on moral responsibility, 
because one’s conception of free will defines one’s views on moral responsibility.  
Determinism negates the idea that we have free will, consequently freedom of choice 
and action. Causal “determinism is the idea that every event is necessitated by 
antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature” (Hoefer 2010). 
Determinism is thus the view that views people as not having free will because 
everything is caused by prior events. If determinism is true, then it is impossible for 
anything else to happen; people’s will, choice or action makes no difference to what 
will happen. Because the deterministic view holds that fate determines everything and 
that our destinies are predetermined, it implies that we do not have freedom (of choice 
and action), at least in the sense required for moral responsibility and consequently 
cannot be responsible for our behaviour. Arguments in support of moral responsibility 
fall into two groups that differ according to whether they regard free will as 
compatible with determinism.  
 
4.1. Compatibilism 
Common to all compatibilist accounts of free will is that they reject the suggestion 
that determinism is the relevant concern. Compatibilists as the name suggests think 
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that determinism is compatible with free will provided that certain minimal conditions 
of voluntariness are met (Bishop 2010). Different compatibilists define free will 
differently and provide differing reasons for the idea that we have free will.  
Additionally, they take different kinds of constraints to be relevant to the issue of 
moral responsibility.  
Classical compatibilists such as David Hume for example defines free will as a lack of 
physical restraint when he asserts that “liberty is universally allowed to everyone who 
is not a prisoner and in chains” (Hume 1967, Ch. 8). Similarly in Freedom of the Will, 
the 18th century preacher, Jonathan Edwards argues that even if we do not will as we 
will (that is, do not choose what we will to do), we do as we will” (Edwards 2009). 
“Modern compatibilists make a distinction between freedom of will and freedom of 
action” (O’Connor 2010), i.e. they separate “freedom of choice from the freedom to 
enact it” (O’Connor 2010). Philosophers who distinguish between free will (choice) 
and freedom of action “do so because our success in carrying out our ends depends in 
part on factors wholly beyond our control” (O’Connor 2010). Having free will, 
understood as being capable of making a free choice, does not therefore imply 
freedom of action because “there are always external constraints on the range of 
options that we can meaningfully try to undertake” (O’Connor 2010).  
For some compatibilists, “the central loci of our responsibility are our choices, or 
“willings” (O’Connor 2010), rather than our actions. Daniel Dennett (2003) for 
example argues that free will can exist “because individuals have the ability to act 
differently from what anyone expects” (O’Connor 2012). His “basic reasoning is that, 
if one excludes God or other such possibilities, then because of chaos and epistemic 
limits on the precision of our knowledge of the current state of the world, the future is 
ill-defined for all finite beings” (O’Connor 2010). He argues that “the only well-
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defined things are expectations” and that “the ability to do otherwise only makes 
sense when dealing with these expectations and not with some unknown future” 
(O’Connor 2010). So even if causal determinism is true, we can still choose how we 
act. 
Other compatibilists include our character or attitudes as the forces that determine 
what we will do and what we do. Robert Cummins (1980) for example argues that “if 
character is the dominant causal factor in determining one’s choices, and one’s 
choices are morally wrong, then one should be held accountable for those choices, 
regardless of genes and other factors (Cummins 1980).
14
 Because we can choose our 
character dispositions, e.g. choose to be honest and kind as opposed to being wicked 
and cruel, we can therefore mostly be held morally responsible for our character 
dispositions, in other words, we can normally justifiably be criticized for it. For 
example, even though a paedophile may believe that he  has no choice than to abuse 
children, he can still be held responsible, because we tend to think it is right to hold 
responsible those with bad character. In simple terms, what matters is not how one 
comes to possess a particular attitude, but that one has it and acts on it.  
 
4.2. Incompatibilism 
Incompatibilists “define free will as freedom from determinism” (O’Connor 2010). 
Incompatibilists think that determinism and free will are incompatible. They argue 
that if a person’s actions are determined by prior events or past actions, then such 
actions are not freely chosen. For them the “major question regarding whether or not 
                                      
14
Some people suggest that all our actions are caused by our circumstances, including our genes and 
our upbringing. The implication of this view is that we can’t and don’t choose anything. And if we 
have no choice, we can’t be morally responsible for anything. But even if people may not be able to 
have done otherwise, it does not mean that they didn’t make a choice to act as they did.  
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people have free will is whether or not their actions are determined” (O’Connor 
2010).  
Some incompatibilists conclude that our actions are in fact predetermined and they are 
therefore reluctant to assign moral responsibility, whereas others reject determinism in 
favour of the view that we freely choose our actions. For them, so long as we freely 
choose our actions we are morally responsible for them and can therefore be held 
morally responsible.   
Indeed “if causal determinism were true about human actions across the board, we 
would not have free will” (O’Connor 2010). If everything is predetermined, our past 
and our future, our fate is somehow destined, then in what sense and to what extent 
can we be said to be responsible for something over which we have no control?. If we 
can cause nothing to (not) occur, in other words, if we have no choice or control over 
whatever happens, how can we be held responsible for anything? To deny that people 
have free will therefore has serious implications for moral responsibility. This is 
arguably why Jean-Paul Sartre asserts that determinism enables people to sometimes 
avoid responsibility, when he says that, “we are always ready to take refuge in belief 
in determinism if this freedom weighs upon us or if we need an excuse” (Sartre 
2012[1943]).  
Even though the incompatibilist argument against free will is compelling, there are 
several reasons why we should recognize that people have free will and consequently 
moral responsibility. Firstly, we can’t not believe in free will, because our experience 
is that we do not merely do as we will, we also will what we will. We tend to think 
that we can and more often do choose our actions and attitudes; that we can choose 
what we will do and act on the basis of that choice. If we deny the possibility of free 
will, the implication is that no one can be held responsible for anything. We can 
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imagine a world in which everyone has internalised a habit of excusing others. In a 
world of this sort, we will excuse everyone for anything and everything because 
nothing is their fault, they cannot help but do what they do. But we tend to think that 
people have choice – that their actions can be the product of conscious deliberation, of 
mulling over alternatives and weighing options. Another reason for recognizing that 
we have free will (even in a deterministic world) is quite simply because it is an 
essential tool to control antisocial behaviour. Unlike the first reason, this justification 
does not rest on whether or not someone deserves to be held responsible, but rather on 
the social benefits that come with holding people responsible. “When people act 
together, forming a collective agent, holding one another accountable is an 
essential part of that collective agent’s way of guiding its movements. It is the 
way we collectively mind what we are collectively doing. When we fail as a 
result of one of us not minding what he is doing, something has to be settled 
about what has happened before we can decide to go on acting together, or to 
give it up. It is in this context that we blame each other for faulty action”  
(Korsgaard 2013). 
A commitment to morality thus requires the recognition of responsibility for violating 
rules we have made collectively as a society. One could plausibly also maintain that 
holding others responsible is a way to show respect for them. One could argue that 
when we hold someone responsible we respect that person’s “fundamental human 
right to be treated as a person by permitting him or her to make the choices that will 
determine what happens to him” (Korsgaard 2013) or her and holding them 
responsible for their actions. Thomas Scanlon (2008; 1998) for example argues that 
“refusing to blame others… involves an attitude of superiority toward the person in 
question (something like the attitude of a parent toward very young child) and thus 
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represents a failure to take that person seriously as a participant in the relationship.” A 
final reason for recognizing free will and consequently moral responsibility is 
straightforwardly because it’s what we do. Even though we may think that we do not 
have a right to judge, or that we are morally obligated to do so, we do it anyway. 
“There are no metaphysical facts of the matter about whether people are responsible 
for what they do. Instead, holding people responsible is a practice—it’s something 
that we do” (Korsgaard 2013). Perhaps it is because we think it motivates decent 
behaviour, which makes the world better off as a result. 
 
5. Factors that Diminish and Excuse One from Moral 
Responsibility  
 
Feinberg (1971) explains that one’s choice or action is completely involuntary (i.e. 
not one’s own) when “it is no choice at all”, as “when one lacks all muscular control 
over one’s movements, or is knocked down or sent reeling by a blow or an explosion 
– or when, through ignorance, one chooses something other than what one means to 
choose, as when one thinks the arsenic powder is table salt and sprinkles it on one’s 
scrambled eggs”. Actions that are involuntary are therefore roughly those actions that 
are automatic or forced or based on misinformation or done in ignorance. One’s 
action is also not fully voluntary if it is based on immature or defective faculties of 
reasoning (Feinberg 1971).  
 
5.1. Ignorance 
Aristotle doesn’t consider an action as voluntary when the cause (of action) is 
internal, in other words when the action comes about by ignorance. He distinguishes 
between actions caused by ignorance and actions done in ignorance. An action is 
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caused by ignorance if it is performed because a person ignores the particulars which 
the action consists in and is concerned with. This is the case when for example a 
person does not really know what he or she is doing, toward whom the action is 
directed or what the consequences of the performance of that action will be. As an 
illustration we can imagine someone who mistakenly drinks a liquid she thinks is 
water when it actually is poison.  
In contrast, Aristotle says an action done in ignorance can be performed while 
knowledgeable of the particulars which define the action. In this case the ignorance is 
about universals (as opposed to ignorance about the particulars of the action). It is 
ignorance regarding what kind of action we must do or avoid. Hence actions done in 
ignorance are those where a person, while aware of the particulars of the case, does 
not know what the right or wrong, good or bad action is. For Aristotle this kind of 
ignorance is the cause of vice. He maintains that even though the person does not 
know that performing this kind of action is not right, that this is not a reason for 
saying he or she acted unwillingly (Aristotle 2009, Bk 3). So, for Aristotle, someone 
could know very well what kind of action he or she must do in certain circumstances, 
but, as a consequence of his or her ignorance of the particulars, not be able to perform 
the right action. This person will be excused, because the action performed does not 
indicate to us that he or she is vicious, but rather that he or she was under 
unfavourable circumstances, which did not allow him or her to know the particulars. 
On the other hand, a person who, knowing the particulars in which the actions 
consists, does not know what kind of action he or she must do, is blamed, since the 
action is an indicator of a vice in him or her. 
He says that, “actions… receive praise or blame when they are voluntary, but 
pardon, sometimes even pity, when they are involuntary” (Aristotle 2009, Bk 3). 
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“Voluntary actions that are virtuous actions are to be praised” (Aristotle 2009, Bk 3). 
According to him, "Everything that is done by reason of ignorance is not 
voluntary; it is only what produces pain and repentance that is involuntary. For 
the man who has done something owing to ignorance, and feels not the 
least vexation at his action, has not acted voluntarily, since he did not know what he 
was doing, nor yet involuntarily, since he is not pained. Of people, then, who act by 
reason of ignorance he who repents is thought an involuntary agent, and the man 
who does not repent may, since he is different, be called a not voluntary agent; for, 
since he differs from the other, it is better that he should have a name of his own.  
Acting by reason of ignorance seems also to be different from acting in ignorance; 
for the man who is drunk or in a rage is thought to act as a result not of ignorance 
but of one of the causes mentioned, yet not knowingly but in ignorance. 
Now every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do and what he ought to 
abstain from, and it is by reason of error of this kind that men become unjust and in 
general bad; but the term 'involuntary' tends to be used not if a man is ignorant of 
what is to his advantage- for it is not mistaken purpose that causes involuntary 
action (it leads rather to wickedness), nor ignorance of the universal (for that men 
are blamed), but ignorance of particulars, i.e. of the circumstances of the action 
and the objects with which it is concerned. For it is on these that both pity and 
pardon depend, since the person who is ignorant of any of these acts involuntarily” 
(Aristotle 2009, Bk 3).  
Aristotle makes a distinction between actions “caused by ignorance” and those “done 
in ignorance” (Aristotle 2009, Bk 3), but maintains that these do not necessarily make 
an act involuntary.  Thus he says that "we punish a man for his very ignorance, if he is 
thought responsible for the ignorance, as when penalties are doubled in the case of 
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drunkenness; for the moving principle is in the man himself, since he had the power 
of not getting drunk and his getting drunk was the cause of his ignorance. And we 
punish those who are ignorant of anything in the laws that they ought to know and 
that is not difficult, and so too in the case of anything else that they are thought to be 
ignorant of through carelessness; we assume that it is in their power not to be 
ignorant, since they have the power of taking care " (Aristotle 2009, Bk 3).  
 
5.2. Coercion 
According to Aristotle if one’s choice or action is compelled by external factors, then 
the decision or action is not a voluntary one, because “acting freely entails the ability 
to have done otherwise at the time of action” (Eshleman 2014). So, when the cause of 
the action is external to the individual, in other words, where it is not caused by the 
individual’s own will, but comes about by coercion (sometimes also described as 
force or compulsion) then it is not voluntary.  
Common to all philosophical accounts of coercion is the idea that coercion involves 
“the use of a certain kind of power for the purpose of gaining advantages over others 
(including self-protection), punishing non-compliance with demands, and imposing 
one’s will on the will of other agents” (Anderson 2006). For instance in his discussion 
of coercion in The Summa Theologica, Thomas Aquinas suggests “that coercion is a 
kind of necessity in which the activities of one” person (the coercer) “makes 
something necessary for another person” (Anderson 2006). Aquinas explains that “the 
necessity of coercion is that in which a thing must be, when someone is forced by 
some agent, so that he is not able to do the contrary. Such necessity is altogether 
repugnant to the will” (Anderson 2006). Hence, “what is done because of coercion is 
not done voluntarily” (Anderson 2006). For Aquinas, “to say that something is 
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voluntary implies that it follows from or is in accord with one’s inclinations. In 
contrast, coercion is linked with the notions of violence and the involuntary”.  
According to him “we call that violent which is against the inclination of a thing… 
[A] Thing is called voluntary because it is according to the inclination of the will. 
Therefore, just as it is impossible for a thing to be at the same time violent and 
natural, so it is impossible for a thing to be absolutely coerced or violent, and 
voluntary” (Anderson 2006). Aquinas proposes two ways in which violence coerces a 
person: (i) when used directly against one’s body (Aquinas, 1920: I.II Q6 A4) and (ii) 
“when used in a way that disables” one’s “will” (Anderson 2006).  Hence by 
Aquinas’s account, “at least some coercion affects the” coercer’s “responsibility or 
blameworthiness for what he does as a result of coercion. He holds that one is not to 
be blamed for things done non-voluntarily. Insofar as violence undercuts the 
voluntariness of one’s” actions, one is not to be blamed for them (Anderson 2006). 
Interestingly on Aquinas’s understanding, the threat of “violence that causes one to 
act from fear or to avoid that violence does not make an act involuntary” (Anderson 
2006).  
“Coercion is typically thought to carry with it several important implications, 
including that it diminishes the targeted agent’s” (i.e. coercer’s) freedom (control) and 
“responsibility and that it is” a prima facie “wrong and/or violation of right” 
(Anderson 2006). For instance, “Kant makes clear that coercion counts as a hindrance 
to freedom, in which respect it is similar to all violations of a person’s rights but” that 
it “can” equally “be used to prevent other rights violations, and thus may be justified” 
(Anderson 2006).  Since no society can effectively function without some authorized 
uses of coercion, “coercion is one method by which a powerful agent” (Anderson 
2006) such as the state can exercise and maintain its power or dominance over its 
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citizens, maintain social order and achieve justice.  Few if any, would therefore argue 
that coercion is always ethically problematic or unjustified. However because 
coercion involves rights interference, and because it is such a potent means available 
to the state, it is “prone to abuse and” therefore “something that deserves ethical 
scrutiny whenever it is used” (Anderson 2006). 
According to Anderson (2006) “there are two traditional sorts of grounds on which” a 
person’s “responsibility might be truncated or attenuated because he was coerced. The 
first is by virtue of being excused for his action; the second is by virtue of his action 
being justified”. Anderson explains that, one may be excused – wholly or “in part – 
for an action performed under coercion if that action (or its consequences) was 
beyond one’s control or willpower to prevent, or if that action (or its consequences) 
was unintentional. This latter condition might obtain if, for instance, one acquiesces 
under coercion to do something intentionally (like driving a car) but in” doing “so one 
does something else unintentionally (like helping a murderer escape). Excuse may 
also be invoked when the coerced person acts in ignorance or the harm he causes is 
unintentional (excuses which are available regardless of whether one is coerced). One 
is justified in acquiescing to coercion if one’s action (or its consequences) is morally 
required, or is morally permissible under the circumstances even if the action will 
foreseeably result in harm to others” (Anderson 2006). Hence one may be justified in 
harming an attacker in order to save one’s own life or that of others. 
“If one is restrained, incapacitated by violent means, or denied essential means to 
achieve a purpose, then it may be fairly obvious that one has an excuse for not doing 
otherwise than one did. Relying on the principle of ought implies can, when one 
cannot do something, this provides a good excuse for why one is not responsible for 
failing to do it” (Anderson 2006). What this means is that even though one has a duty 
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to do something one may be excused if one has good reason for not doing it. So we 
can excuse a person where they have a moral duty and should have acted in 
accordance with it, but could not do so because they were not able to do so. In these 
cases the person could not have chosen or acted otherwise; they had no option but to 
choose or act as they did.  
Before concluding the discussion of voluntary choice and action, it is important to 
draw the reader’s attention to some important details. To claim that an action is 
voluntary only when it depends on the person to do or not do it, is however not to 
claim that only those actions the person has decided to do following rational 
deliberation are voluntary. For Aristotle, even actions caused by non-rational feelings 
such as impulse and appetite, are voluntary. Otherwise, he says, we should say that 
neither animals nor children do voluntary actions, given that the actions performed by 
them are caused by non-rational feelings or instinctive or natural drives, desires or 
cravings (Aristotle 2009, Bk 3).  
However, Aristotle holds that although the actions of children and animals are 
consequences of non-rational feelings, since they lack the capacity for decision-
making, they are not responsible for them. Thus to say that children and animals can 
be causally responsible for an event, is not to say they are morally responsible, i.e. to 
blame for them. Although they are responsible for the action they performed 
inasmuch as they were the cause of the movement of their limbs, they are not 
responsible for performing the kind of action they performed, for they did not decide 
whether they wanted or not to be moved by the kind of feeling that moved them. In 
contrast, a normal adult person who acted based upon his or her previous decision is 
responsible not only for having performed the action, but also for having performed 
the kind of action performed, because the adult person decided, based on his or her 
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virtues and vices, what kind of action he or she was going to perform, and he or she is, 
at the same time, responsible for having the vices and virtues he or she has. What 
vices and virtues a person has depends on the person self, and hence the kind of 
actions he or she performs depends on him or her too. Thus the kind of action an adult 
person performs indicates his or her character and is his or her full responsibility, 
whereas actions of children and animals indicate their circumstances and, at best, their 
natural constitution, for which they are not responsible. 
Aristotle believes that the kind of person we are is a consequence of the actions we do 
and that there is no reason why an adult person cannot change a disposition to act 
viciously. Because moral dispositions are alterable, by habituation, (some) actions, are 
always up to us. If someone has a disposition to act viciously and wishes not to have 
such a disposition anymore, he or she cannot abandon a vicious disposition out of his 
or her mere will; for this change to be possible, he or she must overcome this 
disposition by performing virtuous actions so that he or she can modify this old 
disposition by habituating himself or herself to performing different actions. Thus not 
every virtuous action that we perform is an actualization of a virtue; one can act 
virtuously without having a virtuous character (Aristotle 2009, Bk 3).   
Based on the above analysis it seems reasonable to conclude that a person may, to 
some extent, be excused from full responsibility if they cannot make decisions, or act 
on the basis of incomplete or incorrect information or have no control over their 
actions. The wrongdoer is usually responsible in a mitigated extent for the action or its 
consequences. For example if I carelessly hold out my arms and unbeknown to me, 
there are people standing beside me, and my arms hit them, I am generally thought to 
be less blameworthy than someone who intentionally hit them. The same may be true 
if I delivered a blow to the chest of my cheating partner without knowing that I could 
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break her bones in so doing. I am likely to be seen to be less blameworthy than the 
person who intentionally kills another person. In both instances, I am thought to be 
less blameworthy because I lacked knowledge of the relevant facts. A person with no 
voluntary control over their actions or its consequences is similarly generally excused. 
Consider for example the case of someone who sleepwalks and breaks into another 
person’s house. Equally, people who lack the capacities necessary to (fully) 
understand the moral character of their actions e.g. minor children can cause 
something to occur but are not to be held morally responsible for their actions quite 
simply because they lack capacity to make a free choice.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter I’ve considered what it means to have moral responsibility and to be 
held morally responsible. I’ve explained that moral responsibility is generally 
understood to entail normative judgements about a person’s choices, actions and 
character. It concerns the proper ascription of praise and blame, but typically blame. 
An important feature of moral responsibility concerns one’s duties - those that one 
freely chooses or that one has in virtue of one’s social roles. My view is that it doesn’t 
really matter whether there is a morally significant distinction between the concepts of 
duty and obligations. Common sense morality recognises that we have duties in virtue 
of our being human and one grounded in special relationships and our social roles. 
The issue then is not really, if at all, a case of whether or not human beings don’t 
already stand in special relationships to one another simply in virtue of their being 
human. We can accept the claim that we have duties without having to debate this 
question. For instance we can agree that a pregnant woman who voluntarily chooses 
to reproduce has duties to the fetus - whether because of their uniquely special 
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relationship or because we think she should take responsibility for her decisions and 
the outcomes thereof.  
I have also shown that one’s moral responsibility for something implies one’s causal 
responsibility for that, but that the reverse is not true. In order for one to be morally 
responsible, one must not only have caused something (typically harm) to occur, one 
must also be at fault (in the wrong). Not all harms are therefore necessarily wrong in 
the sense that one should be blamed. Some harm may be justified e.g. killing someone 
in self-defence or consenting to surgery are not wrongful in the sense that we would 
or should hold the agents liable for causing harm.  Consent and necessity can excuse 
one from the wrongfulness of one’s actions.  
Two necessary conditions for the proper ascription of moral responsibility require that 
a person possess the requisite mental capacity and be in control of their actions. Moral 
agents can have moral responsibilities and be held morally responsible for their 
voluntary actions, because they have the capacity to make free and informed 
decisions. An action is voluntary if it is within an agent’s control, i.e. if it is up to the 
agent whether (or not) to perform it. If an agent does not have options to choose or act 
differently his or her choice or actions is not voluntary in the sense required for moral 
responsibility. Equally so if they lack full decision making capacity or make a choice 
based on misinformation or in ignorance. We cannot blame someone if they didn’t 
know that their choice or action would lead to the particular result. We really cannot 
expect someone to choose in what we perceive to be the right way if they don’t know 
what the right choice is.  
Setting aside the controversies about whether collectives can have moral 
responsibility in the same way as individual human beings, it is sufficient to claim that 
the idea of collective responsibility is widely accepted in common morality. We tend 
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to ascribe moral responsibility, to judge, praise or blame collectives – be they states, 
corporations or organized religions – all the time in practice. Thus in spite of the 
philosophical issues attendant to the idea of collective responsibility we typically 
think that collectives such as the state can have and indeed do have obligations and 
can be held accountable for its actions. So, even though the idea of collective 
responsibility is philosophically controversial, it is not necessary for me to delve into 
this particular debate. It is sufficient to claim that some collectives can have moral 
responsibility, in other words have obligations and be held accountable. To say that a 
collective can have obligations is not to say that these do not entail obligations for its 
individual members or that individual members have the same moral responsibility. If 
a collective, such as the state, can hold moral obligations this entails obligations for its 
individual members or citizens.  
One can consider the issue of moral responsibility at different levels and in different 
ways. One can consider it at the level of individual decision-making and action by 
asking about a pregnant woman’s responsibility. What are her obligations if she is 
pregnant and chooses to continue the pregnancy? Although she may not have an 
obligation to keep it alive by not aborting the pregnancy, can we hold her responsible 
for harming a fetus that she chooses to carry to term? Although pregnant women have 
a right, based on autonomy and self-determination, to accept serious health risks for 
herself, does she have a right to impose such risks on her future child? It is one thing 
for a woman to drink alcohol to her own detriment, but if she is pregnant, does her 
reproductive autonomy extend to include the risk of harming her fetus? What are the 
moral implications of choosing to continue a pregnancy? Does she have an obligation 
to not drink alcohol if she or plans to get pregnant? Is it appropriate to describe a 
woman who drinks during pregnancy as irresponsible? Can we hold her accountable 
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for her actions if she is addicted to alcohol? To what extent, if any, might alcoholism 
undermine responsibility for one’s actions?    
At the level of healthcare one might enquire about the responsibility of physicians and 
others involved in the care of pregnant women. Do they have a role to play in the 
prevention of FAS? If so, what might these entail? What obligations do physicians 
have to an expectant mother? What, if any, obligations might they have for her future 
child? When faced with a dilemma of having to choose between their obligations to 
their patient and their obligations to prevent harm to others, how are physicians to 
weigh these competing interests? In the context of FAS prevention, how should they 
deal with an expectant mother who rejects or cannot comply with medical advice to 
abstain from alcohol during pregnancy? How are they to balance the rights of a 
woman with the interests of her future child, where birth is the intended outcome? 
And at the level of wider society, one can ask whether and what responsibility the 
state, has concerning the particular problem of FAS. While we may agree that a 
government in a liberal and just state has a role to play in preventing FAS, defining 
that role is challenging, least not because we do no tend to agree on the types of state 
intervention to be implemented. To what extent then, if any, can the state interfere in 
the rights of pregnant women in order to prevent FAS (prenatal harm)? Can it compel 
her to behave in certain ways through for example criminalizing drinking during 
pregnancy or mandatory treatment for the sake of protecting the unborn child?  Which 
ethical principles justify state interference in individual liberty?  
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Chapter 4: The Moral Implications of Pregnancy and 
the Moral Responsibility of Pregnant Women Who 
Choose to Carry a Pregnancy to Term 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The “principle of parental responsibility offers a normative standard by which to 
judge the decisions and actions of those who wish to become parents” (Freeman 
1997:180). In terms of the principle, individuals must “attempt to refrain from having 
children, unless certain minimum conditions can be satisfied” (Steinbock & 
McLamrock 1994), notably the “conditions necessary to allow their children to have 
good and fulfilling lives” (Ankeny 2007). This idea can be traced back to John Stuart 
Mill who argues “that it is a moral crime to bring a child into this world without fair 
prospect of being able, not only to provide food for its body, but instruction and 
training for its mind” (Mill 1859, Ch. 5).  
In terms of the principle, individuals, who desire to become parents, must consider the 
interests and welfare of the future child when deciding whether to reproduce. If there 
is a possibility that the child will have a life marked by severe pain and disability the 
principle implies that people should refrain from having children. “Anyone willing to 
subject a child to a miserable life when this could be avoided” (Steinbock & 
McClamrock 1994) would be failing to live up to a minimum ideal of responsible 
parenting.  
The idea that there should be limitations on an individual’s right to reproduce is not 
uncommon. Rights are prima facie claims, powers or freedoms that should not be 
understood in absolutist terms, but rather in general terms, where the content of the 
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right is determined by its interaction with other rights and duties. Writers have argued 
that restrictions should be placed on a person’s right to reproduce and hence be 
parents, whether for public aims or because the exercise of the right posits duties that 
may limit the right. Hugh LaFollette (1980) for instance endorses a programme for 
licensing parents, whereas Julian Savulescu (2001) argues that the principle entails a 
duty of procreative beneficence, which requires parents to always choose to have the 
best possible child.  
However, even though one may assume “a range of responsibilities in making a 
decision to reproduce, including consideration of the conditions that should be in 
place to bear and rear a child, there are no obvious objective norms for ideal 
childrearing conditions” (Ankeny 2007). While people generally would agree that 
parents and those who wish to become parents should consider the interests of their 
future child, what precisely parental responsibility requires of them is contentious.  
John Harris (1990) explains that the problem is split in two. “The first involves an 
examination of potential children for their adequacy as children and the second 
involves examining potential parents for their adequacy as parents…. One dimension 
of the problem involves asking whether we might do wrong by bringing particular 
children into existence because of problems relating to…the constitution of those 
children, in virtue of which we might expect them to have less than adequate or 
satisfactory lives. The second concerns the question of whether we might do wrong by 
permitting children to be brought into existence who will suffer from less than 
adequate parenting” (Freeman 1997:173).  
The complexity of the questions “and the dilemma of understanding what is meant by 
acting in a parentally responsible manner” (Freeman 1997:173) are illustrated in two 
contrasting examples that Derek Parfit (1976) invites us to consider. The first example 
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is of a woman who is one month pregnant and told by her physician “that, unless she 
takes a simple treatment, the child she is carrying will develop a certain” disability 
(Freeman 1997:174). Life with this disability would probably “be worth living, but 
less so than normal life” (Freeman 1997:174). According to Parfit, it would be wrong 
for the mother to refuse the treatment because it will mean that her child will be 
disabled. The second case that Parfit provides is of “a second woman, who is about to 
stop taking contraceptive pills so that she can have another child. She is told that she 
has a temporary condition such that any child she conceives now will have the same 
handicap” (as the child in the first example), “but if she waits three months she will 
then conceive a normal child” (Freeman 1997:174). For Parfit (1976:76), “it would be 
just as wrong as it would be for the first woman to deliberately handicap her child” 
(Freeman 1997:174).    
Parfit explains that the first case is relatively uncontroversial because the principle of 
parental responsibility instructs the woman to prioritise her child’s wellbeing, hence 
take treatment for the sake of her child, but that the second case is far from 
straightforward (Freeman 1997). He illustrates this point with another example that 
involves a teenage girl who wants a baby. He says that we may, in an attempt to 
persuade her to delay having a child, say to her “You should think not only of yourself 
but also of your child. It will be worse for him if you have him now” (Freeman 
1997:175). He points out that the “weak link in this claim is the phrase ‘worse for 
him’, for clearly if she has a child later it will not be the same child” (Freeman 
1997:175), hence it can be neither worse nor good for him. He acknowledges various 
consequentialist arguments why teenagers should not have babies, but maintains that 
“having a child cannot make that child” that she is contemplating “better off by 
waiting” (Steinbock & McClamrock 1994). If she delays childbirth, the child that she 
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will ultimately give birth to will be a different child, because it would have developed 
from a different egg and sperm (Steinbock & McClamrock 1994).  The child that the 
teenage girl “will have if she becomes pregnant now cannot be born at a later time. It 
is either birth to a teenage mother or no life at all” (Steinbock & McClamrock 1994). 
Steinbock and McClamrock (1994) explain that “If we maintain that it is for the sake 
of the child she would bear that she should avoid pregnancy, we seem to be 
committed to the view that it would be better never to be born at all than to be born to 
a very young mother”. Parfit (1984) argues that “although being born to a teenage 
mother isn’t ideal, we” can’t really say that her having a child is so bad as to make 
nonexistence preferable, in other words, that children would be better off if their 
parents did not have them.
15
 He says that despite the hardships that children may 
undergo or the fact that they may have “preferred having an older mother, most 
children of very young mothers are probably glad they were born” (cited in Steinbock 
& McClamrock 1994) 
Although many people may agree that a woman has rights, based on autonomy and 
self-determination, to reproduce (or not) and to accept serious health risks for herself, 
what is less clear and arguably more contentious is whether she has a right to impose 
such risks on her future child. Even if the fetus has no or little rights, where a woman 
has chosen to carry a pregnancy to term, does it mean that she can behave as she 
wishes during her pregnancy? Does a pregnant woman’s alleged sovereignty over her 
own body (right to bodily integrity) imply a right to take serious health risks, even to 
the extent that it amounts to undeniable harm to her future child? What, if any, 
obligations does she have toward her future child? Does she have a compelling duty 
to abstain from alcohol? Can we rightly hold her morally responsible if she continues 
                                      
15
 Note, however, the argument developed by David Benatar that to produce an offspring is always 
morally wrong (Benatar 2006a: 18-59.) 
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to drink despite knowing the risk to her child? What if she is an alcoholic? Does 
alcoholism diminish one’s moral responsibility? Does it excuse her actions and the 
consequences thereof? Is drinking during pregnancy wrong and irresponsible 
behaviour on the part of a woman? Do we have reasonable grounds to morally judge 
and to blame her? And where she is at risk for having a child with FAS, should she 
terminate her pregnancy?  
 
2. The Moral Implications of Choosing to Continue a 
Pregnancy  
 
A moral implication of choosing to continue a pregnancy is that the woman can be 
said to be (one of) the child’s parents. A common and relatively uncontroversial view 
is that parents are the man and woman who were involved in the procreative act that 
causally resulted in the conception of the child (Blustein 1997; Nelson 1991).  
Typically this view places parenthood or being a parent on the nexus of genetic or 
biological relations such as being a child’s mother, father, a sibling, an aunt, a cousin 
and so on. This account, however, does not necessarily accommodate those 
individuals who do not get pregnant through conventional methods but who conceive 
through assisted reproductive techniques such as IVF and surrogacy. It also does not 
accommodate those individuals, who may have no genetic ties to a child and, who 
may not be causally responsible for the child coming into existence, but who may 
wish to become parents through adoption. At the same time it makes parents of people 
who may not necessarily want to be parents. There is a morally significant difference 
between being a pregnant woman and being a child’s mother. Pregnancy and 
motherhood, although often related, are distinct positions.  There mere fact of being 
pregnant does not automatically make the woman a mother. Just because she is 
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pregnant does not necessarily mean that she wants to take on the burdens of 
parenthood. 
A more plausible account of parenthood relates to the actors’ intentions about 
reproduction. In terms of this view parents are not only those individuals with genetic 
ties to the child or who have caused the child to be conceived, but also those 
individuals who intend to have the child (Hill 1991; O’Neill 1979). Theorists such as 
Sydney Callahan claim “the meaning and value of fetal life are constructed by the 
woman and that without this personal conferral, there only exists a biological, 
physiological process” (Callahan 2009:125). Similarly, Deborah Mathieu (1991:14) 
argues that “Once a pregnant woman forgoes her right to have an abortion, then, it 
could be argued that her actions should be constrained by considerations of the 
welfare of the child that the fetus will become” (Mathieu 1995:47) and that she 
“incurs these moral obligations to her future child only if she intends to carry the fetus 
to term” (Mathieu 1995:47) And Kathleen Nolan (1990) argues that “a pregnancy 
which is expected to result in the delivery of a child generates moral obligations based 
on the consequences to that child of actions and events that occurred during the 
prenatal period”.  
This “intention to carry a fetus to term” view has the advantage of accommodating 
even those individuals who adopt children and restricting parenting to only those 
individuals who freely choose to bear children. This account of parenthood recognises 
that a woman is free to choose and intend to have a child and thus be the child’s 
parent when she has socially acceptable options of avoiding pregnancy and birth by 
abstaining from sex, practicing contraception and terminating a pregnancy. Prior to a 
pregnant woman’s own free choice to carry a fetus to term she cannot be described as 
a mother and consequently be expected to behave like one, and neither can a child be 
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said to exist. However once she chooses to carry a fetus to term, she becomes a 
prospective mother with moral obligations to her future child.  
Normal adults are presumed to have the capacity to reflect on their situation and to 
form intentions about how they will act. They are thought capable of choosing 
whether or not they will reproduce. Irrespective of how a pregnancy may come about 
– i.e. voluntarily or not16 - where women have the option to not reproduce, they can 
still be said to intend reproduction and thus choose to cause a child to come into 
existence.  
In South Africa, women can be said to be able to choose whether or not they will 
reproduce or accept the burdens of parenthood, because they have a right to an 
abortion. The Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act (No 92 of 1996) is the primary 
piece of legislation governing abortion in the country. In terms of the Act, a woman of 
any age may request an abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, provided she 
understands the consequences of her choices. Thereafter conditions apply. From the 
13
th
 week up to and including the 20
th
 week of the pregnancy, abortion is permitted, 
only “if a medical practitioner, after consultation with the pregnant woman, is of the 
opinion that- 
(i) the continued pregnancy would pose a risk of injury to the woman's physical 
or mental health; or 
(ii) there exists a substantial risk that the fetus would suffer from a severe physical 
or mental abnormality; or 
(iii)the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest; or 
(iv) the continued pregnancy would significantly affect the social or economic 
circumstances of the woman” (section 1). 
                                      
16
 Even where abortion is optional, some women whose pregnancies may for instance have come about 
as a consequence of rape or other forms of sexual assault may still choose to continue a pregnancy. 
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After the 20
th
 week of pregnancy abortion is permitted only “if a medical practitioner, 
after consultation with another medical practitioner or a registered midwife, is of the 
opinion that the continued pregnancy- 
(i) would endanger the woman's life; 
(ii) would result in a severe malformation of the fetus; or 
(iii) would pose a risk of injury to the fetus” (section 1).  
Generally, “no consent, other than that of the pregnant woman is required for a 
termination of pregnancy” (section 5). However, if she is a minor – in South Africa, 
this is under 18 years of age – “the medical practitioner or midwife” must “advise” 
her “to consult with her parents, guardian, family members or friends before the 
pregnancy is terminated” (section 3). She cannot however be denied an abortion if she 
refuses to do so.  
Where the woman is “severely mentally disabled to such an extent that she is 
completely incapable of understanding and appreciating the nature or consequences of 
a termination of her pregnancy, or where she is in a state of continuous 
unconsciousness and there is no reasonable prospect that she will regain 
consciousness in time to request and to consent to the termination of her pregnancy”, 
the termination may be performed upon the request and with the consent of her 
natural guardian, spouse, legal guardian or curator, as the case may be (section 4)’ 
Given that women qualify for a lawful termination of a pregnancy in a variety of 
circumstances for a myriad of reasons, it seems reasonable to conclude that they can 
choose whether they will carry a fetus to term, i.e. be prospective mothers of future 
children. A moral implication of the decision to continue a pregnancy is that the 
pregnant woman now stands in a special relationship with the child; a relationship that 
generates moral obligations for her toward her future child.  
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One particular problem with my proposal relates to women’s access to abortion 
services in the country. Although women have a legal right to an abortion, this does 
not mean that they have adequate access to the service. A combination of factors, 
including medical professionals’ opposition to and fear of being stigmatised for 
providing abortion and related services, poor knowledge of abortion legislation, as 
well as a shortage of abortion services and trained providers to perform abortions, 
serve to hamper women’s access to abortion services (Harries, et al. 2014; Harrison, 
et al. 2000; Jacobs & Hornsby 2014; Trueman & Magwentshu 2013). One study for 
instance reports that fewer than 50% of public health facilities that are licensed to 
provide abortion services are actually doing so (Trueman & Magwentshu 2013). 
Conscientious objection is a particularly “important issue in understanding the 
obstacles associated with implementation of and access to legal abortion services” 
(Jacobs & Hornsby 2014:857). In South Africa, medical professionals have a 
constitutional right to object to providing services to women seeking to access legal 
abortion, on the basis of their moral belief, religion or conscience
17
, but are legally 
obligated to provide the service in an emergency. However, even when they object, 
they are legally obligated to inform women and refer them to an alternative facility, 
but may not do so, if they believe even these services to be objectionable (Jacobs & 
Hornsby 2014). These practices implicate and undermine women’s free choice 
concerning their decisions about reproduction and continued pregnancy status. 
However, it does not mean that women are completely unable to secure a medical 
professional or facility willing to assist them; it just makes the process of obtaining 
                                      
17
  In terms of section 15(1) of the Bill of Rights contained in the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa (1996), “Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion.”   
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the service challenging.
18
  
 
3. Moral Obligations to Future Children 
 
A woman who chooses to continue a pregnancy is exercising her right to reproduce as 
much as the woman who chooses not to do so. Upon choosing to be a prospective 
mother, she now stands in a special relationship with her future child and can be said 
to have special obligations to not harm and to benefit her fetus - hence future child.  
The proposition that we can have obligations to not harm future children is not a 
bizarre one. Ordinarily we recognize that a wrongful act done today may harm 
individuals in the future.  
Harper and James (1956:1030), provide the following example to illustrate the point. 
They say that “the improper canning of baby food today is negligent to a child born 
next week or next year, who consumes it to his injury”. Joel Feinberg (1984) similarly 
explains how it can be that future children can be harmed. To support his claim, he 
cites an example of a negligent motorist who runs over a pregnant woman, which 
results in harm or wrong to the born child (Mathieu 1995:2; Mathieu 2007:2). 
Feinberg (1984) explains that “The child comes into existence in a harmed state 
caused by the earlier negligence of a motorist whose act initiated the causal sequence, 
at a point before actual personhood, that later resulted in the harm. The motorist’s 
negligent driving made the actual person who came into existence months later worse 
off than she would have been. If the motorist had not been negligent, the child would 
have been born undamaged” (cited in Steinbock & McClamrock 1994).  
                                      
18
 Women can for instance obtain one in the private sector albeit at a cost or bear the costs of travelling 
to far-away locations where the service can be accessed.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
142 
 
Finally, Jen Saugstad (1994) illustrates how, in the context of environmental ethics, it 
can be that we can have moral obligations to not only contemporary but also to future 
generations. In Saugstad’s example “terrorists launch a nuclear missile that is set to 
remain in orbit for two centuries” (Saugstad 1994). After this time, the missiles will 
fall upon a “country, and kill all of its citizens” (Saugstad 1994). Saugstad’s point is 
that we have a moral obligation to not act in ways that will harm future people, 
because “being like us, future people will also have important personal interests – 
including interests that we have the power to affect by our choices” (Saugstad 1994). 
So for Saugstad (1994), whenever our free actions can significantly harm others or 
their important interests, we have a prima facie moral obligation to not act in that 
way. Consequently it is reasonable to suggest that prospective mothers have a prima 
facie moral obligation to not harm their fetuses, because it is the resultant children that 
will suffer the fate of their choices.    
But while the idea that we have obligations to not harm others is relatively 
uncontroversial, the idea that we have positive obligations, grounded in beneficence, 
to promote the welfare of others is arguably more contentious. Understood as a rule or 
duty, the principle of beneficence implies that we are to perform acts such as mercy, 
kindness, and charity and avoiding causing harm to others because doing so serves to 
benefit or promote their good. Understood as a virtue, the benevolent person is one 
who is disposed to act for the benefit of others (Beauchamp 2008). Beneficent acts 
can therefore be performed either from obligation (a sense of duty) or from non-
obligatory, optional moral ideals of action and excellence as the term benevolence 
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suggests. An often cited example of non-obligatory beneficence is the New Testament 
parable of the Good Samaritan contained in the Bible.
19
   
The extent to which beneficence or “doing good to others” is morally required (i.e. is 
obligatory) is vigourously debated in moral philosophy (Beauchamp 2008). Some 
commentators, like Robert Nozick (1974) for instance argue that there is no such 
moral duty, but that beneficence is better understood as a morally commendable 
virtue. Others like Phillipa Foot (1980) point out that, even if we have a duty of 
beneficence, the duty to avoid harm has priority over doing good; in other words that 
the obligation not to harm people is more stringent than the obligation to benefit them. 
So while we can require people to not harm others, we cannot require them, in the 
same way, to do positive acts to benefit others. In practical terms this means that 
while we may have a duty to not drown someone we have no duty to save them if they 
are drowning. It may of course still be beneficent of us to save them, but not because 
we have a duty to do so but rather because we choose to do so regardless of whether 
we have such a duty. Acts that exceed or go beyond the obligatory requirements of 
ordinary morality or professional morality, and are performed for the benefit of 
others, are supererogatory acts (Beauchamp 2008). 
Even though we may agree that a prospective mother has a positive obligation 
(grounded in beneficence) to consider and act in the interests of her future child, we 
may still disagree about what this means or implies for her conduct during pregnancy. 
What does it mean to harm someone? And does the duty to prevent harm mean that a 
woman must always do whatever is necessary to prevent and remove all possible 
harms to her future child?  
                                      
19
 In this parable a Samaritan comes across a stranger (a Jew) in need of assistance and tends to his 
wounds and care for him at an inn. The Samaritan was not obligated to help (since Samaritans and Jews 
in New Testament times were regarded as mortal enemies), but did so anyway and at significant cost or 
sacrifice to himself,  since he also carried the cost of the Jew’s care when he could no longer look after 
the Jew himself. 
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3.1. When Do We Harm Someone? 
 
Common morality recognises that harms are not necessarily wrongs; that only some 
kinds of harms are also a class of wrongs, for which one can rightly be held 
responsible. Philosophers as far back as John Stuart Mill (1863) recognise that “we do 
not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished 
in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow-creatures; 
if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience” (Mill 1863, Ch. 5). So it is 
not always the case that if someone is harmed that they have been wronged or that the 
person who caused the harm should be held responsible for it. Sometimes harmful 
acts and outcomes are justifiable. For example, suppose a lifeguard, in an attempt to 
save the life of a drowning person, breaks the person’s arm. Although the person 
suffered harm in the form of a broken limb, it does not follow that the lifeguard 
should be blamed for it. We can acknowledge that the lifeguard acted out of necessity 
in order to save the person’s life. We tend to think that a reasonable person would 
most likely want to be saved (i.e. be alive, even perhaps in a disabled condition) rather 
than dead; that sometimes harm is a consequence of aiming for a presumed greater 
benefit, as is the case when a patient consents to invasive medical procedures that aim 
to improve the patient’s condition, rather than make the patient worse off.  
Philosophical accounts of harm generally rely on a notion of harm that compares a 
person’s current condition with that which he would otherwise have been, had it not 
been for the harmful event. For example, Joel Feinberg (1984) defines harm as the 
“thwarting, setting back, or defeating an interest”, where interests are defined as 
“those things in which one has a stake... [these] are distinguishable components of a 
person's well-being: he flourishes or languishes as they flourish or languish” (cited in 
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Steinbock & McClamrock 1994). By his account people generally have a stake or an 
interest in something that they stand to gain or lose. Something is therefore in one’s 
best interest if it is good or beneficial for one and against one’s interests if it is bad or 
harmful to one. 
Feinberg suggests that the “minimal conditions of wellbeing amount to a requirement 
that we not doom the child’s future interests to total defeat. The advance dooming of a 
child’s most basic interests – those essential to the existence and advancement of any 
ulterior interests – deprives the child” of what Feinberg calls the child’s “birthrights” 
(Steinbock & McClamrock 1994). According to him, “if the conditions to enable a 
child to fulfil his most basic interests are destroyed before he is born and we permit 
him nevertheless to be born, we become party to the violation of his rights” (Freeman 
1997:167).  
Feinberg explains that “Before the fetus becomes a person it is a potential person with 
the potential attributes, including the possession of rights of a person” (Feinberg, 
1994:24). “If the potential person has an unalterable destiny of extreme impairment 
and suffering, and if one of the rights the child will have at birth (at the presumed 
onset of personhood) is the right to be free of these total impediments to development 
and fulfilment, then the potential rights at the very moment they are actualized are 
violated” (Feinberg 1995:24).  
So, according to Feinberg, a severely disabled child is born “not simply with rights 
but with already violated rights” (Feinberg 1995). Disabilities generally violate what 
Feinberg (1980) calls “the child’s right to an open future”. According to Feinberg an 
open future is one where a child can become capable of choosing his or her own 
conception of the good. So, from the moment the child is born, the child “has a 
grievance, a claim that he has been wronged” (Feinberg 1995). Harm is “caused to a 
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person before birth in virtue of the later interests of the child that can already be 
anticipated” (Steinbock & McClamrock 1994). On Feinberg’s account of harm and 
from the standpoint of the future child, it is wrong to have a child when the minimal 
conditions of well-being cannot be assured.    
John Harris (1989), similarly argues that the desire to found a “family is constrained 
only by consideration for the fate of the children who will constitute that family” 
(Freeman 1997:179) and that where children will be severely disabled, there “may be 
an obligation not to bring them into existence or allow them to continue in a world 
where their existence will be genuinely terrible” (Freeman 1997:179). Harris defines 
harm as simply being “put in a condition that is harmful” (Harris 1990:97). For him, a 
condition is harmful if the individual is disabled or suffering in some way or if their 
interests or rights are frustrated. Harris (1990:98) explains that “Where B is in a 
condition that is harmed and A and/or C is responsible for B’s being in that harmed 
condition then A and/or C have harmed B”, in the sense that they not only harmed B 
but have also wronged B.  
Seana Shiffrin (1999:124) further explains that “To be harmed primarily involves the 
imposition of conditions from which the person undergoing them is reasonably 
alienated or which are strongly at odds with the conditions she would rationally will; 
also, harmed states may be ones that preclude her from removing herself from or 
averting such conditions.” On this view, death, pain, disabilities, injuries and illness 
qualify as harms. If these conditions are forcibly imposed on others, contrary to their 
will, they constitute harms. These unconsented to conditions are also harms because 
“they impede significantly one’s capacities for active agency and for achieving 
harmony between the contents of one’s will and one’s” life more broadly understood 
(Shiffrin 1999).   
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It might appear to be inconsistent to allow a pregnant woman to sever her relationship 
with the fetus entirely through abortion, but argue that she has a moral obligation to 
not harm her fetus and perhaps even sometimes to choose to not have a child.  Thus 
some people might ask: How can we hold a woman responsible for injuring or 
damaging a fetus but not for terminating its existence? Isn’t death/destruction a 
graver, more serious harm than impairment? These sorts of questions however miss a 
fundamental distinction. While abortion considers the fate of usually unwanted 
pregnancies, the cases that this dissertation is concerned with are pregnancies that 
women have “chosen” or “accepted” to continue to term, with the intention of giving 
birth to a child. At issue is not the question of whether or not women should be 
allowed to terminate their pregnancies, but rather what sorts of obligations 
prospective mothers may owe their future children. If a woman opts to continue a 
pregnancy, where abortion was possible, does it mean that she can act as she pleases, 
regardless of how her behaviour will impact on her future child? To consider these 
questions one does not have to necessarily consider in detail the fundamental and 
controversial question that abortion gives rise to, viz. that of personhood or the moral 
status of the fetus. One could plausibly argue for the permissibility (or not) of abortion 
on grounds other than rights. As was previously shown, it is possible to argue that a 
woman’s intent determines whether or not the fetus will have future interests and 
therefore has present interests, albeit developmental in nature. The concepts intention, 
freedom, and responsibility are interconnected. A person who acts freely is usually 
understood to act with intent, and one can be held responsible for one’s intended 
actions and outcomes.  
 A woman who chooses to continue a pregnancy and who drinks during pregnancy 
places her future child at risk for FAS. As a prospective mother she can be said to 
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have both prima facie negative and positive obligations to her future child, which 
includes a duty to not harm her future child without justification and a duty to prevent 
or minimise harm to her future child by taking positive steps such as going for regular 
antenatal check-ups and taking necessary vitamins, that will benefit the child. For the 
purposes of this dissertation it is not important to debate whether or not a woman’s 
duty to not harm others outweighs or takes precedence over any duties grounded in 
beneficence. We can accept that parents can have both natural duties and special 
obligations without being committed to thinking that one or the other must take 
priority. It is also quite plausible to think that the duty to not harm others implies a 
positive act to prevent harm to them, and vice versa. But while a woman’s moral 
obligations to her future child “may be particularly broad and deep, they do not 
overwhelm other considerations in all circumstances” (Murray 1991:107). Sometimes 
those obligations must be weighed against those that she has towards herself, and 
others e.g. her other children and sometimes concern for her other obligations may 
even lead her to opt for a termination of pregnancy. 
Prenatal alcohol exposure is clearly harmful to a child. FAS reduces, instead of 
increases, a child’s chance for normal development and existence. A prospective 
mother can prevent the occurrence of FAS by abstaining from alcohol for the sake of 
their future child, but it is unreasonable to require her to always prioritise the child’s 
best interests, i.e. to claim that her duty of beneficence is an absolute one that should 
always take precedence when it conflicts with other interests, rights or duties. There 
are many competing interests in a person’s life. Most times there may not be a conflict 
of interests between those of the women and those of her fetus, but sometimes the 
woman’s interests may conflict with those of her fetus. For example as may be the 
case when a pregnant cancer patient is faced with the option of taking treatment that 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
149 
 
could give her the best chance of survival but kill or deform her fetus. Common 
morality does not require parents to protect their children from all risk of harm; only 
that they take necessary or reasonable steps to protect their children from harm. We 
cannot expect prospective mothers to take extraordinary measures or do absolutely 
everything or all that is necessary to protect the life and health of their future children, 
particularly since we do not place such high demands on parents of already born 
children. As Judith Jarvis Thompson convincingly argues, “no one is morally required 
to make large sacrifices in order to keep another person alive” (Thompson 1971). We 
do not for example morally require that parents donate a much needed organ to save 
the life of their child. We may frown upon a parent’s refusal to do so, but we do not 
generally think that they have a duty to do so.  
Of course we may disagree about the particular risks and the steps that parents should 
take to protect their children from harm or what constitutes acting in or promoting 
their child’s best interests, the point is however, simply that we do not, at least, as a 
rule, expect parents to always do absolutely everything or the best possible thing for 
their children. To require women to do so would be to treat them as no more than fetal 
containers (Annas 1986; Purdy 1990). “Since we do not force medical interventions 
on anyone in order to save another fully developed, rights-bearing person, a double 
standard that allows forced interventions on pregnant women seems to enshrine the 
fetus as more valuable and deserving of protection than born persons” (Kukla & 
Wayne 2011). 
 
4. Does Alcoholism Diminish Moral Responsibility? 
 
Ordinarily we call people who are addicted to or dependent on alcohol, alcoholics, 
and the condition, alcoholism. However, defining the condition of alcoholism in a 
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satisfactory way is not an easy task, as there are different conceptions of how we 
understand it (WHO 1994).  
Alcoholism presents a particular set of challenges for moral responsibility. Dominic 
Wilkinson (2010) illustrates the problem that alcoholism poses for moral 
responsibility with an analogy involving a hammer and a nail. The analogy begs us to 
consider whether the addict is “akin to a hammer – responsible for the action that 
ensues? Or are they like the nail – driven by forces out of its control?” Wilkinson’s 
illustration of the problem highlights several ethical questions: Do alcoholics have 
moral responsibility? Can they be held morally responsible for their choices, actions 
and character? Do they freely choose to drink or are their actions compelled? Does 
alcoholism diminish moral responsibility? Does it reduce a person’s capacity for 
decision-making and voluntary action? Do alcoholics have options to choose from or 
are they not in control of their choices and actions? Does alcoholism diminish a 
person’s free choice and action? Is their decision-making capacity impaired? And to 
what extent, if any, are biological, psychological and environmental factors morally 
relevant in deciding whether or not an alcoholic can and should be held morally 
responsible? Before considering these questions, it is necessary to say something 
about the different conceptions of alcoholism and their relevance to moral 
responsibility. 
 
4.1. Conceptions of Alcoholism 
Views on alcoholism fall roughly into one of four positions, viz., the willpower or 
moral model, the disease or medical model and the lay position (Foddy & Savulescu 
2010). The main differences that arise out of these models are the causes they attribute 
to alcoholism and the role of free will.  
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The willpower model 
The willpower model is arguably the oldest account of alcoholism, which according to 
Wilbanks (1989), emerged as a result of the significant influence of religion in 
people’s lives. Consequently, this position of alcoholism is rooted in the idea that 
alcoholics wish to “abstain, but their will is not strong enough to overcome an 
immediate desire to temptation” (Foddy & Savulescu 2010). In terms of this view, 
alcoholics are merely weak-willed people who should act otherwise, but lack the 
moral character or motivation to do so (Pickering 2006).  
The weakness model appeals to our common sense because it is consistent with our 
notions of free will and individual autonomy. Alcoholics are seen as free-willed 
individuals who make rational choices to consume alcohol, and alcoholism, a choice 
based on bad values. The implication of the willpower model is that people is that 
people are responsible for creating and solving their problem.   
The willpower model can be traced back to Aristotle’s discussion of an akratic (i.e. 
incontinent) person. In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle (2009) describes an 
incontinent person as someone who cannot master his or her passions and lacks a 
required character disposition, viz. self-control. To remedy the deficiency or inability 
to choose differently, Aristotle argues that the incontinent person must regain or 
develop self-control. In Christian ethics, alcoholism is also understood in terms of sin 
and virtue, vice and godliness (Madueme 2008). Lack of self-control and weakness of 
will or lack of willpower are generally seen as moral dispositions and feelings to be 
avoided with divine help. One shortcoming of the willpower model is its failure to 
sufficiently capture the phenomenon. For example, it does not seem able to account 
for how even people with good or strong morals can and sometimes do become 
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alcoholic. Consequently it ignores the range of social and psychological factors that 
influence alcohol use and alcoholism.  
The disease model 
In contrast to the willpower model, the disease conception of alcoholism sees 
alcoholism as “a condition of primary biological causation and predictable natural 
history, conforming to accepted definitions of a disease” (WHO 1994). Alcoholism is 
seen to be a consequence of physiological changes – i.e. a desire to consume more - 
that drinking may cause (Wilbanks 1989).   
The disease model views alcoholism as a disease and alcoholics as victims of disease, 
and patients that require treatment. Underpinning this view is the belief “that there is 
some normal process of motivation in the brain and that this process is somehow 
changed or perverted by brain damage or adaptation caused by chronic drug use” 
(Savulescu & Foddy 2010). The alcoholic is no longer rational and consumes alcohol 
as a result of a fundamentally non-voluntary process because he or she has no choice 
but to drink. Leschner (1999; 1997) and Hyman (2007; 2005) have for instance 
defended the view that an alcoholic’s “actions are the direct result of brain adaptations 
caused by chronic drinking and that their actions are more like reflexes than rational 
behaviors” (Foddy & Savulescu 2010:2).  
The disease-model, in particular, highlights the questions concerning alcoholics and 
moral responsibility, because it implies that alcoholics cannot be responsible for their 
addictive acts because their addiction to alcohol (chronic drinking) is a disease, i.e. 
something over which they do not have proper control, at least in the sense necessary 
for moral responsibility. This view challenges the traditional understanding that 
normal adults have control over their choices and actions, and gives rise to a situation 
or phenomenon that Buchman, et al. (2010) refer to as “the paradox of neuroscience”. 
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This “paradox” is that while the disease-model of alcoholism gives alcoholics access 
to treatment and support as well as compassion from other people, it, at the same time, 
also undermines an alcoholic’s moral responsibility because it views the alcoholic’s 
capacity for free choice and action, as fundamentally different to that of non-
alcoholics. Because they suffer from a disease (i.e. alcoholism) and because the 
alcoholic’s neurobiological and pharmacological mechanisms differ substantially 
from that of non-alcoholics, we cannot therefore condemn them because of their 
habits or hold them morally responsible. Because alcoholics cannot choose otherwise, 
they have no control over their actions and therefore cannot be held responsible. 
Rather than blame, condemn or otherwise punish the alcoholic, the alcoholic should 
be handled in accordance with this characterisation. 
Like the willpower model, the disease model has been criticised. The implication of 
the disease model of alcoholism is that alcoholics cannot be held responsible for their 
alcoholism because they are compelled to drink and consequently have reduced or no 
control, in the sense required for responsibility ascriptions. On this conception, the 
alcoholic is no more responsible for their condition than say a cancer patient. The 
implication of the disease model is that alcoholism could be “used to excuse 
wrongdoing or to exculpate individuals from responsibility for their actions. After all 
illness implies incapacity of some kind over which an individual has no control” 
(Bonnie 2002:252). Consequently, the disease model has been criticised for taking 
responsibility away from alcoholics by characterising alcoholics as victims. 
Furthermore, Bonnie (2002) describes the model as being incomplete and premature. 
“Incomplete because it fails to communicate the whole story about the behavioural 
and contextual components of addiction... [and]… premature, because research has 
not connected the observed changes in the brain to behaviour…. It is still not possible 
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to explain the physiologic and psychological processes that transform the controlled 
use of drugs into addiction” (Bonnie, 2002:406).    
Lay view  
Finally, the lay account of alcoholism holds that people consume alcohol “because 
they are morally corrupt hedonists who value immediate pleasure above all else and 
who rely on others to handle their ensuing health and survival difficulties” (Foddy & 
Savulescu 2010). By this account of alcoholism, alcoholics are rational agents who act 
on normative reasons and simply choose the pleasure (and pain) of alcoholism. 
Alcoholism is “nothing more than a species of strong appetite” (Foddy & Savulescu 
2010) or desire toward pleasure behaviour. Alcoholics are not necessarily incompetent 
or impaired in their decision-making capacity. In a sense they may be described as 
rational agents making irrational choices. On this view, the best solution to alcoholism 
is for alcoholics “to choose to accept their responsibilities” (Foddy & Savulescu 
2010).  
 
4.2. Alcoholism and Moral Responsibility 
Alcoholics are usually thought to be somehow out of control of their actions. It is 
thought that they cannot abstain from alcohol and are somehow forced to satisfy their 
desire or “need” to drink. The WHO defines it as “chronic continued drinking or 
periodic consumption of alcohol which is characterised by impaired control over 
drinking, frequent episodes of intoxication and preoccupation with alcohol and the use 
of alcohol despite adverse consequences” (WHO 1994).  
A common attitude may therefore be to assume that moral responsibility can be 
reduced or diminished in virtue of being alcoholic or suffering from alcoholism. 
Underlying this thinking is the idea that people are not entirely to blame for what they 
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do because they have no control of their actions because they have no option but to do 
what they did. The effect of this, i.e. holding that alcoholics have little or no control, 
is however that it reduces the moral responsibility of everybody to zero. In the final 
analysis the person ends up bearing no moral responsibility for their actions, which of 
course, is problematic, if we believe that normal adults have, at least some, agency or 
control over their decisions and actions.   
There are additional reasons for thinking that alcoholism does not reduce a person’s 
moral responsibility, and consequently, that they have control over their choices and 
actions. Firstly, if we regard compulsion as being simply about the strength of a desire 
or urge and a binary property (i.e. an action is either compulsive or not), and not a 
matter of degree (i.e. an action is more or less compulsive), then alcoholism, in 
general, is not compulsive in the sense that alcoholics absolutely lack choices to act 
otherwise (Uusitalo 2011:83). Alcoholics have at least two alternative possibilities in 
their reach: to drink or not to drink alcohol. When sober, they can choose whether to 
satisfy their desire. Of course it is relatively easier to abstain from a single act of 
drinking than it is to change the pattern of behaviour involved in alcoholism. But it is 
not absolutely impossible for an alcoholic to choose to not satisfy their desire to drink. 
Although it may be difficult to change the pattern of behaviour in alcoholism, every 
act of abstinence can potentially lead to behaviour change. Moreover, some alcoholics 
do overcome their addictions, sometimes without help. This suggests that, at least 
some, alcoholics can choose to not drink, despite having an immense urge to drink.    
A final reason for thinking that alcoholics have control necessary for moral 
responsibility relates quite straightforwardly to the view that many people may choose 
to drink alcohol because they crave alcohol more than anything else. As Foddy and 
Savulescu explain that, “Even though the choice to take drugs can produce extremely 
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deleterious consequences, we cannot infer from this fact that addictive choices are 
involuntary without making unwarranted assumptions about a person’s ordering of 
values. In particular, it should never be assumed that a person would prefer to 
preserve their health or life rather than obtain some strongly desired outcome…. 
Addicts might seem non-autonomous on these accounts, because they prefer a range 
of imprudent outcomes – but this does not distinguish them from non-addicted, 
imprudent people… we must accept that there is a possibility that drug taking is her 
highest most prized-value, and we must treat with skepticism any claim of a thwarted 
desire for abstinence. We must accept that drug taking may be a preference she 
endorsed after reflecting on relevant facts and considering the alternatives…. 
Addiction cannot be defined as a condition that reduces autonomy or self-control” 
(Foddy & Savulescu 2010:14-15). 
Alcoholism does not completely cancel out a person’s capacity for reasoning and 
decision-making, even if the person’s ability to rationally manipulate information is 
affected momentarily, because they are under the influence of alcohol. Even if 
alcoholism impairs a person’s reasoning ability, this does not mean that the person 
lacks the capacity to understand and appreciate the initial choice they made to drink 
alcohol. Even though we may judge alcoholics’ decisions to (continue to) drink to be 
irrational or unwise, this does not mean that they have no authority over themselves or 
their actions or that they lack options. Strong emotions, sensations and desires affect 
our practical reasoning in all human behaviour, not just in the case of alcoholism 
(Uusitalo 2011:85). Thus the suggestion that alcoholics do not freely choose their 
actions is dubious. It is more accurate to claim that alcoholics find it abnormally 
difficult, rather than impossible, to resist the desire or craving to drink. Even if 
alcoholics (do) lack (full) control over their actions -because their actions are 
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compelled by something beyond their control and they therefore cannot choose 
otherwise than to satisfy the desire - we can still argue that they are responsible for 
their alcoholism (becoming alcoholic) and thus their absence of control. It is not 
obvious that alcoholism excuses one from moral responsibility. Alcoholism may 
explain why one did what one did, but it does not mean that the behaviour is 
excusable or that one cannot be held responsible for one’s actions and the 
consequences thereof. For example, people who drive while under the influence of 
alcohol are penalized regardless of whether the individual is alcoholic.  
 
5. Do Prospective Mothers Have a Duty to Abstain from 
Alcohol? 
 
So far I have shown why normal adult alcoholics can be thought to have control in the 
sense required for moral responsibility and therefore be held morally responsible for 
their actions. It is not obvious that alcoholism does and should excuse one from moral 
responsibility. The mere fact of being diagnosed with alcoholism does not negate or 
diminish an otherwise competent adults’ capacity for free choice and action; it only 
explains or helps us to understand why someone may have acted as he or she did.  
Alcoholism may explain why one did what one did, but it does not mean that the 
behaviour is excusable or that one cannot be held responsible for one’s actions and the 
consequences thereof. Alcoholism does not appear to generally justify one’s 
wrongdoing or (risk) harming of others. For example, society holds accountable and 
punishes a person who drives or injures another while under the influence of alcohol, 
regardless of whether the individual is alcoholic.  So, even if the children of women 
who drank during their pregnancies are not born with FAS, we may still ask whether 
taking such risks is morally responsible behaviour. The answer does not depend on 
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whether harms actually occur.  Bonnie Steinbock (1999) illustrates this point through 
the use of an example. She explains that “it is irresponsible to leave young children 
unsupervised, because of what might happen, regardless of whether any harm in fact 
befalls them. It is irresponsible to have loaded guns where children might get them, 
even if no child ever does” (Steinbock 1999: 376). Thus it is not so much whether a 
child in fact suffers harm or damage, but rather a question of whether it is  
(ir-)responsible of parents to place their children at risk of harm. Even if a child 
suffers no damage as a consequence of prenatal exposure to alcohol, it still does not 
settle the issue of whether maternal drinking during pregnancy is a responsible one.  
Women’s decisions to drink during pregnancy can therefore still be judged to be 
morally irresponsible. 
Setting aside the myriad of factors that foster maternal drinking and increase a 
woman’s chances for having a FAS baby, if a woman’s child has FAS, maternal 
drinking during pregnancy is undoubtedly the most significant and direct causal 
factor. She is therefore (partly) responsible for causing the child’s harmed condition.  
It is therefore not unreasonable to suggest that a prospective mother has a prima facie 
duty to abstain from alcohol, at least for the duration of her pregnancy, given that FAS 
can be prevented without unreasonable cost or risk to herself. However to say that 
women have prima facie moral obligations to benefit and not harm their future 
children is not to suggest that these obligations should be made into legal ones. Even 
though there may be compelling reasons to prevent FAS, it may be impractical, 
inappropriate or unfair to adopt policies that restrict or punish women’s conduct.     
I am not denying that other external factors can’t or don’t influence the choices and 
the range of options a person has to act otherwise. These factors explain why people 
drink and may become alcoholic. Nor am I suggesting that these factors may not be 
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good reasons for holding only the individual responsible. Even if moral responsibility 
can’t be diminished it doesn’t mean that (additional) responsibility can’t be assigned 
to factors (or others) than that which caused a person to behave or choose in a certain 
way. Even though maternal drinking during pregnancy may be primarily and directly 
responsible for causing FAS in children, women by themselves cannot be held solely 
responsible.  
The link between maternal drinking and FAS is contentious. Even though there is 
widespread consensus that prenatal exposure to alcohol can cause FAS in children, 
there is disagreement about a range of issues. While alcohol abuse is a known factor 
that increases the risk for having a FAS baby, there is no consensus about the amount 
and timing of prenatal alcohol exposure that can or will lead to FAS. Coupled with the 
uncertainty about the level of risk is the interplay of genetic and psycho-social and 
environmental factors. Given the uncertainties and the many variables that influence 
maternal drinking during pregnancy and consequently risk for having a FAS baby, a 
moral responsibility to stop drinking alcohol cannot firmly be grounded.  
If we are to require women to practice abstinence then we should also recognise a 
social obligation to provide a range of interventions to assist women to avoid or, at 
least, reduce drinking during pregnancy. It is unreasonable, for example, to expect 
women particularly those who are alcoholic to simply abstain, even when they may be 
aware of the risks of drinking during pregnancy.  It seems particularly problematic to 
posit an absolute obligation to refrain from alcohol, since many women may require 
treatment and support to overcome alcoholism and chronic drinking. Finally, it would 
be unfair to expect or require pregnant women to stop drinking, but not from the range 
of other voluntary behaviours that carry some fetal risk. Doing so would expand the 
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net of possible wrongdoers to include just about anyone whose actions pose risk to a 
fetus, but it would arguably also have the effect of paralysing women into inactivity.    
Despite researchers having failed so far to find any concrete evidence of fetal harm 
from light to moderate drinking during pregnancy, in general, we tend to frame any 
level of drinking as indicating serious irresponsibility on the part of the woman. 
Lyerly, et al (2009) argue that the widespread social anxiety of FAS “constitutes a 
moral panic” over pregnant women “engaging in what we imagine to be self-
indulgent or decadent behavior, rather than an evidence-based response to risk” 
(Lyerly, et al. 2009). For them, “focusing on the consumption of alcohol as harmful a 
form of risk-taking seems to have more to do with images and ideologies of maternal 
self-sacrifice, purity and decadence than with” scientific evidence (Lyerly, et al. 
2009). They point out that “pregnancy can refract and intensify the already demanding 
moral standards of sacrifice we apply to mothers” and “lead to a tendency to 
unreflectively judge any risk to the fetus, however small or theoretical, to trump 
considerations that may be of substantial importance to the woman herself” (Lyerly, et 
al. 2009). Thus “the widely embraced ideal of evidence-based” recommendation “is 
replaced with a version of the precautionary principle”, that disproportionately 
burdens women with the responsibility for managing reproductive risk (Lyerly, et al. 
2009). Risk is always described with a value, be it the preservation of human life or 
respect for individual freedom. However, whenever one makes a decision, it is done 
in the context of conflicting, changeable scientific and technological information. 
Restrictions or demands should not be based on a theoretical risk without due 
consideration of a balanced exploration of benefits and harms. In pregnancy, the 
boundaries between “dangerous” and “safe” and between “reckless” and 
“responsible” are shaped in variable and often strict ways.   
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6. Do Women at Risk of Having a FAS Baby Have a Duty to 
Not Reproduce? 
 
The basic idea behind a principle of parental responsibility is that prospective parents 
should think about the consequences for the children before embarking on 
parenthood. It does not demand that people cannot become parents if conditions are 
ideal. In terms of the principle, it would be “wrong to bring children into the world 
when there is good reason to think that their lives will be” miserable (Steinbock & 
McClamrock 1994). This means that individuals who desire to become parents may 
sometimes have to postpone or avoid reproduction entirely, until certain minimum 
conditions can be satisfied. The principle of parental responsibility implies that 
parents who will be or are incapable of providing their child with the minimum 
conditions for a decent life should avoid reproduction. At the same time the principle 
also implies that one should avoid reproduction if one’s child is likely to be born 
without a chance at a normal life. Essentially the principle holds “that prospective 
parents are morally obligated to consider the kinds of lives” that their children “are 
likely to have, and to refrain from having children if their lives will be sufficiently” 
miserable (Steinbock & McClamrock 1994). But what is so miserable, that it would 
be wrong to reproduce or bear a child? 
Laura Purdy (1989) considers whether individuals “at risk of” passing on “serious 
disease to their” children should reproduce (Steinbock & McClamrock 1994). She 
argues that “individuals at high risk of transmitting” Huntington’s disease, a lethal 
genetic disorder, to the children, “are unable to provide them with -at least a normal 
opportunity for a good life and therefore should” refrain from reproduction (Steinbock 
& McClamrock 1994). Purdy however recognises that everyone won’t agree with her 
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conclusion, because not everyone shares her assessment of life with a serious disease. 
Huntington’s chorea, in addition, is a disease that only affects people from their 
forties onwards; before then, they can lead relatively normal lives. She acknowledges 
that “Optimists argue that a child born into a family afflicted with Huntington's chorea 
has a reasonable chance of living a satisfactory life.... Even if it does have the illness, 
it will probably enjoy thirty years of healthy life before symptoms appear... Optimists 
can list diseased or handicapped persons who have lived fruitful lives. They can also 
find individuals who seem genuinely glad to be alive” (Steinbock & McClamrock 
1994). A “stronger case for the moral obligation not to reproduce” is offered by John 
Arras (1990) who considers whether women who are infected with HIV and run the 
risk of transmitting the virus to their children should forgo reproduction for the sake 
of children (Steinbock & McClamrock 1994). Arras (1990) recognises that not all 
pregnant women infected with HIV will transmit the virus to their children and “that 
the severity of the disease varies widely”, but argues that even better-off HIV-infected 
children have lives that are, in Arras’s phrase, “decidedly grim” (Steinbock & 
McClamrock 1994). So, even though children infected with HIV may live somewhat 
satisfactory lives, the chances are good that they will live their lives under a cloud of 
impending death. Arras (1990) points out that in many instances, these children will 
also be born to parents who are themselves dying and who are therefore usually 
unable to care for their children. He argues that “When the medical and the social 
realities are considered, even an optimist should concede that it is very unlikely that 
an HIV-infected woman will be able to provide her baby with a reasonable (much less 
a normal) chance at a good life” (Steinbock & McClamrock 1994). Arras is not 
denying the “optimist” view, that some children may live somewhat satisfactory lives 
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despite having a serious disease or disability; instead he argues that these lives still 
fall short of a relatively normal life.   
Individuals desiring to become parents base their decisions about reproduction on a 
myriad of factors, which should include consideration of their ability to provide a 
good or relatively normal life and the quality of life. Providing children with a 
minimally decent life requires that parents make reasonable sacrifices that entail 
forgoing certain pleasures and behaviours for the sake of their future children. 
Although “the principle of parental responsibility does not provide a formula” 
(Steinbock & McClamrock 1994) for making decisions about reproduction and 
parenthood, and because people can and do often differ on what a decent life entails, 
and what risks are worth taking, decisions concerning reproduction are best made by 
the individuals, and in particular women, themselves, since it is mostly they who will 
bear the burdens of childbearing and rearing.   
The right to reproduce does not imply a duty to reproduce; only that people can [or 
should be allowed to] choose whether they wish to become parents. Because 
pregnancy imposes burdens on women, it should not be compelled. These burdens (or 
harms) are not merely that one’s body undergoes substantial change for months. In 
and of itself, pregnancy can impose financial, psychological, vocational and social 
hardships.  To require women to undertake these hardships would constitute a form of 
involuntary servitude. Any moral or social order compelling women to undertake it 
unwillingly violates any claim to promoting their full social and sexual equality with 
men. Until a full-proof method of contraception exists, and as long as the only way for 
human life to develop is within women’s bodies, women need the option of abortion 
in order to avoid being fettered by biology. Contraception and abortion offer women 
the opportunities to separate sexuality from parenthood, and thus enable them to 
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undertake parenthood only when they feel it makes sense for their lives (Asch 1986). 
While pregnancy could and usually does lead to social parenthood, it need not, where 
women have options to avoid it.  
One implication of the principle of parental responsibility as far as women are 
concerned is that it posits moral obligation on them to make responsible choices about 
pregnancy, birth and parenthood. It requires that they not harm but seek to benefit 
their future children by ensuring that the child will have a reasonably normal life. 
Thus the principle suggests that maternal drinking during pregnancy is prima facie 
wrong because it risks serious disability in one’s child, and constitutes irresponsible 
parenting behaviour. The principle does not imply that women have duties to not 
reproduce or to terminate their pregnancies if their children will suffer harm or live 
somewhat miserable lives. It only implies that they choose wisely and take into 
account the kinds of lives that their children will most likely live when making 
decisions. It also requires that parents make fair assessments about their ability to 
provide for the child’s basic needs to live a relatively normal life before choosing to 
have a child. Thus, in terms of the principle, there may be cases where the child’s life 
will be so miserable that an abortion may be an “appropriate” and responsible 
“exercise of parental responsibility” (Freeman 1997:180). Deliberately conceiving a 
child that is likely to suffer from serious disability to live in a world that generally 
rejects and stigmatises disabled people seems morally reprehensible when one has the 
option of preventing this.  
However one reason for rejecting an obligation to terminate a pregnancy for reasons 
of disability is because it violates the common sense notion that we should be allowed 
to end human life simply because it does not meet our specifications. We tend to think 
that, in deciding to become parents, we should be open to the possibility that we will 
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have children who do not meet our specifications of the “perfect” child. We may well 
have a child who will suffer from serious disease or disability or one who doesn’t 
have the physical traits we had hoped for. Even so, people generally tend to think that 
parents should welcome into their lives and this world, any type of child.   
Ending pregnancies for reasons of disability have serious moral and social 
implications that go beyond an individual woman’s reproductive decisions about her 
own life. Terminating a human life that has already begun is not the same as pulling 
an infected tooth. Moreover terminating a pregnancy because of the conditions of our 
own lives, says something very different to terminating one’s pregnancy because we 
don’t like what we find out about the child (Asch 1999:387). Terminating a pregnancy 
because the child will be or is at risk for disability differs from a decision to end a 
pregnancy because one’s life has radically changed, in that it is a statement not about 
the woman but about the value assigned to a future child that has characteristics we 
don’t like. Hence, feminists such as Asch (1999) and more generally disability rights 
activists argue that a society that condones abortion of disabled future children 
communicates a message that impairment is reason enough to make life and death 
decisions about one’s potential value. They point out that abortion for disability-
related reasons can be used as a eugenic tool and that society must consider whether it 
wants to send out the message to disabled people that there should be no more of their 
kind in future. People who are in favour of eugenic action typically believe that the 
quality of the human race can be improved by reducing the fertility of “undesirable” 
groups and at the same time, encouraging the birth rate of “desirable” groups. 
However, because selectively terminating the existence of seriously damaged or 
disabled fetuses, like abortion on the basis of sex selection, has the effect of distorting 
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the structure and balance of different groups in a population, it is also potentially 
unfair.  
The principle or parental responsibility seems to imply that the only way to prevent a 
severely disabled or FAS child from being born is to terminate a pregnancy. In turn 
then it seems to follow that the woman has a general duty to submit to an abortion. 
But the woman also has a general right to bodily integrity – a right to choose whether 
to abort or not, as she prefers – thus it seems to follow that she cannot have a duty to 
terminate a pregnancy any more than she can have a duty not to abort a pregnancy 
(Feinberg, 1985:72). It is however reasonable to say that the prospective mother’s 
duty is to take only reasonable steps to prevent harm while denying that abortion is 
something that can reasonably be expected or demanded of her; or perhaps we should 
say that the rights in question are mere prima facie rights, or claims of different 
strength, so that one type overrides the other.  
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Chapter 5: Social Responsibility for FAS Prevention: 
Should the State Punish Women for Drinking During 
Pregnancy? 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Although rational people are likely to agree that a pregnant woman who chooses to 
continue a pregnancy has prima facie moral obligations to accept certain burdens for 
the sake of her future child, they are equally likely to disagree about whether these 
moral obligations should be turned into legal ones, where failure renders her legally 
responsible.  
Society has an undeniable “interest in the welfare of children. For example, the state 
has a compelling interest in securing the full citizenship capacities and rights of each 
of its citizens” (Brake & Millum 2014). As a society, “we have a strong collective 
interest in the health and welfare of our future community members” (Brake & 
Millum 2014), so pregnancy cannot be seen as an exclusively private matter, but also 
one of public concern.  
Society gives parents considerable freedom in raising their children (Wikler 1978). 
Parents make all sorts of choices about their minor children; from what they eat and 
the clothes they wear to where they will go to school. Important “ends are served by 
relegating to parents the right to decide important issues” (Schoeman 1980) for their 
children. Against society, parents and their children have “rights to conditions which 
permit” and encourage or at least do not discourage the social and material conditions 
conducive to parent-child intimacy” (Schoeman 1980:9). But just how much 
discretion should be left to parents is not always clear. We do not always agree on 
how much latitude or powers parents should have over their children, hence “parental 
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decisions that threaten the child’s chances of becoming a fully participating citizen 
may come under special scrutiny” (Brake & Millum 2014).  
The social and economic cost of maternal drinking and consequently the range of 
possible conditions that could afflict a child have been described as a matter for public 
health. One way for states to prevent FAS is by passing legislation that criminalises 
and punishes drinking during pregnancy and instances of prenatal harm. The idea that 
women should be deterred from and punished for drinking during pregnancy and thus 
placing her child at risk of harm is controversial but not entirely uncommon. In the 
US, for example, many states have considered or implemented punitive policy in an 
effort to prevent prenatal harm, and which effectively infringe a woman’s rights for 
the sake of her fetus (Armstrong 2005; Larson 1991; DeVille & Kopelman 1998; 
Roberts 1991; 1990; Young 1994). Some states have approached the problem of 
prenatal alcohol exposure by focusing on the pregnancy period; whereas others have 
chosen to intervene only after a child is born affected (Larson 1991). Some judges 
have reportedly gone so far as to sentence “pregnant addicts convicted of crimes like 
theft and shoplifting to much heavier sentences than they would have otherwise” 
(Young 1997:76). Among the policies proposed or adopted have been policies that: 
 Allow for the removal of a child into (usually) state custody if a mother tests 
positive for alcohol or other drug use (Larson 1991). 
 Allow for mandatory reporting by medical care professionals and social workers 
of, (even) suspected maternal alcohol or other drug use, to the state (Chavkin 
1996; 1991; 1990). 
 Enable others to seek a court order to compel a woman to undergo treatment 
(Balisy 1987; Young 1994).  
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 Include prenatal “drug exposure in their definition of child abuse and neglect” 
(Young 1997).  
In South Africa, although there are restrictions on the production, sale and 
consumption of alcohol, alcohol is widely available to, and used among, the general 
public. Anyone over 18 years of age can purchase and consume alcohol. However, 
recently there has been a proposal by the Gauteng Provincial Government to 
indirectly prevent pregnant women from acquiring alcohol. In terms of the draft 
Gauteng Liquor Bill (2011), a licensee (i.e. person to whom a licence has been issued 
and who is thereby authorised to conduct a business in terms of the Bill), may not sell, 
supply, or give alcohol to pregnant women. Any person who is guilty of an offence in 
terms of the Bill, is liable to a fine not exceeding ZAR 100 000 (one hundred 
thousand rand) or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years or to both such 
fine and imprisonment. Although the provisions are not directly aimed at pregnant 
women, they do ultimately operate to restrict women’s access to an otherwise legal 
substance for the sake of preventing FAS and its associated costs.   
Punitive efforts to prevent and punish maternal drinking during pregnancy are 
controversial because they raise complex questions and conflicting responses. People 
disagree about what the role of the state should be and consequently the sorts of 
interventions that are appropriate responses to prevent maternal drinking and FAS. 
While people tend to agree about the legitimacy and appropriateness of methods that 
involve voluntariness e.g. voluntary health education or treatment, many may be 
opposed to coercive measures that criminalise and punish women for drinking during 
pregnancy or if her child has FAS.  
The political philosopher, Alan Wertheimer (2002) points out that the question of the 
proper role and function of the state is a distinctly modern one. He explains that, 
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whereas classical western “philosophy, as exemplified by the works of Plato and 
Aristotle, was concerned with the nature of a good life and a good state,” and “simply 
assumed that a primary task of” the state was “to get its members to live moral lives” 
(Wertheimer 2002), early modern philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes (1968[1651]) 
and John Locke (1690) questioned this assumption and thus concerned themselves 
with the political legitimacy of or justification for the state. Nowadays, we assume, as 
the classical philosophers have, “that the state is legitimate, at least if it is democratic” 
(Wertheimer 2002). Hence our concern, today, is usually with questions about the 
sorts of policies that the state should adopt. Wertheimer sums up the problem for 
modern day political philosophy in the following way. He says that, “In liberal 
societies, we believe that the individual is the primary locus of moral value and that 
individual freedom is of the utmost importance. At the same time, we think that the 
state is justified in using its coercive powers to limit individual liberty if it does so for 
the right reasons. Unfortunately we disagree as to what those reasons are” 
(Wertheimer 2002:38). So, even if we agree that there are good reasons for state 
interference, we disagree on the extent that the state should be involved in regulating 
human behaviour, in other words, what sorts of policies it would be justified in 
implementing.  
In this chapter I consider the appropriateness of punitive policies for the sake of 
preventing prenatal harm. I proceed by making some remarks about how we may 
understand the concept of “the state” and what a few thinkers have said is the proper 
role or function of the state. This is followed by a discussion of one the key moral 
justifications for state interference in individual freedom in liberal societies. 
Thereafter I evaluate some of the main arguments favouring punitive approaches and 
suggest that they are unwarranted, potentially discriminatory and likely to be 
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ineffective. I conclude by offering proposals for what constitutes an ethically 
appropriate state response to the concomitant problems of maternal drinking and FAS.    
 
2. State, Society and Government: Defining the Concepts 
 
A state is one of our best known institutions in society. An institution is an instance of 
collective action by members of a society. We do not only act as individuals; we (can) 
also act together with other people. In the state, we act collectively in order to protect 
us all against harm and to promote justice. 
One definition of society is that it is an association of human beings, which includes 
the whole complex of the relations of man to his or her fellows, and consists of all 
organized and unorganized institutions and associations within the community 
(Appadoria, cited in Iroegbu 2013:51). By this account the state is distinct from 
society. Society is the bigger whole of which the state is just a part. The state is 
therefore created from society. And while society has no territorial limits – it can 
extend from a small community to the whole world – the state comprises a definite 
geographic region (and consequently population or society) in which it is supreme. 
So, unlike society, the state must have an organisation, viz., a government, that is 
responsible for its internal administration and its relationships with other countries. 
And whereas society can use moral persuasion and influence, the state is the only 
institution that can legitimately use force or coercion.  
The authority of society mainly finds expression through customs while the state 
exercises its authority through laws enacted and enforced by the government. Laws 
that express the will of the state are framed and given effect by the government. 
Government is but one factor that constitutes the state, but it is the institution that 
holds the exclusive power to enforce certain rules of social conduct in a given 
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geographical area (Rand 1964). The state is therefore the principal body having 
original powers, while government is a subordinate agency that enjoys only delegated 
powers, much like those of a board of directors of a joint stock company; they are not 
owners of the company. Government then possesses no sovereign powers, only 
derivative powers delegated to it by the state through its constitution. Constitutions set 
out the fundamental principles and values according to which a state is governed but 
also act as limiters of state power by establishing the lines which individuals and 
collectives, including the state, cannot cross (Rand 1964). The distinction made 
between state and government is however mostly of theoretical value than of any 
practical value because all actions of the state are performed by its government and 
whatever the government does, it does in the name of the state. For this reason I will 
use the term state to include government.  
 
3. Moral Justifications for the State  
 
Attempts to show that the state is morally legitimate might be backward looking or 
forward-looking. For example for social contract theorists like Hobbes (1968[1651]) 
and Locke (1690), the state is justified if, and only if, every individual over which the 
state claims authority has consented – whether explicitly or hypothetically. Locke for 
instance writes that “every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic 
under the government, puts himself under an obligation to every one of that society to 
submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it, or else this 
original compact, whereby he with others incorporates into one society, would signify 
nothing, and be no compact if he be left free and under no other ties than he was in 
before in the state of nature” (Locke 1690:52f).  
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On the other hand Utilitarians of the kind espoused by, for example, Jeremy Bentham 
(1948) rejects the Hobbesian idea that the state is created by some kind of a social 
contract. Bentham for instance argues that the justification for the state can simply be 
found in the principle of utility, i.e. with reference to its beneficial consequences. He 
points out that it is the state that creates the possibility of binding contracts and that 
the main problem faced by the state is the question of which laws are justified.  
Excepting for those who prefer anarchy, most of us would agree with the principle 
that the state exists to govern rights and wrongs and that one of its core purposes is 
protection of its members.
20
 The state is the institution within society that is most 
capable of enforcing morality, but in order to effectively do so or to cultivate moral 
behaviour, the state must meddle in the affairs of its members. This, however, raises 
questions about which values a society should promote and which laws are best in 
achieving these ambitions.  
Libertarians such as Robert Nozick (1974) argue that the only relevant wrong is 
coercion by the state. Thus, the state’s role or obligations are limited to protecting 
individuals from coercion. Others however argue that the protection of individual 
freedom or autonomy is not the only thing that matters and that there are other 
considerations concerning the proper role of the state such as justice and beneficence 
or the promotion of social welfare. John Rawls (1971) for instance proposes that the 
role of the state is to create a just society.
21
 Essentially, a just society for Rawls is one 
where no one has an unfair advantage over others and that adopts fundamental 
principles of justice that would pass the following test: They must be principles that 
                                      
20
 By anarchy I simply mean a situation where people rely purely on voluntary arrangements and there 
is an absence of any formal or organized system of government control.   
21
 Rawls’ conception of justice is derived from the sense that Aristotle gives to justice. Aristotle 
interpretation of justice is that of refraining from pleonexia, i.e. from gaining some advantage for 
oneself by seizing what belongs to another, his property his reward, his office, and the like, or by 
denying a person that which is due to him, the fulfilment of a promise, the repayment of a debt, the 
showing of respect and so on. 
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we would rationally agree upon behind a veil of ignorance. To be behind a veil 
ignorance is to know how the principles would shape society, but not to know what 
particular positions each of us would have in that society. On the other hand John 
Stuart Mill (1859) argues that the state has no business interfering in the acts and 
decisions of competent individuals that do not (threaten to) harm others but permits 
state interference where restrictions will provide benefits to others. He argues that 
“every one who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and 
the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to 
observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest. This conduct consists, first, in not 
injuring the interests of another; or rather certain interests, which either by express 
legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights; and 
secondly, in each person bearing his share (to be fixed by some equitable principle) of 
the labours and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from 
injury and molestation… [I]n all things which regard the external relations of the 
individual, he is de jure amenable to those whose interests are concerned, and if need 
be, to society as their protection” (1859, Ch. 1).   
 
4. The Coercive Power of the Sate   
 
This idea that the state can and should use coercion and punish wrongdoers can be 
traced back to the works of Thomas Aquinas for whom the “law and the” state “bear a 
special relationship to the use of coercion” (Anderson 2006). Aquinas argues that 
coercive power is not and should not be generally available to anyone to use; that it 
should not be vested in private parties but rather “in the whole people or in some 
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public personage” (Anderson 2006).22 He suggests that the law “must use force and 
fear in order to restrain those who are “found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and 
not easily amenable to words, so that they will desist from evil-doing, and leave 
others in peace, as well as become habituated in this way, and” thus virtuous” 
(Anderson 2006).  
Common to all philosophical discussions of coercion is the idea that coercion involves 
the “use of a certain kind of power for the purpose of gaining advantages over others 
(including self-protection), punishing non-compliance with demands, and imposing 
one’s will on the will of other agents” (Anderson 2006). In some ways, many modern 
philosophers’ such as Thomas Hobbes 1968[1651]), John Locke (1690), Immanuel 
Kant (Kant 1996 [1797]) and John Stuart Mill (1859) hold views on coercion follow 
that of Thomas Aquinas (Anderson 2006). 
Although Hobbes, Locke and Kant “differ in innumerable ways in their philosophical 
and ethical views, they appear to hold similar views of the nature of coercion and its 
role in the function of justice and the state” (Anderson 2006). All seem to agree that 
“coercion is essential to both the justification of and function of the state” (Anderson 
2006); that it is necessary “for people to establish a state with coercive powers in 
order to achieve justice” (Anderson 2006). Hobbes, for example, sees the state’s 
coercive power as necessary for ensuring performance of obligations by parties to a 
contract (Hobbes 1968[1651]: Ch. 14). Similarly, Locke (1690) believes “that the 
function of the state is intimately tied to its role in securing individuals against those 
who would” harm them (Anderson 2006). Although Kant differs in his views on the 
necessity of coercion from those of Hobbes and Locke, he supports the idea that states 
                                      
22
 Aquinas does however allow some parties which he refers to as “imperfect communities” such as the 
head of a household, to” be able to use an “imperfect coercive power, which is exercised by inflicting 
lesser punishments, for instance by blows, which do not inflict irreparable harm” (Anderson 2006). 
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“require the ability to use coercion in defense of the equal freedom of their” citizens 
(Anderson 2006). Kant thinks that “there are two sorts of incentives to follow the law: 
ethical and juridical” (Anderson 2006). For Kant, “the ethical” or “rational incentive 
to” obey “the law is the motive of duty” (Anderson 2006). However, he recognises 
that some people’s will is determined “by inclinations and aversions, rather than by 
duty” (Anderson 2006). Thus he holds that there also needs “to be a way to get such 
persons to follow the law as well, through such means as aversion to punishment” 
(Anderson 2006). “Coercion is then a tool the law uses to get the lawless to respect 
the rights of others whether they want to or not” (Anderson 2006). “Kant makes clear 
that coercion counts as a hindrance to freedom, in which respect it is similar to all 
violations of a person’s rights, but” that “coercion can” also “be used to prevent other 
rights violations, and thus may be justified on the grounds that it counts as a hindrance 
to freedom” (Anderson 2006).  
John Stuart Mill also “associates coercion with the state’s powers to punish 
lawbreakers” (Anderson 2006). However, “he takes a more expansive view of what 
coercion amounts to than” do those of Kant, Locke and Hobbes. Mill seems to “treat 
the terms coercion and interference as much the same thing” (Anderson 2006). In On 
Liberty, he says that “the object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle, as 
entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of 
compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal 
penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is that the sole end 
for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the 
liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection… [An individual] cannot 
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, 
because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would 
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be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or 
reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, 
or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise” (Anderson 2006).     
“In treating coercion expansively” Mill captures “a number of different ways in which 
powerful agents could exercise constraining power on others besides the use of force, 
violence, and threats thereof” (Anderson 2006). He “suggests that the potency of legal 
penalties often resides more in the stigma they attach than the actual punishments they 
apply” (Anderson 2006). Thus he says that the “chief mischief of the legal penalties is 
that they strengthen the social stigma. It is that stigma which is really effective…. Our 
merely social intolerance kills no one, roots out no opinions, but induces men to 
disguise them, or to abstain from any active effort for their diffusion” (Anderson 
2006). In contrast to earlier thinkers Mill recognises “that the power of civil 
institutions is frequently on par with the power of the state, and treats the potential for 
coercion by these other institutions as similarly a matter of concern” (Anderson 2006).  
 
5. Justification for State Coercion  
 
Coercion (sometimes also described as compulsion) “is typically thought to carry with 
it several important implications, including that it diminishes” a person’s “freedom 
and responsibility and is a” prima facie “wrong and/or violation of individual rights” 
(Anderson 2006). However, “few believe that” coercion “is always unjustified” or 
wrong, “since no society can” effectively “function without some” authorised “uses of 
coercion” (Anderson 2006). Because of its usefulness (e.g. maintenance of social 
order, the achievement of justice) and its sometimes devastating effects, coercion 
remains both politically and ethically controversial.  
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To some extent, all state policies involve interfering with people’s freedom to act as 
they please. The paradigmatic case of state interference with individual freedom 
involves the use of criminal law to either forbid people to behave in certain ways (e.g. 
from committing murder or theft) or to require us to behave in certain ways (e.g. pay 
state taxes and wear seatbelts). Law is by nature coercive because it aims to regulate 
human behaviour and to punish offenders. However, to say that law infringes 
individual freedom is not to say that coercion per se is problematic. Often there are 
good normative reasons for the use of state coercion.  
 
5.1. Harm Principle 
John Stuart Mill (1859), proposed what is possibly the most widely cited justification 
for interference by a liberal state in individual freedom. In his seminal essay, On 
Liberty, Mill argues “that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually 
or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, self-
protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others… his 
own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightly be 
compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, or because it will 
make him happier, or because in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or 
even right…. [While these are] good reasons for remonstrating with him or reasoning 
with him, they are not good reasons for compelling him, or visiting him any evil. To 
justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to 
produce evil to someone else. The only part of the conduct of anyone for which he is 
amenable to society is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns 
himself, over his mind, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign…. If 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
179 
 
anyone does an act hurtful to others, there is a prima facie case for punishing him by 
law, or where legal penalties are not safely applicable, by general disapprobation…,. 
Whenever… there is definite damage, or a definite risk of damage either to an 
individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the province of liberty and placed 
in that of morality or law” (Mill 1859: Ch. 1).  
Mill makes clear that the principle applies only to “human beings in the maturity of 
their faculties” in “a civilized community” (Mill 1859: Ch. 1), thus leaving open the 
possibility for legitimate interference in the lives of those incapable of fully making 
free choices e.g. children and mentally disabled people.      
Mill explains that an action is harmful to others if it is “injurious or sets back 
important interests of particular people; interests in which they have rights”, without 
“their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation” (Mill 1859, Ch. 1). 
“To satisfy the harm principle, an action need not cause harm; it is enough if it poses a 
substantial risk of imminent harm” (Mill 1859, Ch. 4).  According to Mill, we can 
harm others through both our acts and our omissions, but “a much more cautious 
exercise of compulsion” is required in the case of our inactions. He says that that to 
make anyone “answerable for not preventing evil, is comparatively speaking, the 
exception” (Mill 1859: Ch.1). For Mill, “inaction constitutes harm only when it is 
obviously a man’s duty to act” (Mill 1859: Ch. 4). Thus, whether a person’s 
omissions harm another will depend on whether he or she had a duty to act.   
The principle espoused by Mill is widely known as the harm principle. In terms of the 
principle, a liberal state and others have no business interfering in a person’s freedom 
when his or her actions affects the interests of no other person but the actor self. 
Interference in individual freedom is therefore justified only if it aims to prevent (risk 
of) harm to others. Where the individual’s actions affect only the actor, then 
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interference is not justified by the principle.  In terms of the principle there can be no 
victimless crimes, and one cannot commit a crime against oneself. If an action has no 
victim, i.e. someone other who will be harmed, and if one has freely consented to the 
risk of harm, then there cannot be a wrong, in the sense that it justifies interference in 
individual freedom of action.  
In terms of this principle punishing someone for failing to prevent harm to others 
should not be the norm and occur only in exceptional cases. This suggests that a 
distinction be made between cases where someone intentionally causes harm from 
cases where someone fails to take steps to prevent harm from materialising. As has 
been previously shown in this dissertation, it is easier to argue that we have a 
(negative) duty not to harm others than it is to argue that we have (positive) duties to 
help them. Thus we may for example judge more seriously a person who intentionally 
drowns another person, than the one who failed to attempt a rescue. In the former case 
the individual is clearly harmed by the action, however, in the latter case, it is not 
obvious that the person was harmed (in the sense that he or she is wronged) by the 
inaction.  
Mill does not seemingly specify who those others are, whom it would be wrong to 
harm. If “others” refer only to persons, and if the fetus is a person, then it would be 
prima facie wrong to harm it in the same way that harming an adult person is. 
However, if the fetus is not a person, then the harm principle may not support 
restrictions on a woman’s conduct for the sake of her fetus. Whether the fetus 
qualifies as such a being is ethically contentious. Thus the application of the harm 
principle requires consensus on the status of the fetus.  
Although Mill argues that causing harm is generally always a wrong, he maintains 
that regulation may not always, on balance, be best (Mill 1859: Ch. 1). So, while he 
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recognises that there may be good reasons for holding individuals accountable for 
their harmful acts, he, at the same time believes that there sometimes may be more 
compelling reasons for us not do so. According him, this would be the case where the 
interference will “produce other evils, greater than those which it would prevent” 
(Mill 1859: Ch. 1). He goes on to say that, “When such reasons as these preclude the 
enforcement of responsibility, the conscience of the agent himself should step into the 
vacant judgment-seat, and protect those interests of others which have no external 
protection” (Mill 1859, Ch. 1). Thus by Mill’s account an evaluation of policy that 
interferes with individual freedom requires that two approaches be taken. First it must 
be evaluated from a philosophical perspective in terms of moral justification to 
determine whether it is justified by ethical principles. Secondly, it must be evaluated 
from the perspective of efficacy, to determine if it will, on balance, be more beneficial 
than harmful.   
  
6. Problems with Punitive Approaches 
 
Punitive measures are troubling because they involve intrusions and restrictions of 
varying duration, degree and risk in a person’s freedom and rights. Punitive 
approaches that criminalise and punish drinking during pregnancy allows for women 
to be arrested and charged criminally and if found guilty, to receive a sentence as 
punishment. Proponents of punitive approaches argue that the rights of pregnant 
women may or should be curtailed in some circumstances, either because they believe 
that the fetus has rights or because of the consequences of permitting women to do 
entirely as they wish. Proponents of criminal approaches further point out that the 
harm to the woman is minor compared with the benefits to her child and society. HLA 
Hart for instance argues that a law penalising prenatal culpable conduct is desirable 
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because “it announces to society that these actions are not to be done and to secure 
that fewer of them are done” (Hart 1968:6), whereas Sam Balisy (1987) argues that 
the cost of caring for drug-damaged children and the state interest in protecting fetal 
life are good reasons for imposing criminal sanctions, including compelled enrolment 
in rehabilitation programmes.  
The mere fact that a policy involves coercion does not imply that it is unjustified. In 
liberal societies, the harm principle is one of the most widely cited justifications for 
state interference in an individual’s freedom or rights. But even if a policy 
criminalising drinking during pregnancy may be defensible, it suffers from serious 
problems and shortcomings, which suggests that it will be largely ineffective at 
achieving its supposed ends of protecting fetuses and future children from harm. 
There are several reasons that warrant concern about the use of punitive state policy to 
prevent FAS; some of which I now turn to.  
 
6.1. Uncertainty Principle 
The uncertainty principle implies that we cannot punish someone for a harm that has 
not yet occurred and which may not occur. Although FAS is preventable, much of the 
“data on the problem remain unequivocal and are rendered problematic by several 
confounding factors. Polydrug and multiple substance use may make it difficult for 
investigators to determine both the amount of the substance or substances ingested 
and when in the course of the pregnancy they were used. Other factors, such as 
socioeconomic status, the availability of prenatal care and individual patient 
pathophysiology, frequently have an important role in suboptimal fetal outcomes” 
(DeVille & Kopelman 1998).   
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Not all women who drink alcohol will have a FAS baby. We cannot predict which 
fetuses and future children will be seriously harmed as a consequence of maternal 
drinking. There is for example, uncertainty about the precise amount and pattern of 
prenatal alcohol exposure and the conditions which result in FAS. A myriad of 
psycho-social and economic factors coupled with maternal characteristics have been 
found to increase the risk of drinking during pregnancy and having a FAS baby.  The 
problem of accurately predicting or knowing the precise conditions that cause FAS is 
compounded by maternal polydrug use, since it will be harder to isolate the exact 
harm-causing agent.  
Punitive measures therefore fails to take into account the fact that there are complex 
interactions between genes, the environment and pattern and extent of prenatal 
alcohol exposure that shape birth outcomes. They are therefore at odds with scientific 
evidence that suggests that a complex relationship exists between alcohol and 
pregnancy outcomes. Moreover, we do not ordinarily punish people for what they 
might do but rather for what they factually do. For example, we know that driving a 
motor vehicle is a potentially dangerous activity to others (e.g. pedestrians) but we do 
not ban driving on the basis that it might harm others.   
 
6.2. Potentially Unfair and Discriminatory 
Punitive approaches that single out women and more specifically, pregnant women 
for punishment is potentially unfair and discriminatory, hence contrary to the common 
dictates of justice. It would be unfair to single out prenatal alcohol exposure through 
maternal drinking for punishment, when many other harmful substances and 
behaviours are not punishable. For example we might inquire about the father’s 
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drinking habits (Gearing, McNeill & Lozier 2005; Hye Jeong, et al. 2013)
23
 or 
woman’s family life, since these have also been found to impact fetal health. 
Moreover, since it is not ordinarily permitted to require substance abusing non-
criminals to enter treatment or rehabilitation programmes, it is “reasonable to assert 
that there must be a compelling state interest to warrant a change in the rules with 
regard to pregnant women” (Mathieu 1991).  
Iris Young (1994) and Dorothy Roberts (1990) point out that the targeting of women 
drug users for particular surveillance and policies raise questions not only about 
sexism but also racism implicit in such policies. Where they have been imposed, 
“criminal sanctions against pregnant women” have typically been “applied 
unequally”, resulting in mostly poor black “women bearing the brunt of suspicion and 
prosecution” (Armstrong 2005). To avoid charges of unfair discrimination, punitive 
sanctions would have to extend equally to any other person whose behaviour is 
harmful to the fetus and future child.   
 
6.3. Consequences for Medical Professionals’ Relationships with Patients and 
Patients’ Access to Health Care 
The threat of criminal punishment will foster a climate of fear and mistrust between 
medical professionals and patients, thus placing the health of both woman and child at 
greater risk (Hackler 2011). “If women perceive that health care is entangled with the 
criminal justice system”, they are likely to avoid seeking prenatal care (Armstrong 
2005, Hackler 2011).  
Early identification and intervention can assist affected children so that they may lead 
relatively normal lives however a particular concern about criminal approaches relates 
                                      
23
 Paternal alcohol use has for example been found to alter a man’s sperm (Bielawski & Abel 1997; 
Strickland 1996) and impact infant birth weight (Little & Sing 1987). 
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to its reliance on the identification and reporting of women who either are at risk for 
having a FAS baby or who have already given birth to a FAS baby. In a sense it 
presupposes the involvement of medical professionals, and places them in a policing 
role, which may have detrimental effects on their relationships with patients (DeVille 
& Kopelman 1998; Larson 1991; Mulvey, et al. 1987).  
Medical professionals might lose their treatment function and instead degenerate into 
social monitoring functions if they have to screen, identify and report pregnant 
women who use alcohol (Mulvey, et al. 1987). Mandatory screening and testing of 
children, even for their own sake will, additionally, have the effect of inadvertently 
exposing mothers who drank during pregnancy, hence compromises her right to 
privacy (Young, et al. 2009). Compulsory screening and testing implies that the 
doctrine of informed, voluntary consent, which applies to all competent patients, can 
be encroached in the case of alcohol-abusing pregnant women (Arrigo 1992; Chavkin 
1992; Mulvey, et al. 1987). Furthermore, there is little point in identifying women and 
children at risk if they do not have access to appropriate treatment and support 
services. A study by Skolnick (1990), found that “care provided in the framework of 
support, rather than judgment, can improve the outcome for drug-abusing pregnant 
women” (Young 1997:174-175). In this study, over 80% of pregnant addicts who 
tested positive for drug use agreed to counselling and a little over 60% of those in 
counselling discontinued their drug use (Skolnick 1990; Young 1994; 1997).  Because 
women who abuse alcohol and other substances are most at risk for having a child 
with FAS, it is crucial that prenatal care and other services are accessible to them in a 
supportive environment, so that the potentially harmful effects on pregnancy 
outcomes can be minimised, if not avoided.  
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6.4. Ineffective  
Underlying punitive approaches to prevent FAS, is the idea that women who are 
alcoholic will weigh the benefits of drinking against the costs of doing so (i.e. 
punishment) and will choose abstinence. But this is unreasonable because it assumes 
that it is entirely within her control to choose not to drink, “if she judges the costs to 
be too high” (Young 1994). It ignores the concept of alcoholism, which “implies a 
limitation on the free agency and thus responsibility of the woman” (Young 1994).  
There are paternalistic dangers in promoting a model of alcoholism that depicts the 
habitual drinker as completely irrational, unaware, or out of control. But there are 
equal dangers in denying the reality of alcohol dependence that is so ingrained in a 
person’s habits, their way of life and desires that make them somehow not responsible 
for their continuing use.  
Few people, if any, use drugs with the aim of becoming dependent or addicted. Many 
people believe that they can control their use and thus avoid addiction. And even 
when they may have a problem, they may refuse to admit to it. And even if they admit 
to it and desire abstinence, they may find it very hard to stop. So, even when medical 
recommendations during pregnancy are clear and definite some women may still have 
difficulty following them. There is little reason to think that they will be any different 
from the drunk driver who, despite its unlawful status and the risks involved, 
continues to drink and drive (Abel 1998). What Abel (1998) is suggesting is that 
punitive measures may be ineffective because the pregnant alcoholic woman is 
essentially an “alcoholic who is pregnant, rather than a pregnant woman who happens 
to become alcoholic during pregnancy”. 
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Although policymakers and legislators “may be motivated by an understandable 
desire to protect children”, but criminalising the woman’s conduct will not 
accomplish that goal (Armstrong 2005). As Elizabeth Armstrong correctly notes, 
punishing women “may feed a sense of social retribution” but it will neither prevent 
harm nor promote child welfare (Armstrong 2005). Women will be identified and 
punished long after prenatal harm may already have been done. Moreover, sentencing 
women to imprisonment will have the unintended effect of placing woman and child 
at additional and increased risk because they are likely to be exposed to violence, 
infectious diseases and other potentially stressful conditions.   
Providing treatment programmes on a voluntary basis and encouraging women to 
participate in them is a reasonable alternative to coercion because voluntary 
programmes can have the same outcomes with the use of less intrusive methods. 
Research suggests that “coerced patients often do as well as patients who have sought 
treatment voluntarily” (Mark 1988; Westermeyer 1989).  
 
6.5. The Status of the Fetus 
A final and significant reason for thinking that punitive approaches are inappropriate 
means to prevent FAS pertains to the ethically controversial status of the fetus. 
Punitive approaches imply that the fetus is a physically separate entity to that of its 
mother. However because of its unique situation, it is unlike a born child. It cannot be 
removed from the care of its alcohol abusing mother and it cannot be protected from 
harm in the same way that a born child can be.  For the state to protect fetuses and 
future children from harm it will literally have to invade the woman’s body.  
Currently in South Africa a fetus acquires legal personality, hence legal personhood 
only upon live birth. Given this reality, the state would be hard pressed to show why 
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any rights and interests of or obligations to a fetus – which effectively is a non-legal 
person – should take precedence over those of a live born person.    
 
Punitive approaches “run counter to the dictates of medical care, public health and 
rights” (Armstrong 2005). They fail to respect a woman’s rights to autonomy and 
bodily integrity and their status as citizens entitled to equal treatment and protection 
under the law. In addition their implementation and enforcement will require new or 
additional resources to be made available; something most societies can ill afford. 
Given the possible ineffectiveness and costs involved in punitive approaches, it seems 
irrational to adopt policies that seek to criminalise or punish woman’s conduct during 
pregnancy. An ethically appropriate and effective response to FAS prevention 
requires a coordinated multifaceted approach that does not penalise, but rather aims to 
assist women and children, through the provision of education, health care and access 
to treatment and support services. By integrating efforts within existing programmes, 
limited resources can be used more efficiently, thereby providing additional public 
health benefits. 
 
77. Effective Approaches to Prevent Maternal Drinking 
During Pregnancy and Consequently FAS 
 
Young, et al. (2009) identify four major periods when the state has an opportunity to 
intervene to prevent maternal drinking during pregnancy and consequently FAS. 
According to these writers, the state can intervene during the pre-pregnancy stage, 
during pregnancy, at birth and after birth. At the pre-pregnancy stage the state can 
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implement strategies such as placing warning labels on alcoholic beverages
24
, 
providing educational materials and conducting awareness campaigns on the effects 
of alcohol use during pregnancy. Pregnant women can be screened for alcohol use 
using validated tools such as the T-ACE and the TWEAK (Bradley, et al. 1998; CDC 
2009; Chang 2001), as part of routine care and those at risk be referred to treatment 
and related services. Young, et al. (2009), further insist that to reduce the risk for 
maternal drinking during pregnancy and FAS, and thus improve the “chances for a 
healthy birth outcome, there must be an effective link between screening and 
facilitating a woman’s access to necessary treatment and related support services” 
(Young, et al. 2009:25). Interventions that can be offered at or post-birth, include the 
early identification of or diagnoses of children so that mother and child can be 
connected to adequate treatment services (Young, et al. 2009). These services must, 
however, cater for the particular needs of women and children if they are to be 
successful (Armstrong 2005; Ashley, et al. 2003; Streissguth, et al. 2004). 
 
7.1. Effective Interventions for Alcoholism 
Dependence on alcohol and/or other drugs may impede an alcoholic’s efforts to 
abstain from alcohol. Alcohol dependence (or alcoholism as it is commonly known) is 
a clinical diagnosis that is regarded as distinct from the harmful use of alcohol.  
Multiple interacting factors – genetic, psycho-social and economic – increase an 
individual’s risk for alcoholism. Even if women alcoholics may have some sense of 
control over their decisions about drinking, a range of variables influence their risk for 
having a child with FAS. At the same time, we must acknowledge that alcoholism 
                                      
24
 Health warning labels have been shown to” raise awareness and reduce alcohol intake among light to 
moderate drinkers” (Fenaughty & MacKinnon 1993). In South Africa manufacturers of alcoholic 
beverages are legally required to place warning labels on their products in terms of the Regulations to 
the Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act (1972). 
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involves a biochemical process, where the alcoholic is seen as physiologically 
dependent, and often unable to (simply) quit without assistance. Wilson and Wilson 
(2013) identify the following approaches as among the most effective interventions to 
manage alcoholism as including a combination of strategies that can be offered as part 
of routine medical assessment. These are “brief interventions, motivational 
interviewing, social skills training, community reinforcement, self-change manuals, 
behavioural self- control training and pharmacology” (Wilson & Wilson 2013).   
Brief interventions have been shown to be effective in reducing alcohol use among 
women who drink and are not effective birth control (Bient, et al. 1993; Wilk, et al. 
1997; Whitlock, et al. 2004). Brief interventions are structured and time-limited 
(usually about 15 minutes) interventions, which aim to educate patients about alcohol 
use, screen drinking behaviour and detect problems and individuals at risk so that 
appropriate interventions can be made early.  
Motivational enhancement therapy (interviewing) is an evidence-based 
psychotherapeutic method that involves counselling aimed at creating awareness of 
the consequences of drinking and helping a person to think about making a change to 
their current circumstances, and to “identify potential change strategies and choose 
the most appropriate course of action” (Wilson & Wilson 2013).  
Community reinforcement approaches aim to achieve abstinence. Several 
“components are integrated in this approach – learning new coping behaviours, 
particularly those involving interpersonal communication, involving the family, work 
and social environment in the recovery process” (Wilson & Wilson 2013). 
“Social skills training is a treatment method that aims to discourage addictive 
behaviour, by showing the individual how to meet the demands of life without the use 
of substances” (Wilson & Wilson 2013). This relies on programmes that provide 
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people with, among other things, “training in anxiety management, problem solving 
skills, and job skills” (Wilson & Wilson 2013).  
Treatment and support services may be effective in both reducing the risk of prenatal 
alcohol exposure or its effects (Marwick 1989; Quinlivan & Evans 2005). However, 
many women have inadequate access to treatment and many may not seek treatment, 
promptly, if at all, for a host of reasons that have largely to do with their socio-
economic circumstances. For example, women in abusive relationships may fear 
possible repercussions; others may avoid seeking help because they fear 
stigmatisation and many may not because services are remote far or too costly to 
access. 
 
8. South African Policies Relevant to the Prevention of and 
Treatment for Substance Abuse  
 
A few policy documents contain the South African government’s response to drinking 
during pregnancy and FAS. This includes the Prevention of and Treatment for 
Substance Abuse Act (No. 70 of 2008), the National Drug Master Plan (Department of 
Social Development 2007), the National Human Genetics Policy Guidelines for the 
Management and Prevention of Genetic Disorders, Birth Defects and Disabilities 
(Department of Health 2001) and the Guidelines for Maternity Care in South Africa 
(Department of Health 2002).  
The Prevention of and Treatment for Substance Abuse Act (No. 70 of 2008) is the 
primary piece of legislation governing the prevention of and treatment for substance 
abuse in South Africa. Four central aims of the Act are “to provide for a 
comprehensive national response for combating substance abuse; mechanisms aimed 
at demand and harm reduction in relation to substance abuse through prevention, early 
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intervention, treatment and re-integration programmes; the committal of persons to 
and from treatment centres and for their treatment, rehabilitation and skills 
development in such treatment centres” and “to provide for the establishment of the 
Central Drug Authority”25 (section 2). For purposes of the Act the terms abuse 
substances, drugs and treatment are defined as follows. “Abuse means the sustained or 
sporadic excessive use of substances and includes any use of illicit substances and the 
unlawful use of substances” (section 1). “Substances mean chemical, psychoactive 
substances that are prone to be abused, including tobacco, alcohol, over the counter 
drugs, prescription drugs and substances defined in the Drugs and Drug Trafficking 
Act (No. 140 of 1992), or prescribed by the Minister” of Social Development “after 
consultation with the Medicines Control Council” (section 1). For purposes of the Act 
the term drugs has a similar meaning to that of substances (section 1). The Act defines 
treatment as “the provision of specialised social, psychological and medical services 
to service users and to persons affected by substance abuse with a view to addressing 
the social and health consequences associated therewith” (section 1).  
The Act obligates the Minister of Social Development together with other government 
departments and organs of state, to “take reasonable measures, within the scope of 
their line functions and available resources, to combat substance abuse through the 
development and coordination of interventions that fall into three broad categories, 
namely -.: 
(a) Demand reduction, which is concerned with services aimed at discouraging 
the abuse of substances by members of the public, 
                                      
25
 Major functions of the CDA include: advising the Minister of Social Development on matters 
pertaining to alcohol and drug abuse; developing a “National Drug Master Plan as a national strategy 
for managing the demand for and supply of illegal drugs in the country, and for facilitating an 
integrated approach to service delivery and the coordination of programmes on the management of the 
drug problem in all spheres of government and civil society” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008).  
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(b) Harm reduction, which for purposes of the Act is limited to the holistic 
treatment of service users and their families, and mitigating the social, 
psychological and health impact of substance abuse, and 
(c) Supply reduction, which refers to efforts aimed at stopping the production and 
distribution of illicit substances and associated crimes through law 
enforcement strategies as provided for in the applicable laws” (section 3).  
Together with these specified groups, the Minister of Social Development must 
“develop and implement comprehensive intersectoral strategies aimed at reducing the 
demand and harm caused by substance abuse. These strategies must include four 
categories of services, namely” prevention programmes, early identification 
programmes, treatment and rehabilitation programmes and aftercare and reintegration 
services (section 5). 
 
8.1. Prevention Programmes  
Prevention programmes aim “to prevent a person from using or continuing to use 
substances that may lead to abuse or result in dependence” and “provides for- 
(i) measures aimed at skills development for individuals, families and communities to 
enable them to enjoy a better quality of life; 
(ii) anticipatory actions to reduce the likelihood of undesirable conditions which may 
expose people to substance abuse, including information, communication and 
education of members of the public about the risks associated with substance abuse; 
(iii) proactive measures targeting individuals, families and communities to avoid the 
abuse of substances and to prevent persons from moving into higher levels of 
substance abuse; and 
(iv) the creation of opportunities for and promotion of healthy lifestyles” (section 5).  
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8.2. Early Intervention Programmes  
Early intervention programmes aim “to identify and treat potentially harmful 
substance use prior to the onset of overt symptoms associated with dependency” on 
substance, and provides for: 
(i) the identification of risky behaviour that is associated with and predisposes people 
to substance abuse; 
(ii) the detection of conditions such as poverty and other environmental factors that 
contribute to crime and the abuse of substances; 
(iii) diversion of service users to programmes that promote alternative lifestyles; 
(iv) programmes to interrupt progression of the abuse of substances, such as 
recreational drug use, to the higher levels of dependence through skills development 
and developmental socio-therapeutic interventions; and 
(v) referral to treatment programmes, where appropriate, to reduce the social, health 
and economic consequences for service users” (section 5). 
The Act obligates the Minister to “facilitate the establishment of community-based 
services with special emphasis on under-serviced areas” (section 13). The Act defines 
“community based services as services provided to persons who abuse or are 
dependent on substances and to persons affected by substance abuse while remaining 
within their families and communities” (section 1). In terms of the Act, “community-
based services must: 
(i) include community-based treatment programmes;   
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(ii) establish or utilise existing facilities and infrastructure, including primary health 
care centres to provide integrated community based treatment programmes; 
(iii) consist of a multidisciplinary team consisting of a social worker, professional 
nurse and any other mental health practitioner registered with the relevant statutory 
body; 
(iv) provide professional and lay support within the home environment; 
(v) establish recreational, cultural and sports activities to divert young people from 
substance abuse; and 
(vi) provide for support groups for service users and those affected by substance 
abuse” (section 13). 
 
8.3. Treatment and Rehabilitation Programmes  
In terms of the Act, treatment and rehabilitation programmes include:  
“(i) medical interventions that address the physiological and psychiatric needs of the 
service user; 
(ii) psycho-social programmes that address the relationships, emotions, feelings, 
attitudes, beliefs, thoughts and behaviour patterns of service users; 
(iii) provision of interventions that target the environmental factors in the space of the 
service user, including the family and community; and  
(iv) the preparation of service users for reintegration into society through 
developmental programmes, including skills development; and after care and 
reintegration services” (section 5). 
The Act further requires that the Minister, in consultation with others, “establish, 
maintain and manage at least one public treatment centre” that offers in-patient and 
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out-patient treatment,
26
 in each of South Africa’s nine provinces “for the reception, 
treatment, rehabilitation
27
 and skills development of users” (section 17). The Act 
furthermore obligates the Minister to establish, maintain and manage halfway homes, 
which may be private or public, “to provide a sober living environment for service 
users who have completed a formal treatment programme for substance abuse and 
require a protected living environment in order to prepare them for reintegration into 
society” (section 1).   
In terms of the Act, a person may be admitted voluntarily or involuntarily to a 
treatment centre. An admission is voluntary when a person or any other person acting 
on that person’s behalf applies for admission to a treatment centre (section 32). An 
involuntary user is someone “who has been admitted to a treatment centre upon being 
convicted of an offence and has in addition or in lieu of any sentence in respect of 
such offence been committed to a treatment centre or community based treatment 
service by a court; committed to an in-patient treatment centre by way of a court order 
after such court has held an enquiry; or transferred from a prison, child and youth care 
centre, alternative care or health establishment, for treatment of and rehabilitation for 
substances” (section 1).  
In terms of the Act, a voluntary service user “is entitled to appropriate treatment, 
rehabilitation and skills development services” (section 32). The Act obligates the 
Department of Health to “provide detoxification services and health care 
requirements” to those using public health establishments (section 32). Detoxification 
                                      
26
 The Act defines “in-patient service” as meaning “a residential treatment service provided at a 
treatment centre” and “out-patient as meaning a non-residential service provided by a treatment centre 
or halfway house to persons who abuse substances and to persons affected by substance abuse and 
which is managed for the purposes of providing a holistic treatment service” (section 1). 
27
 Rehabilitation is defined in the Act as “a process by which a service user is enabled to reach and 
maintain his or her own optimal physical, psychological, intellectual, mental, psychiatric or social 
functional levels, and includes measures to restore functions or compensate for the loss or absence of a 
function” (section 1).   
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is defined in the Act as “a medically supervised process by which physical withdrawal 
from a substance is managed through administration of individually prescribed 
medicines by a medical practitioner in a health establishment, including a treatment 
centre authorised to provide such a service under the National Health Act” (section 
1). 
Generally, “an involuntary service user, may not be provided with treatment, 
rehabilitation and skills development at a treatment centre unless a sworn statement is 
submitted to a public prosecutor by a social worker, community leader or person 
closely associated with such a person, alleging that the involuntary service user is 
within the area of jurisdiction of the magistrate’s court to which such prosecutor is 
attached and is a person who is dependent on substances and— 
(i) is a danger to himself or herself or to the immediate environment or causes a major 
public health risk; 
(ii) in any other manner does harm to his or her own welfare or the welfare of his or 
her family and others; or 
(iii) commits a criminal act to sustain his or her dependence on substances” (section 
33).  
In terms of the Act, a “court convicting a person of any offence may in addition or in 
lieu of any sentence in respect of such offence order that such person be committed to 
a treatment centre” (section 36). However, “such an order may not be made in 
addition to any sentence of imprisonment, whether direct or as an alternative to a fine, 
unless the operation of the whole sentence is suspended” (section 36). 
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8.4. Aftercare and Reintegration Services  
Aftercare and reintegration services aim to successfully reintegrate a “service user 
into society, the workforce and family and community life” (section 5). The Act 
defines aftercare as meaning ongoing “professional support to a service user after a 
formal treatment episode has ended in order to enable him or her to maintain sobriety 
or abstinence, personal growth and to enhance self-reliance and proper social 
functioning” (section 1). In terms of the Act, aftercare and reintegration programmes 
must “provide for - 
(i) integration of people who have undergone the formal treatment episode into their 
families and communities; 
(ii) individuals to be equipped with additional skills to maintain their treatment gains, 
sobriety and avoid relapse; 
(iii) establishment of mutual support groups to enhance their self-reliance and optimal 
social functioning; and 
(iv) link between service users and resources for their further development and well-
being” (section 5).  
The Act encourages the establishment of support groups, “at community level by a 
professional, non-governmental organisation or a group of service users or persons 
affected by substances abuse, that focus on integrated ongoing support to service users 
in their recovery” (section 31).  
In keeping with the provisions of the Prevention of and Treatment for Substance 
Abuse Act, the National Drug Master Plan (NDMP) aims to bring about the reduction 
of substance abuse and its related harmful consequences, and recognises that in order 
to do this effectively, there must be a balance between actions, which bring about a 
decrease in the availability of drugs (through control and enforcement), and, the 
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demand for drugs (through prevention, treatment and rehabilitation) (Department of 
Social Development 2007). “It outlines the role that each department should play in 
fighting abuse” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008), particularly among young women of 
reproductive age, and mentions teenage pregnancy, FAS, STIs and HIV/AIDS as 
areas of special concern.  
A central aim of the of the Prevention of and Treatment for Substance Abuse Act 
(2008) and the NDMP, is to ensure access to services for those most directly affected 
by substance abuse, however, treatment facilities typically situated only in major 
metropolitan areas and none appear to provide services for specifically pregnant who 
abuse alcohol or other drugs (Ovens 2009). A report issued by the Alcohol and Drug 
Abuse Research Unit found treatment services to be particularly inaccessible for 
young, poor and black South Africans and recommended that the existing treatment 
services “revise their admission criteria to ensure that” they are accessible to black 
clients (Alcohol and Drug Abuse Research Unit 2005). The report further 
recommends “an increase in state funding for services to allow for the treatment” of 
indigent persons (Alcohol and Drug Abuse Research Unit 2005).   
 
9. South African Policies Relevant to the Prevention FAS  
 
In accordance with the Guidelines for Maternity Care in South Africa, the use of 
maternal alcohol, tobacco and other substances should be explored as part of history 
taking (Department of Health 2002). Other than the NDMP, the Human Genetics 
Policy Guidelines for the Management and Prevention of Genetic Disorders and Birth 
Defects (Department of Health 2001) appears to be the only other policy document 
that specifically mentions FAS as a national priority condition (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 
2008). The “guidelines list the following three key interventions for FAS: 
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 Educate all women  regarding the deleterious effects of alcohol on the fetus, 
 Educate all women to avoid alcohol throughout pregnancy,  
 Offer early detection of FAS, with appropriate referral of affected individuals and 
their parents for counseling and care” (Rendall-Mkosi, et al. 2008).  
The public policy documents discussed contain mechanisms that could have a 
significant impact on the harmful use of alcohol in South Africa. However, their level 
of success in meeting their objectives is hampered by a shortage of resources – 
financial or otherwise (Parry & Bennetts 1998). Moreover, when compared to some of 
the country’s other pressing problems e.g. crime, unemployment and HIV/AIDS, the 
harmful use of alcohol can appear almost secondary. Parry and Bennetts (1998) note 
that budgets for alcohol and drug abuse are typically included in broader categories 
such as welfare. There is little value in identifying women at risk, if we do not provide 
them with support services to assist them to abstain. By integrating prevention efforts 
within existing programmes, limited resources can be used more efficiently, thereby 
providing additional public health benefits.   
 
10. Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter sought to consider and evaluate punitive measures to prevent FAS. One 
way for the state to prevent FAS is by criminalising and punishing maternal drinking 
during pregnancy. However underlying such policy is an unrealistic expectation that 
women should do just about everything that they can that will benefit and not harm 
their fetuses. Punishing women for alcohol use during pregnancy would open the door 
to the placement of restrictions on a range of behaviours during and possibly even 
prior to pregnancy that could have the effect of paralysing them into inactivity and 
treating them as no more than fetal containers.   
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Other reasons for opposing punitive measures relate to the uncertainty principle, the 
potential for discrimination and relative ineffectiveness of such measures.  
Efforts to prevent maternal drinking and consequently protect future children from 
harm must seek to safeguard a woman’s health and well-being, as well as her 
autonomy and dignity. It must also recognize the myriad of factors that place a 
woman at risk for drinking during pregnancy and consequently having a FAS baby. 
Effective FAS prevention will thus require a coordinated interdisciplinary response 
that involves a range of interventions aimed at women, children and wider society. 
Interventions must address each of the determinants and risk factors that create and 
facilitate risk for maternal drinking during pregnancy. This includes access to 
adequate treatment for women at risk or who may be alcoholic, so that have a chance 
at abstinence or moderating alcohol use. As Elizabeth Armstrong (1005:46) correctly 
notes, “If we truly care about improving and protecting children’s well-being, we 
need to first care about women; whether they are mothers or not”.  
 
In addition, sexually active women who drink and may not be using contraception 
may find themselves pregnant unintentionally. Therefore we “need to continue to 
focus on the goals to reduce unintended pregnancy in all women, through the 
provision of safe and effective contraception, empowering women in their relations 
with men and ensuring access to safe and legal abortion so that women who 
experience an unwanted pregnancy are not faced with the unwelcome prospect of 
carrying it to term” (Armstrong 2005:47). Finally, we must improve the material 
circumstances of women’s lives, and see fetal and maternal interests as 
interconnected, rather than in oppositional terms, where the fetus is seen as a separate 
entity to that of the woman carrying it. “The simple fact is that healthy women make 
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healthy mothers make healthy babies… Moreover, most women are highly motivated 
to have good birth outcomes. It is time we recognize this powerful truth and provide 
all women with the means to achieve the goal of health for themselves and their 
children” (Armstrong 2005:47).  
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Chapter 6: Suing Mothers for Damages for Prenatal 
Harm: The Case for FAS 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter I set out to determine whether and if a child can and should be allowed 
to sue his or her mother for prenatal harm. I start off by defining what I mean by the 
term prenatal harm and the reasons why I believe that actions by children with FAS, 
who have been harmed prenatally through their mothers conduct, should be 
recognised. I show that although a fetus is not a legal subject in South Africa, this 
does not mean that a fetus has no value and that we cannot be held liable for causing 
prenatal harm. In terms of the South African law of delict, a successful delictual 
action can be instituted against anyone whose wrongful and culpable conduct causes 
harm to another person. I argue that although a child with fetal alcohol syndrome 
(FAS) can theoretically sue his or her mother for damages, there are several reasons 
for why this may not be an effective approach to prevent FAS in children. 
 
2. What are Claims for Prenatal Harm? 
 
Prenatal harm refers to cases where a wrongful act that occurs prior to a child’s birth, 
initiates a causal sequence that leads directly to harm the child (Matthieu 2007, 
Feinberg 1985; 1984). Joel Feinberg (cited in Matthieu 2007:21) illustrates a case of 
prenatal harm in the following example: “A negligent motorist who runs over a 
pregnant woman may cause damage to the fetus that causes it later to be born deformed 
or chronically ill. Sometime after birth that infant will have an active welfare interest in 
self-locomotion or health that may be harmed (doomed to defeat) right from the 
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beginning. The child comes into existence in a harmed state caused by the earlier 
negligence of a motorist whose act initiated the causal sequence, at a point before 
actual personhood, that later resulted in the harm. The motorist’s negligent driving 
made the actual person, who came into existence months later, worse off than she 
would otherwise have been. If the motorist had not been negligent, the child would 
have been undamaged”. Cases of prenatal harm can therefore be understood to refer to 
those harms that are caused before birth through another’s wrongful conduct. Actions 
for prenatal harm can be distinguished from wrongful life actions. The idea behind 
wrongful life actions is the controversial “claim that the child has been harmed by 
being born” (Steinbock & McClamrock 1994) and that his or her existence is such that 
never having been born would be a preferable condition (Feinberg 1986; Pearson 1997; 
Strauss 1996; Steinbock 1986). Wrongful life actions are usually brought against 
physicians, by or on behalf of a disabled child, for being brought into existence. 
Typically the claim is based on a physician’s negligent failure to diagnose his or her 
impairments prenatally or for failing to have informed the parents of the methods 
available to screen for fetal abnormalities. “The child argues that "but for 
the inadequate advice, it would not have been born to experience the pain and suffering 
attributable to the deformity” (Shandell, Smith & Schulman 2006). 
The child therefore claims compensation for being born into an unwanted or 
miserable life. On the other hand prenatal harm claims are for compensation for what 
one can term ‘wrongful disability’. The issue then is not about whether the “child 
would be better off dead” (Steinbock & McClamrock 1994) but rather whether the 
child can sue for having to live with permanent or severe disability. On this 
understanding, fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) is a prenatally inflicted harm caused by 
maternal drinking during pregnancy that affects the born child.  
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3. Reasons for Recognising Claims for Prenatal Harm 
 
There are several reasons, which relate largely to notions of fairness and equality, for 
recognising actions for prenatal harm of a child. One reason is that it is largely 
immune to the charge of unfair discrimination, which typically bedevils approaches 
that focus almost exclusively on controlling a woman’s behaviour during pregnancy 
or that seek to punish only her. Actions for prenatal harm can be brought by anyone, 
including fathers. Although this dissertation focuses on women and their role in 
prenatal harm, men’s behaviours and characteristics too can cause prenatal harm. For 
example, paternal smoking and drinking can result in fetal harm and birth defects 
because of abnormal sperm (Cicero 1994; Jensen, et al. 2005; Hye Jeong, et al. 2013). 
Claims for prenatal harm also avoids at least some of the negative consequences such 
as stigmatisation from having a criminal record and separation from the child due to 
imprisonment that come with policies that criminalise a woman‘s conduct during 
pregnancy. Moreover a policy of allowing a child to sue for prenatal harm is fair to 
the child in that it seeks to provide compensation to the child for living in the harmed 
condition, that was caused by someone else’s wrongful conduct.  
South African courts already recognise delictual claims by parents against third 
parties whose wrongful conduct caused them harm in some way. Specifically the 
courts have recognised actions for wrongful pregnancy (or conception) and wrongful 
birth but have been reluctant to award damages for wrongful life actions
28
.   
Wrongful pregnancy refers to cases where a healthy but unplanned (and therefore in a 
sense unwanted) child is born following negligent sterilisation or abortion procedure 
or contraceptive advice by a physician (Pearson 1997; Strauss 1996). In wrongful 
                                      
28
 See for example Friedman v Glicksman (1996) and Stewart & Another v Botha & Another (2008).  
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pregnancy parents claim compensation from physicians for the maintenance costs of 
rearing a child they did not plan to have. In wrongful birth the parents claim 
compensation, usually from physicians, for the costs of being burdened with a 
disabled child; something that they claim could have been avoided had they been 
adequately and properly informed of genetic testing, test results or fetal abnormalities 
(Pearson 1997; Strauss 1996). In wrongful birth claims, the issue is not that the 
parents do not want or did not plan to have the child, but rather that they did not want 
a disabled one. In both wrongful pregnancy and wrongful birth actions, wrongful 
conduct consists of the prior breach of delict (or contract) which led to the birth of the 
child and the harm.  
A claim for wrongful life was for the first time seriously considered in the case of 
Stewart & Another v Botha & Another (2008). “The Stewart case was an action 
against various medical practitioners whom the mother had consulted with during her 
pregnancy. The basis of the claim was on the failure of the medical practitioners to 
inform the parents of the child’s abnormalities that the child presented while still a 
fetus. The parents of the child further alleged that had the medical practitioners 
informed them of these abnormalities, the mother would have terminated the 
pregnancy and the child would not have been born and suffered from these 
abnormalities. The mother of the child sued in her personal capacity for damages 
relating to the maintenance, special schooling and past and future medical expenses. 
The child, represented by the father, brought an alternative claim for the pain and 
suffering, loss of earnings etc. In essence, the parents sued for both wrongful birth and 
wrongful life. The medical practitioners argued that there was, in law, no duty on 
them to ensure that the child was not born and that any claim that recognises such a 
duty would be contrary to public policy and good morals” (Norton Rose Fulbright 
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2010). The court awarded damages to the parents for the wrongful birth claim, but 
refused to do the same for the wrongful life claim on the basis of policy 
considerations, in particular the controversy of defining birth or existence as a harm 
and the difficulty of assessing damages for having been born. The court held because 
the questions raised in wrongful life claims went “so deeply to the heart of what it is 
to be human, that it should not be asked of the law” (Norton Rose Fulbright 2010). It 
held that allowing a wrongful life claim would require the court to evaluate and attach 
a financial value to the existence of a child against non-existence. It further pointed to 
the negative consequences of recognising such claims in law. It held that allowing 
wrongful life claims would open the door to claims by children against their mothers 
in circumstances where she was informed but chose not to terminate the pregnancy, 
and this could give rise to a situation where medical professionals become overly 
cautious and advise abortion to avoid possible liability (Norton Rose Fulbright 2010). 
Although the courts did not recognise the wrongful life claim in this case, it is worth 
noting the court’s reasoning for not doing so.  The difficulty for the court seems to be 
based on the possible consequences of recognising wrongful life actions and in 
deciding on how to quantify damages rather than law per se.  
It seems reasonable to think that if parents can sue others for harm arising from 
wrongful conduct that children, themselves, should also be allowed to do so against 
those who wrongfully harm them. Moreover, although the fetus is not regarded as a 
legal subject under South African law, this does not mean that the law does not seek 
to protect or promote the interests of fetuses. 
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4. The Application of the Nasciturus Fiction to Promote or 
Protect Fetal Interests 
 
Currently, in South Africa, legal personality begins at birth, however, the nasciturus 
fiction is a fiction employed to protect the potential interests of an unborn child, and, 
in terms of which an unborn child can be considered born if it will be to the child’s 
advantage. The result of the application of the nasciturus fiction is therefore that the 
unborn child’s interests are kept in abeyance until birth when it becomes a legal 
subject (person).  
The nasciturus fiction has been applied in the law of succession and in maintenance 
law. For example, in ex Parte Boedel Steenkamp (1962), the court ruled that the 
grandchild who was conceived but not born at the time of the grandfather’s death 
could inherit from his estate (unless specifically excluded from inheritance).  
The nasciturus fiction has also been successfully used to claim maintenance from a 
third party after the child’s birth. In Chisholm v East Rand Proprietary Mines (1909), 
the court recognised a claim for damages against the employer of the child’s father 
after he was killed as a result of a colleague’s negligence. The court held that the child 
is entitled to claim loss of support even though the child was not born at the time of 
the father’s death. 
The question of whether a disabled child who was harmed in utero as a result of a 
blameworthy act of a third party should have an action for damages arose in the case 
of Pinchin v Santam Insurance Company Limited (1963). In this case a pregnant 
woman was seriously injured in a motor vehicle crash and her child was subsequently 
born with cerebral palsy - a permanent condition resulting in the child never being 
able to care for himself. In this case the court held that the principles of South African 
law are flexible enough to extend the nasciturus fiction to the field of delict, thus 
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permitting a child’s claim for damages for prenatal harm from a third party (Mankga 
2008). The court held that the South African law of delict does not require that the 
wrongful act and the harm caused by it occur simultaneously (i.e. “that an act and its 
consequences may be separated in time and space”) and that it is therefore 
unnecessary to invoke the nasciturus fiction in delict. It doesn’t matter that the harm 
caused by wrongful conduct in utero would only manifest itself at a later point, i.e. 
when the child is born, because it is the resulting child that suffers harm as a 
consequence and who has a delictual action. It is worth noting that in this case the 
father was unsuccessful in his action because it had not been proved that the brain 
damage had been caused by the accident. Causation, as will be shown, is a crucial 
aspect in establishing delict. If there is not a causal connection between harm and 
conduct the claim cannot succeed.   
The general finding in Pinchin’s case - that a child can have a claim for prenatal harm 
- was reiterated in Road Accident Fund v Mtati (2005). In this case, the father brought 
an action on behalf of his daughter against the Road Accident Fund for damages that 
arose as a result of a collision between a motor vehicle that was negligently driven by 
its driver and his wife, who was a pedestrian at the time of the accident (Mankga 
2008). His wife, who was pregnant with the child at the time of the accident, sustained 
serious bodily injuries, which resulted in the child being born brain damaged. 
Significantly, in this case the court found it both unacceptable and unjust to deny legal 
recourse to a child who was in utero at the time of the damage-causing event. The 
court was of the opinion that to deny a child an action in common law, would amount 
to the child having to go through life disabled through no fault of his own and with no 
legal recourse.  
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5. Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act and Fetal 
Interests 
 
Aside from the application of the nasciturus fiction, there are other instances where 
the law has sought to protect the interests of the unborn, even though it may not have 
legal rights prior to birth. For example it is clear that while the Choice on Termination 
of Pregnancy Act (No 92 of 1996) affords women the right to abortion that the right is 
qualified in several ways namely, in terms of when and how it can be done, for what 
reasons and by whom. One thing that the Act reveals is a gradual shift towards fetal 
protection as the fetus develops. After the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, certain 
conditions must be met before a woman can qualify for an abortion.  
These conditions imply that as the pregnancy progresses a woman’s freedom of 
choice or right to abortion becomes limited; even to the point that the decision must 
somehow be endorsed by a medical practitioner. The constraints to a woman’s right to 
abortion suggest that the right is not absolute thus that the state considers prenatal life 
an important value in society that sometimes may need to be balance with a woman’s 
autonomy or rights (Meyerson 1999).  
So far I have proposed that the principles of South African delict can and has 
accommodated the nasciturus fiction but that it is not necessary to invoke the fiction 
in delictual actions because the law of delict does not require that the wrongful act and 
the damage caused by it occur simultaneously. This suggests that a disabled child who 
was harmed as a consequence of another’s wrongful and culpable act while in utero 
can theoretically sue for damages provided that the elements of delict are established.  
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6. Overview of South African Law of Delict 
 
The law of delict sets out the broad principles or elements in terms of which a person 
who has suffered harm at the hands of another may claim compensation (Loubser & 
Midgley 2009). Delict has been defined in different yet shared ways. Neethling, et al 
(2006) define it as “an act of a person that in a wrongful and culpable way causes 
harm to another,” (Neethling, et al. 2006) whereas Van der Walt & Midgley (2005) 
define it as a wrongful and blameworthy conduct by a person which causes monetary 
loss, bodily injury, or injury to a personality interest of another person. And David 
McQuoid-Mason (2011) defines it as the breach of a general duty imposed by the law, 
and not one based on a contractual relationship between the parties.  
Delictual duties, then, are those duties owed to people generally and not to a particular 
group of people with whom we have contractual relationships. If one breaches a duty 
that one has voluntarily assumed then this is a breach of contract. Remedies for breach 
of contract are primarily directed at enforcement, fulfilment or execution of the 
contract, whereas delictual remedies are directed at compensation and not fulfilment. 
The basic delictual actions that can be instituted by a person who was legally wronged 
and who is able to satisfy the conditions of delict are the Aquilian action, the action 
iniuriarum and an action for pain and suffering (Breetzke n/d). The Aquilian action is 
a broad action with which both general and special patrimonial (monetary) damages, 
caused by culpable conduct can be claimed, whereas the actio iniuriarum is used to 
claim for intentional injury to one’s personality. The action for pain and suffering can 
be used where “the impairment of a person’s personality was caused by negligent 
conduct” (Breetzke n/d). The three possible actions that a plaintiff can institute against 
the defendant are not mutually exclusive, so people, who suffer different kinds of 
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harm at the same time, can simultaneously claim compensation under more than one 
action. 
 
7. Elements of Delict 
 
A person is legally wronged, if he or she can prove the following five required 
elements of a delict, which is, per definition, an unlawful act (Loubser & Midgley. 
2009; Neethling, Potgieter & Visser 2006; Van der Walt & Midgley 2005): 
(i) Conduct  
(ii) Wrongfulness  
(iii) Fault (blameworthiness)  
(iv) Causation  
(v) Harm  
 
7.1. Harm 
The purpose of a delictual action is to enable a plaintiff (aggrieved party) to claim 
compensation from the defendant (alleged wrongdoer) for the harm caused. Thus the 
plaintiff must prove that he or she suffered harm as a result of the defendant’s 
conduct. A plaintiff may claim for patrimonial (e.g. medical expenses) and non-
patrimonial damages (e.g. pain and suffering).  
 
7.2. Conduct 
The defendant’s conduct must have been voluntary; it must not have been coerced or 
be the result of uncontrollable muscular actions, as in for example the case when a 
person having an epileptic fit may hit another person. Delictual conduct includes 
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positive actions (commissions) or actions by omission (i.e. a failure to do or say 
something) and statements.  
 
7.3. Wrongfulness 
There are two aspects to wrongfulness: (i) the act must have caused the harmful result, 
and (ii) the act must have taken place in a legally reprehensible or unreasonable 
manner. If a harmful result did not occur then the act is not wrongful. Thus not all 
harms are per se wrongful in the sense that it will incur liability in law. In order to 
succeed with a delictual action, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant infringed 
upon his or her subjective right(s) or failed to adhere to a legal duty.  A subjective 
right is a protectable interest which a legal subject (e.g. a person) has. If one has a 
valid defence e.g. consent, self-defence, provocation or necessity, then one’s 
behaviour is not wrongful.  
In the case of omissions, liability arises only in special circumstances (Loubser & 
Midgley. 2009; Neethling, Potgieter & Visser 2006; Van der Walt & Midgley 2005), 
if one had a duty to prevent harm to the plaintiff.
29
 This means that “a legal duty rests 
on the wrongdoer, to prevent the potential danger from becoming a real danger” 
(Breetzke n/d). A failure to fulfil this duty constitutes loss or damage to another 
person. The generally accepted omissions which give rise to delictual liability include 
instances where:  
(i)  One “creates a potentially dangerous situation and fails to remove the danger” 
and it “results in loss or damage being caused” (Breetzke n/d). 
(ii)  One fails to exercise control over a potentially dangerous object or animal.  
                                      
29
 For example it would be wrong for a lifeguard tasked with saving people from drowning to not 
attempt a rescue, whereas there may be no duty on an ordinary person to attempt a rescue of a 
drowning stranger.  
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(i) “Positive action” is “required by statutory provision” (Breetzke n/d). 
(ii) A “special relationship” “exists between the parties” (Breetzke n/d). 
(iii) The harm is foreseeable (Loubser & Midgley. 2009; Neethling, Potgieter & 
Visser 2006; Van der Walt & Midgley 2005). 
A general “duty of care may be considered a formalisation of the social contract, the 
implicit responsibilities held by individuals towards others within society”. To 
establish wrongfulness, the plaintiff must show that a duty of care exists and that the 
duty was breached. A breach of duty exists only if the defendant failed to act as a 
reasonable man would have done under the particular set of circumstances.  
 
7.4. Causation 
For a delictual action to be successfully established it is also necessary to prove a 
causal link between the wrongful action and the harm suffered. If this link is missing 
then the defendant cannot be held delictually liable.
30
 Law differentiates between 
factual causation and legal causation. Legal causation presupposes factual causation 
so it is necessary to first prove factual causation. Factual causation is proved by a 
demonstration that the wrongful and culpable conduct was a cause of the harm 
(Minister of Police v Skosana 1977). This is also known as the “but-for” test. In terms 
of this test, “If the wrongful conduct is take out of the equation, and the result also 
falls away”, then a factual causal nexus/link exists between the act and the result” 
(Breetzke n/d). A successful demonstration of factual causation is however not 
necessarily enough to result in legal liability. Legal causation must also be proved. 
“Legal causation seeks to limit the consequences of the unlawful act to what can be 
                                      
30
 See for example Mtati’s case, discussed above. 
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regarded as reasonable” (Breetzke n/d). This means that the wrongful and culpable 
conduct must be linked sufficiently close to the harm for delictual liability to ensue.   
 
7.5. Fault 
In order to establish a successful delictual action, the plaintiff must also prove that the 
wrongful conduct is blameworthy (culpable), in other words “that the person who 
committed the wrongdoing can legally be blamed for his conduct” (Breetzke n/d). 
This requires that he “possess the necessary mental capacity to distinguish between 
right and wrong and be able to act accordingly. A subjective test is applied each time, 
in that each case is judged on its own facts and merits, and each person’s abilities are 
judged in order to determine whether he” or she “can legally be blamed for the 
conduct” (Breetzke n/d). Fault can take one of two forms, viz. intent or negligence.  
 
7.5.1. Intent 
Intention concerns the defendant’s state of mind. Conduct is intentional if a person 
directs his or her will at achieving a particular result while being aware of the 
wrongfulness of the conduct. This means that one must both intend to injure and know 
that it is wrongful (Maisel v Van Naeren 1960). Intention is different to motive. 
Whereas intention concerns how the act was performed, motive concerns one’s 
reasons for acting, in other words why the act was performed. Intention may take one 
of three forms: 
 “Dolus directus, where the wrongdoer directed his will at achieving a 
particular result; 
 Dolus indirectus, where the wrongdoer proceeds to act, despite being aware of 
or sure of the fact that a certain consequence will invariably follow;  
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 Dolus eventualis, where the wrongdoer foresees the possibility that a certain 
consequence might follow, but proceeds to act in spite of this” (Breetzke n/d). 
There are several defences that exclude intent, including if the person is a youth or is 
emotionally and intellectually immature (Weber v Santam Insurance Co 1983), suffers 
from mental disease or illness (S v Campher 1987) or is ignorant (Maisel v Van 
Naeren 1960). Consent (Jordan v Delarey 1958), self-defence (S v Van Wyk 1967), 
provocation and necessity (S v Pretorius 1975; Stoffberg v Elliot 1923) are additional 
factors that may exclude one from liability.  
 
7.5.2. Negligence 
Not all wrongful conduct is intentional. “Where a person’s conduct does not conform 
to the standard of conduct which could legally be expected of him in those specific 
circumstances, his conduct is negligent” (Breetzke n/d). In order to prove that the 
defendant acted negligently, the aggrieved party must establish that the defendant 
acted differently from how a reasonable or average person would have in the same set 
of circumstances. It must be shown that the reasonable person would have foreseen 
that the behaviour risks harming others and subsequently have taken steps to prevent 
the harm from materialising (Kruger v Coetzee 1966; Lomagundi Sheetmetal and 
Engineering v Basson 1973) or at least seek to minimize it.  
The idea behind negligence is that people should exercise a reasonable standard of 
care when they act. “Conduct can only be negligent if it is certain that the reasonable 
person would have acted differently in the same set of circumstances” (Breetzke n/d).  
This means that people should foresee the likely consequences of their actions for 
others and avoid those which are unreasonably harmful to them.   The requirement to 
exercise reasonable care is an objective standard based on an average or reasonable 
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person. It does not require perfection on one’s part, or that one foresees every 
eventuality and prevents all kinds of risks to others. The duty to exercise reasonable 
care when acting is breached when someone who engages in conduct that poses an 
unreasonable risk toward others and/or their property that actually results in harm. 
Equally, a person who knowingly places others at a substantial risk of harm, which 
any reasonable person in the same situation would clearly have realised also breaches 
that duty of care.  
In certain cases a modified version of the reasonable person test is applied. This is 
because the ordinary application of reasonable person test might lead to unfairness. 
For some individuals and groups the reasonable man standard would be low and lead 
to situations where the wrongdoer is absolved of wrongdoing. This explains why we 
posit a higher standard for experts and expect the “to act with a greater degree of care 
and caution than the reasonable man” (Breetzke n/d).    
On the other hand, there are persons for whom the reasonable man standard is too 
high and demand extraordinary behaviour from ordinary people.  This explains why 
we generally treat mentally incompetent and not fully competent people differently 
and not hold them to the standard of the reasonable man as a rule. Generally, 
“children are tested according to the standards of the reasonable man, provided that 
the child has the required accountability and is able to distinguish between right and 
wrong and act in accordance with that knowledge” (Breetzke n/d ).  
 
8. Can Children with FAS Successfully Sue Their Mothers 
for Compensation?  
 
Given the above analysis of the elements of delict required for the successful 
establishment of a delictual action for prenatal harm, it seems theoretically possible 
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for a child with FAS, and to a lesser degree for its less severe forms, to sue his or her 
mother for damages31. The focus of this discussion will therefore relate primarily to 
FAS.  
Conduct is established if the woman voluntarily drank during pregnancy. Essentially 
voluntariness of choice and action is established if it can be shown that the woman 
had options from which to choose; that her decision to, and act of drinking was not 
forced on her. Typically, the influence of alcohol upon a person’s mental capacity 
may result in a temporary loss of active legal capacity (Van Metunger v Badenhorst 
1953); however, this exception does not seem applicable in the case of FAS. It is 
worth noting that under South African law, drunkenness is no excuse for driving a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Even though a drunk driver may 
not intend to kill a pedestrian on the drive home, when he or she does, they are still 
brought to justice. The law does not discriminate between its treatment of alcoholics 
and non-alcoholics. Alcoholism and drunkenness do not therefore seem to excuse a 
woman’s conduct from voluntariness because her initial decision to drink was 
voluntary, in the sense that she could still choose whether or not she will drink 
alcohol. A woman’s addiction to alcohol may make her decision reckless, and the 
decision to abstain difficult, but her decision to drink can still be voluntary because 
she could opt to act otherwise. Just as she is free to drink, so she is free to abstain. It 
seems absurd to claim that women can choose to drink based on respect for her 
autonomy (right to self-determination), but not to think that they are equally capable 
of choosing not to do so.  
                                      
31
 It must be borne in mind that some of the features used to diagnose ARBD (alcohol-related birth 
defects) and ARND (alcohol related neurological disorders) are not exclusive to prenatal alcohol 
exposure, as has been shown in Chapter 2. For these diagnoses it is less clear that prenatal alcohol 
exposure is a factual causal factor of the harm.   
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Concerning harm, the child exposed to alcohol prenatally can suffer a range of 
conditions; FAS being the most severe condition that result in a range of primary and 
secondary disabilities in the child. Although there is uncertainty about the exact 
timing, dosage and frequency of alcohol exposure that actually causes harm, and the 
fact that a range of variables influence the risk for FAS, FAS is entirely preventable if 
a woman abstain from alcohol if she plans to become or is pregnant and plans to 
continue the pregnancy. Precisely how much alcohol during pregnancy is unsafe is 
contentious, however given the uncertainty about any potential safe level of drinking 
during pregnancy it seems prudent for pregnant women who intend continuing a 
pregnancy to abstain in light of the risks. Prenatal alcohol exposure is a factual cause 
of FAS. But just like a gun can’t shoot by itself so alcohol cannot make people drink. 
People choose whether or not they will drink. If it can be proved that a woman was 
unreasonable in her decision to drink during pregnancy and that her wrongful conduct 
caused harm, then legal causation can be established.   
While it may be the case that many women are not aware of the dangers associated 
with drinking during pregnancy, information about the hazards of drinking during 
pregnancy is arguably generally available in South Africa, so there seems to be little 
good reason for thinking that women are ignorant or don’t know that drinking during 
pregnancy is potentially harmful to one’s child. In addition to general public health 
promotion efforts, mandatory warning labels on alcoholic beverages in South Africa 
serve to give consumers information about the risks of drinking during pregnancy.  
Nowadays, in terms of the Regulations to the Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants 
Act (1972), container labels for alcoholic drinks must contain one of seven health 
messages or warnings that includes one that reads “Drinking during pregnancy can be 
harmful to your unborn baby”. Moreover, in terms of the Guidelines for Maternity 
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Care in South Africa (Department of Health 2002), all health workers (not only 
midwives and obstetricians) who care for women in the reproductive age must 
identify women at risk of alcohol abuse or having a FAS baby and offer them 
counselling and refer pregnant women at risk for having a child with a birth defect or 
genetic disorder as early as possible in the pregnancy for counselling regarding 
management and the performance of prenatal tests.   
The right to terminate a pregnancy implies a right to choose to become pregnant and 
have a child. In South Africa women have a right to terminate a pregnancy, by 
implication one can infer a decision to continue a pregnancy as a commitment to a 
general duty of care towards her fetus and consequently future child. A special 
relationship exists between the pregnant woman and her fetus; they are uniquely 
intertwined; distinct yet also connected. A fetus is dependent on her for its continued 
existence, making it especially vulnerable. Whatever the woman does affects not only 
herself but also her fetus.  
When a woman chooses to continue a pregnancy, she is typically considered a 
prospective mother and her fetus, a future child; one likely to be born under normal 
circumstances. Generally the social expectation is that she behaves in ways that 
benefit a fetus; that she takes reasonable steps to promote and safeguard its interests 
from harm. As a prospective mother she is not just a pregnant woman but now one 
that stands in a special relationship with not just a fetus but her future child, to whom 
she has concomitant responsibilities.  
It is also worth noting that even though the decision to abstain from alcohol may be 
hard, a woman can seek help. Moreover, abstinence (the sacrifice she is required to 
make for the sake of her child) will be not be lifelong, only 9 months, after which time 
she can resume drinking. When considering the longer-term benefits and short-term 
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costs of abstinence, it seems that a reasonable woman would and should abstain. If 
she chooses to drink during pregnancy she arguably breaches her duty of care towards 
her fetus. Even though her intention may not be to harm her fetus (and child), but for 
example wanting to satisfy a desire to drink, she can still be found negligent, for 
choosing to do so and for not taking reasonable steps to prevent harm to her fetus.  
The above analysis suggests that a child who was exposed to alcohol prenatally and 
consequently born with FAS has suffered harm, in that he or she will have to go 
through life with physical and cognitive disability. The child has not only been 
harmed, he or she has also been wronged, because he or she was put into a disabling 
condition that was preventable and required only a reasonable and time-bound change 
in behaviour on the mother’s part. My view is therefore that a child with FAS can 
theoretically institute a delictual action against his or her mother.   
 
9. Should a Child with FAS Be Allowed to Sue Its Mother 
for Prenatal Harm? 
 
There are good reasons for recognising prenatal actions by a child with FAS. It seems 
both fair and reasonable, particularly in light of the fact that parents can claim 
damages from third parties for prenatal harm. However, there also reasons that 
undermine the effectiveness of this approach. While it makes sense to hold third 
parties liable for prenatal harm, holding the child’s mother legally responsible in this 
way does not obviously seem to resonate with our common sense conceptions of the 
mother-child relationship. Society does not expect mothers to do absolutely 
everything all the time to ensure that their unborn children are always benefitted and 
never harmed. Society understands that the duty of care require that she act as a 
reasonable mother would, as average people are thought to. No parent is required to 
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do absolutely everything for the sake of their children. Society recognises that they 
may have other, sometimes weightier duties such as duties to oneself or duties to 
others. For example a pregnant woman who has cancer may have to decide about 
whether to take treatment that will benefit her but is harmful to her fetus. Permitting 
prenatal actions against mothers has the effect of requiring women to always 
absolutely act in the interests of the fetus. Where she has to choose between her duties 
to herself or others and those to her fetus, she must choose those to her fetus.  This 
would however create an unreasonable burden on pregnant women, since even their 
most mundane actions could cause prenatal harm and render her delictually liable. 
Arguably, prenatal harm actions against mothers would infringe too much on her 
rights of privacy and bodily autonomy.  
Another reason why recognising prenatal actions against mothers is problematic was 
raised in Stewart’s case (2008). In this case the court held that recognising wrongful 
life claims would open the door to claims by children against their mothers in 
circumstances where she was informed of the abnormality but chose not to terminate 
the pregnancy. This situation, the court held, could give rise to a situation where 
medical practitioners become overly cautious and advise abortion to avoid possible 
liability. Equally, a pregnant woman who fears that her child could or may sue her for 
prenatal harm might choose instead to have an abortion.  
A final concern is more pragmatic in nature. Women at risk of having a child with 
FAS are typically poor. Even if a child lodged a successful claim, it is unlikely that 
the mother would be able to afford to pay damages. The actions are essentially empty 
if the child cannot be compensated. 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
223 
 
10. Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter sought to determine whether a child with FAS can generally sue his or 
her mother for prenatal harm. I offered reasons for why prenatal harm actions by a 
child can and should be recognised. Even though recognising and permitting such 
actions may be detrimental to the mother-child relationship, the concern seems 
misplaced, for as Mathieu (2007:141) notes, “it is not the legal system’s recognition 
of legitimate claims for compensation that creates difficulties within a family, but the 
other way around - that is, the existence of serious family strife leads one member to 
seek compensation from another through the courts.” Whether consequentialist 
considerations should outweigh considerations of fairness is debatable. To deny 
children who have been harmed prenatally a right to sue for damages would be to 
tantamount to unfair discrimination, because our law already recognizes prenatal harm 
claims as legitimate causes for legal action. Thus, denying a child who has been 
harmed prenatally a claim would be to deny him or her equal protection of the law.  
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Chapter 7 - Conclusion 
 
This dissertation focused on the topic of moral responsibility for prenatal harm. It set 
out to achieve several interrelated goals aimed at considering the moral responsibility 
of pregnant women and the state concerning FAS, as a paradigm case of preventable 
prenatal harm.   
The first two goals of the dissertation were to establish the moral implications of both 
becoming pregnant and choosing to carry a fetus to term and to establish the set of 
moral obligations that prospective mothers may have toward their future children.  
I propose that women choose to continue a pregnancy when they have the option of 
terminating their pregnancies and that they are prospective mothers when they do so, 
to distinguish them from pregnant women who choose to terminate their pregnancies.  
I argued that prospective mothers have prima facie moral obligations not to harm but 
to benefit their future children. I argued that a prospective mother’s right to do as she 
pleases is limited by the principle of parental responsibility, which posits an 
obligation on her to take into consideration, if not, act in the best interests of her 
future child. I suggest that this implies a responsibility on her to alter her lifestyle for 
the sake of her future child, but that this responsibility must often be balanced with 
her other obligations, and hence cannot be an absolute one that requires her to always 
prioritise the interests of her future child.   
I argued that women have a general obligation to stop drinking if they are pregnant 
and choose to continue it to term. I suggest that alcoholics can have moral 
responsibility and that alcoholism does not diminish one’s capacity for moral 
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responsibility, but that the duty to abstain from alcohol if one is pregnant cannot be an 
absolute one. To require women to refrain from all behaviours which is potentially 
harmful to their future children, would be unreasonable and unfair and essentially 
paralyse them into inactivity. Many related factors serve to complicate the 
establishment of a definitive link between drinking during pregnancy and FAS, and 
thus make it difficult to posit an absolute obligation on her to stop drinking. 
Moreover, it seems unreasonable to expect women alcoholics to simply abstain if they 
are pregnant. However, even though women do not have absolute obligations to 
prevent harm to future children, this does not mean that we cannot and do not still 
judge their behaviour to be (ir-) responsible.  
The third and fourth goals of the dissertation were to investigate society’s interest in 
the issue of FAS and how it ought to be protected and/or enforced. I argue that, even 
though women have general obligations to prevent FAS in their future children, they 
cannot be held solely responsible. FAS does not come into existence, nor does it 
thrive, in a social vacuum. FAS can be seen as a social disease with roots in social 
practices and beliefs that are morally deeply problematic. Many factors that influence 
a woman’s decision to drink have to do with her psycho-social and economic 
circumstances, including alcohol’s widespread availability and social acceptability, 
suggesting a social responsibility for FAS. In an attempt to show society’s interest and 
justify a social response, I offered evidence of the social and economic impact of 
maternal drinking and FAS. I then considered what an ethically appropriate social 
response to prevent FAS would entail. In so doing I evaluated the morality of policies 
that aim to punish women who drink during pregnancy, in an effort to prevent FAS. I 
argue that policies that criminalise a woman’s conduct during pregnancy are 
unjustified and likely to be ineffective. I propose interventions that may constitute an 
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ethical social response to FAS prevention and consider some of the relevant policies 
in South Africa that deal with drinking during pregnancy, alcohol abuse and FAS.  
The fifth and final goal of the dissertation was to establish if and whether children 
with FAS can and should be allowed to institute delictual actions for prenatal harm 
against their mothers. Following reflection on common law on the status of the fetus, 
provisions of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act (1996) and the principles 
of delict under South African law, I argue that children can theoretically sue their 
mothers and that they should be allowed to do so, but that even this may not be an 
effective approach to FAS prevention.  
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